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DEREGULATING RELEVANCY IN INTERNET TRADEMARK
LAW
Jane, a 10th grader, is writing a report on ancient Greek religious
figures for her classical history class. She enters the word "Nike"
into the Google search engine in an attempt to find source material
for her report.
However, she only ·finds product information
regarding footwear and clothing from Nike, Inc., because Google has
removed other content due to liability concerns. Out of frustration,
Jane abandons her Internet search and turns to the next most
convenient free resource, her school library. Unbeknownst to Jane,
her school library's acquisition director is personally interested in
Roman mythology but finds Greek mythology boring. As a result,
Jane only finds a few books briefly discussing her subject.
John is a rock climbing enthusiast with a penchant for the latest
gear. He has heard rumors about the.new Reebok "Hilltopper 483,"
an advanced technology shoe for rock climbing intended to directly
compete with the just-released Nike "Swooshtown 96" model. He
would like to educate himself about each model to decide if he wants
to purchase the newest, hottest rock climbing footwear. He searches
for "Reebok Hilltopper 483" in Yahoo Search but this only leads him
to the official website of Reebok, Ltd. and its authorized distributors.
These sites have some information about Reebok shoes but no
neutral or comparative information. Frustrated by his inability to
find the information he wants, John decides not to buy new shoes
from either Reebok or Nike.
These two scenarios illustrate how trademark law could jeopardize the
Internet's potential as a n infonnation resource and a catalyst for competition.
Emerging tr ademark law doctrines have allowed trademark owners to excise
socially beneficial content and to take unprecedented control over their
channels of distribution.

Without limits, trademark law has the capacity to

counterproductively destroy the Internet's utility for everyone.
It does not have to be this way. Trademark law's assault on the Internet is
predicated on a series of factual myths and doctrinal errors. The cliched story
assumes that predatory marketers steal customers' attention away from
'
trademark owners using surreptitiously dishonest means. Under this story, it

1 See, e.g., Scott Shipman, Comment, Trademark and Unfair Competition in Cyberspace: Can These
Laws Deter "Baiting" Practices on Web Sites?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 245, 246-47 (1998).
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is argued that trademark law needs to protect trademark owners and searchers
by ensuring that Internet searchers see only content approved by the trademark
owner.
This cliche, and its supporting academic commentary, have developed from
intuition based assumptions about searcher behavior that contradict the
empirical data about how searchers actually search. This Article corrects those
mistakes by basing its analysis on what information scientists know about
Internet search behavior.
By examining how people search for information on the Internet, it
becomes clear that Internet search providers compete fiercely with each other
to help Internet searchers find the content they want. To do so, search
providers must discern searchers' true objectives from opaque and poorly
chosen search keywords delivered without any surrounding context. This
requires search providers to choose what content to present to searchers,
putting publishers trying to reach those searchers at the mercy of the search
engme.
Using

the facts presented by the Article, it becomes possible to develop an
Internet trademark policy from the ground up. To increase the odds of
efficient and successful searches, searchers should be able to pick the search
terms they want, and search providers should be able to use those search terms
to deliver the most helpful content to searchers. Thus, trademark law must step
aside when searchers receive relevant content they may want.
In short, the introductory vignettes above may realistically preview the
current direction of Internet search.
However, with a more rigorous
understanding of both trademark law and Internet search, there is an
opportunity to preserve the Internet as a medium that helps searchers find what
they seek.
Part I of the Article provides a brief overview of the Internet search
process. Parts II-IV consider Internet search from three perspectives. Part II
considers Internet search from the searcher's perspective, concluding that one
cannot infer searchers' objectives from the keywords they choose. Part II
considers Internet search from the web publisher's perspective. Part IV
considers Internet search from the search provider's perspective, explaining
that search providers, not web publishers, decide what searchers see. Part IV
also explains that all Internet technologies are converging to use keywords to
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match searchers with content. Thus, historical distinctions between the domain
name system, directories, and search engines are collapsing.
Part

V summarizes trademark law and then provides a theoretical
framework to distinguish beneficial and misappropriative uses of trademarks.
The framework helps explain why trademark law doctrines like "initial interest
confusion" are misguided. Part VI offers three concrete solutions: (1) courts
should consider the search process stage where searchers see a trademark being
used; (2) the law should modernize the test used to determine consumer
confusion, most conspicuously by considering content relevancy in any
infringement analysis; and (3) search providers should have both common law
and statutory safe harbors. The Article concludes with a brief consideration of
how keyword-based search benefits society.
I.

A BRIEF PRIMER ON INTERNET SEARCH

Internet searchers have two primary means of conducting a keyword search
2
using keywords to express their interests: search engines and domain names.
3
Search engines allow a searcher to enter a keyword into a search box and
make a query against a database of content. The search engine may be a stand
alone database, like Google, or a functionality supporting some other business
objective, such as the search function at Staples's office supply website. Major
ecommerce websites like eBay and Amazon incorporate a broad variety of
third-party content into their search databases and depend heavily on users
conducting keyword searches, so they share a lot of common issues with stand
alone search engines like Google.
Stand-alone search engines build their databases in a variety of ways.
4
Commonly, a search engine uses automated robots to canvass the Internet for
content, which then make copies of pages they find and add those copies to the
database. 5 Alternatively, or in addition, some search engines allow publishers
to afatively upload content to the search engine which may be

2 These methods are converging into a single keyword-based search approach, a topic explored in Part
N.B infra.
3 For convenience, this Article refers to "keyword" in the singular. Keywords, however, can be
composed of multiword phrases, and this Article covers those phrases as well.
4 Search engine robots may also be called scripts, crawlers, or spiders.
5 See THOMAS A. POWELL, WEB DESIGN: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE 277-79 (2nd ed. 2002), available
at http://www.webdesignref.comlchapters/09/ch9-01.htm.
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incorporated, either automatically or after manual reVIew, directly into the
6
7
index. Databases can also be built manually.
The domain name system ("DNS") enables searchers to obtain content in at
least three ways. First, the searcher can guess that a word, when used as a
domain name, will lead to relevant content. Second, the searcher may already
know a desired domain name and can type it into the web browser address bar
directly. Third, if a searcher has already visited the web page, the searcher can
use bookmarks or the browser' s history to return to the page.
While search engines and the DNS represent the principal techniques for
engaging in keyword searches, there are other methods of presenting "search
like" content. For example, as an alternative to affirmatively entering a
keyword into a search box, searchers can navigate their way to content through
directories of editorially-organized links. Links can be graphics, pictures or
text, and the links can be laconic ("More") or very detailed ("Click Here to
Learn More About the Canon PowerShot S400 Digital Camera"). Often,
websites organize links into "taxonomies" that group related items into
8
hierarchies.
This Article refers to the process of navigating through a
directory of links as "link navigation." Unlike the other two search methods,
the directory organizer (instead of the searcher) selects the applicable
keywords that lead to more content. Part IV.B.2 revisits link navigation.

6 Feeds can contain the entire dataset incorporated into the index or a partial dataset that also instructs
the search engine how to obtain the remaining data automatically (such as through a robot that collects
information from a publisher's website in accordance with the instructions contained in the feed). See Google,
Froogle Beta Information for Merchants, at http://google.comlfrooglelmerchants.htmI(last visited Apr. I,
2(05).
7 Many associate manually built databases with Yahoo! and, to a lesser extent, LookSmart. However,
today Yahoo!, LookSmart, and other directories primarily rely upon publishers to submit feeds which are
manually evaluated (usually for a fee) before being added to the database. However, "pure" directories still
exist, the most prominent of which is the Open Directory Project("ODP"). See Open Directory Project, at
http://dmoz.org!(last visited Apr. I, 2(05).
8 Consider this hypothetical four level taxonomy that a searcher might use to find more information on
the Canon PowerShot S400 digital camera. The home page contains a text link called "Digital Cameras"
(Level 1 of the taxonomy). On the subsequent page (Level 2), the searcher sees a list of digital camera
manufacturers, including a text link called "Canon." On the subsequent page(Level 3), the searcher sees a list
of digital camera brands manufactured by Canon, including a text link called "PowerShot." On the final page
(Level 4), the searcher sees a list of different models of PowerShot-brand digital cameras, including the
"S400."
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II. INTERNET SEARCH FROM THE SEARCHER'S PERSPECTIVE
This Article takes complementary looks 'at the Internet search process from
three different perspectives: the searcher, the publisher, and the search
provider. This Part evaluates Internet search from the perspective of a searcher
looking for information.

A. The Complex Process of In ternet Search
Search processes are complex and defy simplistic analysis. Some searches
9
are very simple and directed; other searches are open-ended and meandering.
Thus, any attempt to describe a universal search process is inherently
misleading.
Nevertheless, Internet searches share sufficient commonalities to develop a
methodology that applies to many such searches. Specifically, all successful
Internet keyword-driven searches go through the following eight distinct
10
stages:
Stage 1: Objective Formulation
Stage 2: Search Provider Selection
Stage 3: Keyword Selection
Stage 4: Search
Stage 5: Results Evaluation
Stage 6: Decision
Stage 7: Investigation
Stage 8: Objective Satisfaction

9

6.2

LoUIS ROSENFELD & PETER MORVILE, INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE WORLD WIDE WEB

§

(1998), available at http://www.monkeytools.com!oreilly/webdesignlinfoarchlch06_02.htm (distinguishing

different types of search behavior, such

as

known-item searching, existence searching, exploratory searching

and comprehensive searching and research).
IO
Cf POWELL, supra note 5, at 276-77 (describing a four-stage search process, consisting of query
formulation, search, results review, and decision what to do).
When a searcher uses a software agent, this process may vary some because the searcher prospectively
delegates authority to the software agent to monitor behavior and interject content when the agent deems
appropriate. In these situations, the searcher is implicitly selecting a search provider at Stage 2 prior to having
an objective from Stage I.

.
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This process is depicted graphically as:
Figure 1
Objective
Formulation

Search
Provider
Selection

Keyword
Selection

Try new
search
provider

Try new
keyword

Search

Result
Evaluation

Abort

Consider
other
results

Decision

Investigation

Objective
Satisfaction

To better understand the search process, this subsection describes each
stage in more detail. While this discussion treats each stage as distinct and
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separate, a searcher may move from stage to stage very quickly, making the
search process appear seamless and integrated.

1. Stage 1: Objective Formulation
11

A searcher initiates a search by formulating a search objective.
Objectives may range from transacting goods or services, to obtaining
information to make a nontransaction decision (e.g., checking the weather to
decide if an umbrella is necessary before departing), to obtaining information
for general educational purposes (e.g., trying to remember the fIrst name of
Kramer from the Seinfeld TV show).
2.

Stage 2: Search Pro vider Selection

Once a search objective is formed, the searcher decides which search
provider to use for the search. This involves two separate but related inquiries:
(1) which search tool is most likely to yield the desired results (i.e., search
engine, DNS, or link navigation), and (2) which particular vendor is the best
2
choice for that search tool. 1
3.

Stage 3: Keyword Selection

Having formulated a search objective and selected a search provider, the
searcher picks a keyword that the searcher believes will elicit relevant
information. Before one can make any inferences about searchers' objectives
based on the keyword they use, it is important to understand how they choose
terms.
Unfortunately, searchers do a poor job selecting keywords. Searchers with
3
domain expertise on a topic generally do a better job selecting keywords,1 but
because searchers routinely have low domain expertise, searchers routinely
II

Although this Article contemplates that searchers pursue only a single search objective during a

search, some searchers "multi task," i.e., pursue multiple search objectives simultaneously.

et aI., Multitasking on Web Search Engines

12 See

See Amanda Spink

(draft on file with author).

RAHUL TELANG ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNET SEARCH ENGINE CHOICE (Darden

School of Business Working Paper No. 03-05, Sept. 2(01) (discussing the factors searchers use to choose
search providers).

1 3 See Giorgio Brajnik et aI., Strategic Help in User Interfaces for Information Retrieval, 53 J. AM.
SOC'Y INFO. SO. & TECH. 343, 344 (2002) (summarizing the literature showing that novice searchers use
simple and low efficacy techniques); Barbara M. Wildermuth, The Effects of Domain Knowledge on Search
Tactic Formulation, 55 J. AM. SOC'Y INFo. SCI. & TE CH. 246 (2004) (showing how researchers improved their
search process when they had better domain knowledge).
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choose keywords poorly.

Specifically, most searchers use no more than two
14
keywords in a keyword search,
and searchers almost never use advanced
15
search methodologies like Boolean logic or advanced searching functionality
16
offered by search providers.
4.

Stage 4: Search

With all of the preliminary decisions resolved, the searcher next conducts
the search and receives the search results. If the searcher uses a search engine,
the searcher may receive multiple search results. If the searcher uses the DNS,
the searcher is, in effect, taken directly to the search result.
5.

Stage 5: Results Evaluation

Regardless of the search method used, the searcher evaluates the content
provided in response to the search. This stage is crucial for both the searcher
and any legal judgments regarding the searcher's objectives.
The amount of information presented to a searcher following a search
varies with the search provider. Search engines almost always display some
amount of content previewing each website in the search results list.

This

Article refers to the previewing of content as "filtering content."
For

example,

Google

frequently

provides

a

substantial

amount

of

information for searchers to evaluate before they decide which search results to
explore further.

Search results in Google may display some or all of the
17
a web page title, an excerpt of the page, a
following filtering content:

14 See

iProspect.com,

Inc.,

iProspect Natural SEa Keyword Length Study (Nov. 2004), at

http://www.iprospect.comJpremiumPDFs/keyword_length_study.pdf(88% of search engine referrals are based
on only one or two keywords);

see also DecIan Butler,Souped- Up Search Engines, NATURE, May I I , 200, at

112, 115 (citing an NEC Research Institute study showing that up to 70% of searchers use only a single

keyword as a search term); Bernard J. Jansen et al., Real Life Information Retrieval: A Study of User Queries
on the Web, 32 SIGIR FORUM 5, 15 (1998) (average keyword length was 2.35 words; one-third of searches
used one keyword and 80% used three keywords or fewer); Jakob Nielsen, Search: Visible and Simple, at
http://www.useit.comJalertboxl2oo10513.html(May 13,2001)(average keyword length was 2.0 words).

1 5 Nielsen, supra note 14 ("Most users cannot use advanced search or Boolean query syntax."); Jansen,
supra note 14, at 15(only one in eighteen searchers used any Boolean functions).
16 Press Release, Vividence, Inc., Google Wins Users' Hearts, But Not Their Ad Clicks(May 25, 2004),
at http://www. vividence.comJpublic/company/news+and+events/press+releases/2004-05-25+ce+rankings+
search.htm("Although a majority of users expressed interest in advanced search options when asked, less than
3% actually used advanced search techniques in any given search task . . . . ").

1 7 Google, How To Interpret Your Search Results, at http://www.google.com!help/interpret.html (last

visited Apr. I , 2005).
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summary description of the website, the category into which the website has
been taxonomized in Google's directory, the web page's format (e.g., HTML,
18
PDF, or Microsoft Word), a Uniform Resource Locator ( "URL") for the web
page, the web page's file size, and the date Google last indexed the page.
Unfortunately for searchers, filtering content is sometimes inaccurate. Some
19
20
web publishers use techniques such as cloaking and pagejacking to present
inaccurate filtering content.
In contrast, a searcher using the DNS does not see filtering content.
Instead, the searcher gets a single search result (the web page associated with
that domain name) and is immediately taken there.
This Article does not distinguish ads from other forms of filtering content.
Like other filtering content, ads can inform searchers what to expect if they
21
investigate further.
While controversy has brewed over the blurring of
22
editorial search results and paid search results,
searchers often find the
23
relevance of paid search results equal to or better than editorial search results.
18
Goog1e, Google Web Search Features, at http://www.google.comlhelp/features.html#pdf (last visited
Apr. I, 2005).
19
Although definitions vary, cloaking generally occurs when the publisher presents a different page to
search engine robots than is presented to searchers who select the search result. See Danny Sullivan, Ending
the Debate Over Cloaking, at http://searchenginewatch.comlsereportlprint.php/34721_2165231 (Feb 4, 2003).
Although cloaking is not inherently bad (good-looking or ergonomic web pages may be "cloaked" because
they are not readable by search engine robots or will not be favorably indexed), search engines often penalize
publishers who are caught doing it. Id.
20 Pagejacking occurs when a web publisher copies the third party content and incorporates that content
into the publisher's web page in a way that results in search engines displaying filtering content for the copier
identical to the filtering content displayed for the copied site. Whatis.com, Pagejacking, at http://whatis.tech
target.comldeflnition/0"sid9..ci213799, OO.html (last visited Apr. I, 2005). See Niton Corp. v. Radiation
Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998); Press Release, Federal Trade Commission,
FTC Halts Internet Highjacking Scam (Sept. 22, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opal1999/09/atariz.
htm (discussing how a pornographer used cloaked pagejacked pages (including the Harvard Law Review) to
induce users to visit pornography and then mousetrapped them). See generally F. Gregory Lastowka, Note,
Search Engines, HTML, and Trademarks: What's the Meta For?, 86 VA. L. REv. 835, 862-65 (2000)
(defining and discussing the terms).
21
See F. Gregory Lastowka, Search Engines Under Siege: Do Paid Placement Listings Infringe
Trademarks?, 141NTEu... PRoP. & TECH. LJ. 1, 6 (2002).
22
Search engines receive some criticism for blurring the line between ads and editorially generated
search results, including "paid inclusion" programs and ambiguously-labeled zones on search results pages.
See Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Associate Director, Division of Advertising Practices, Federal Trade
Commission to Mr. Gary Ruskin, Executive Director, Commercial Alert (June 27. 2002). available at
http://www.ftc.gov/oslclosingslstafflcommercialalertletter.htm.
23 See iProspect, Search Engine User Attitudes, at http://www.iprospect.comlpremiumPDFs/iProspectSur
veyComplete.pdf (Apr.-May 2004) (survey showing that users of several search engines found paid search
advertisements more useful than algorithmically-generated search results); Leslie Marable, False Oracles:
Consumer Reaction to Learning the Truth About How Search Engines Work, 21 (June 30, 2003), at
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Ultimately, searchers care only about the relevancy of the information they see,
and

artificial

divisions

between

"ads"

and

"content"

mask

important

similarities in the searcher's relevancy determination process.
When evaluating search results, the searcher judges the relevancy of the
results to his or her search objective.

Assessing relevancy is a complex

cognitive process not completely understood by information scientists. Part of
the problem is definitional:

Information scientists do not have a single well
24
accepted definition of relevancy.
There is general agreement that relevancy
consists of multiple factors, of which "topicality" (i.e., being on topic) is an
essential one. However, information scientists do not agree on the number or
nomenclature of other factors.
No

matter

what

25

definition

is

used,

the

fact

that

searchers

make

multifactored assessments of relevancy has two important consequences. First,
two searchers with the same search objective may grade the relevancy of
content differently because individual judgments will depend on idiosyncratic
Second, relevancy is not a "binary" determination
26
but will exhibit shades of gray, as even the best search results may satisfy

weightings of the factors.

most, but not all, of a searcher's criteria.
Information scientists believe that relevancy judgments occur in two stages:
27
predictive and eValuative.
Stage 5 (results evaluation) is the predictive stage,
which generally involves sorting search results based principally on topicality.
Stage 7 (investigation) is the evaluative stage where the searcher evaluates a

http://www.consumerwebwatch.orginews/searchengines/ContextReport.pdf (in ethnographic study, twelve of
seventeen participants found paid search listings helpful in ecommerce searches); Stefanie Olsen,

Tool

Smothers

Sponsored

Search,

CNET

News.com,

at

Software

http://news.com.coml2102-1032_3-

5107846.html?tag=sCutiU>rint (Nov. 14, 2003) (citing a survey showing that 24% found sponsored search
results more useful than algorithmically-generated search results and 51% found them just

as

useful).

24 See Kelly L. Maglaughlin & Diana H. Sonnenwald, User Perspectives on Relevance Criteria: A

Comparison Among Relevant, Partially Relevant, and Not-Relevant Judgments, 53 J. AM. SOC'y INFo. SCI. &
See
generally Stefano Mizzaro, Relevance: The Whole Story, 48 J. AM. SOC'y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 810 (1997)
TECH. 327, 328-31 (2002) (stating that "there is not a consensus regarding the definition of relevance").

(summarizing several decades of information science research about "relevance").

25 See Rong Tang & Paul Solomon, Use of Relevance Criteria Across Stages of Document Evaluation:
On the Complementarity of Experimental and Naturalistic Studies, 52 J. AM. SOC'y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 676,

677-79 (2001) (summarizing the literature).
usefulness, and importance.

Some example factors include goodness, accuracy, currency,

See Soo Y. Rieh, Judgment of Information Quality and Cognitive Authority in the

Web, 53 J. AM. SOC'y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 145, 152 (2002).
26 See Amanda Spink & Howard Greisdorf, Regions and Levels: Measuring and Mapping Users '
Relevance Judgments, 52 J. AM. SOC'y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 161(2001)
27 See Rieh, supra note 25, at 150.
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"quality" (i.e., the other considerations that

collectively define relevancy).
In the predictive stage, searchers sort through heterogeneous search results
28
to find relevant matches.
Sorting is not inherently detrimental to searchers.

Because no search provider delivers only perfectly relevant results every time,
29
searchers expect that they will have to sort search results.
Furthermore,
sorting educates the searcher. Scanning search results for topicality gives the
searcher some feedback about the searcher's choice of keywords and search
providers. For example, the searcher may realize that the chosen keywords are
3o
imprecise, capable of multiple meanings, or inferior to some other keyword.
Depending on the quantity and quality of filtering content, the searcher may
also immediately fulfill the search objective just by scanning the search results
(without having to do further investigation).

6. Stage 6: Decision
Based on the searcher's predictive judgment about the search results, the
searcher decides what to do next.

The searcher can continue on the same

search path by further investigating one or more search results. This process is
described more in Stage 7. Alternatively, the searcher may decide that a new
search approach is needed, in which case the searcher may submit a new
31
keyword to the same search provider (returning to Stage 3) or try the same
keyword at a different search provider (in which case the search returns to
2
Stage 2)? Finally, the searcher may choose to abort the search.

28 For a discussion of the different techniques used by different searcher segments, see Gord Hotchkiss,
Inside the Searcher's Mind: It's a Jungle in Here!, at http://searchenginewatch.com/searchday/article.php/335
7841 (May 26, 2004).
29 See Martin P. Courtois & Michael W. Berry, Results Ranking in Web Search Engines, available at
See generally Gregory Shea, Note,
http://www.on1inemag.netJ0L1999/courtois5.html (May 1999).
Trademarks and Keyword Banner Advertising, 75 s. CAL. L. REv. 529 (2002) (arguing that searchers do not
expect to get only relevant results).
30 See Nina Elkin.Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right To Exclude
Indexing, 26 DAYTON L. REv. 179, 185-86 (2001) ("Search results do not simply locate materials. They
construct meaning. They affect the organization and meaning of information. They structure categories in
response to users' queries, and thereby have the capacity of creating categories for grasping the world.").
31 This happens relatively infrequently. See Jansen et aI., supra note 14, at 15 (observing that two-thirds
of searchers did only one query at a search engine; only one in seven did more than two queries).
32 See Danny Sullivan, NPD Search and Portal Site Study, at http://searchenginewatch.com/sereport/
print.php/34721_2162791 (July 6, 200) (noting that approximately 20% of searchers who have a failed search
try a different search engine); Press Release, Vividence, Inc., supra note 16 (up to 47% of searchers will try
another search engine when their search expectations are not met).

HeinOnline -- 54 Emory L.J. 519 2005

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

520

7.

[Vol. 54

Stage 7: Investigation

In this stage, which the information scientists define as the evaluative stage,
the searcher more carefully investigates the search results he or she has
received.

By choosing to invest that time, the searcher is indicating that the

search results he or she has received appear to have some relevancy to the
searcher' s objec�ive-at least topically, if nothing else.
Although described as a single stage, this stage is composed of a potentially
33
As the searcher
infinite number of incremental decisions by the searcher.
gains more information, such as by visiting another web page, the searcher
34
makes another small calculation: Did I get what I expected?
Am I still on
the right search? Will additional investigation of this website lead me to my
35
objectives?
The more times a searcher answers "yes" to these questions, the
more likely that the web publisher is succeeding in satisfying the searcher's
36
objectives.
Conversely, if the searcher concludes that the web publisher is not helping
to achieve his or her objectives, the searcher may return to the search results
page (Stage 6) and consider selecting a different result to investigate, reinitiate
the search (with new keywords at Stage 3 or in a new search provider at Stage

2), or abort the search. As a practical matter, the searching process is often
iterative. Evaluating and investigating search results causes searchers to refine
37
This process,
their thinking and become more precise in their objectives.
sometimes called "associative learning," means that a searcher, conducting a
normal and productive search, may reach Stage 7 multiple times in a search
sequence.
In all cases--ven when the searcher has been "tricked" into viewing a
website through unscrupulous practices-a searcher's costs to change an
Internet search is trivial.

The searcher need only hit the back button, type a

33 See Marcia J. Bates, The Design of Browsing and Berrypicking Techniques for the Online Search
Interface, 13 ONUNE REV. 407(1989).
34 Rieh,supra note 25, at ISO(stating that the evaluative judgment detennines if the predictive judgment
was correct).

35

See Jakob Nielsen, Deceivingly Strong Information Scent Costs Sales, at http://www.useit.comlaiert

boxl20040802.html (Aug. 2,2004).

36 Rieh, supra note 25, at 156.
37 See ROSENFELD & MORVILLE, supra note 9, § 6.2.3; Rieh, supra note 25, at ISO; Heather Uoyd
Martin, Delving Deep Inside the Searcher's Mind, at http://searchenginewatch.comlsearchday/article.php/3406
911 (Sept. 14, 2004) (citing a statistic that 70% of searchers begin with a generic keyword and refine the term

after getting the search results).
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new web address into the address bar, or select a new bookmark. Any of these
steps requires just a moment or two of the searcher's time. The costs to switch
a web search compare very favorably to other offline searches, such as using
the Yellow Pages (which require extra time to dial, reach a live person and get
questions answered) or driving around town looking for a particular item
(where, if a store does not have what the searcher wants, the searcher must get
8

back into the car and drive to the next vendor)?

8. Stage 8: Objective Satisfaction
In some cases, the searcher satisfies his or her objectives by transacting
with a vendor or by fulfilling the searcher's information needs.

B. Trying To Infer Searcher Objectives from Keyword Selection
I.

"Objective Opaqueness "

Simply put, one cannot make any legally-supportable inferences about
searcher objectives based on the keywords used.

As already discussed,

searchers do a poor job selecting keywords that represent their objectives, but
this is not the core stumbling block.
keywords with more precision, we

Instead, even if searchers picked

still could

not infer their search objectives.

This Article refers to our inability to infer searchers' objectives from their
keywords as "objective opaqueness."
Objective opaqueness should not really be controversial.

Words are

capable of many meanings, so we always need some method to determine
which meaning the searcher intends. A searcher might communicate his or her
intent through very specific keywords: "I am looking to purchase a new in
the-box Canon PowerShot S400 digital camera that is not a gray-market good."
In some cases, the search context will give some clues, such as a keyword

search for "Canon PowerShot S400" in a search database provided by an
ecommerce website that only sells digital cameras.

In other cases, one can

make inferences about searchers' objectives based on their behavior in
response to the information presented to them:

If a searcher explores the

publisher's website more, chances are the searcher found the website useful; if

38 Cf. G. Gervaise Davis, II & Eric B. Boustani, Initial Interest Confusion and the Internet: A Confusion
of Trademark Law Principles, S J. iNTERNET 1. I (Jan. 2002) (discussing the transaction costs incurred by a
retail store shopper lured by false advertising).
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a searcher abandons the publisher's website, the searcher probably did not find
the website useful.
In the vast majority of situations, when the searchers pick short keywords

and use them in a search environment that provides no contextual clues-such
as when a searcher enters a keyword into a stand-alone search engine like
Google or the DNS-it is effectively impossible for anyone to accurately infer
the searcher's objectives. An example illustrates the phenomenon.
Consider a searcher seeking information about the Canon PowerShot S400
digital camera.

The searcher might choose keywords such as "Canon" or

"PowerS hot" or "S400," or the searcher could combine terms to create
keywords such as " PowerShot S400" or even "Canon PowerShot S400 digital
camera." Assume that a searcher chooses the last. Even with a comparatively
lengthy (five words) and precise keyword, it is still unclear, merely from the
chosen keyword, which of the following possible objectives the searcher has:
•

The searcher may want more information to

Prepurchase Information.
facilitate
marketing

a

purchasing
collateral,

decision,

product

such

reviews

as

product

(positive

or

specifications,
negative),

or

information about product warnings or recalls. The searcher may also
want comparative information, such as comparative advertising or
editorial reviews comparing multiple products.
•

Purchase Information.

The searcher may have already decided to

purchase the camera but needs pricing and availability information.
Often, the searcher will want to know about all vendors, including
third-party distributors and manufacturers who sell the product
39
directly.
Some searchers may want or be willing to obtain the product
in used condition from retailers or previous customers.
•

Postpurchase Information.

The searcher may have already purchased

the camera and may be looking for postpurchase assistance, including
customer support or repair or servicing information, from either the
manufacturer or a third-party vendor.

The searcher could also want

ancillary goods or services such as training courses or after-market
accessories that are compatible with the camera (camera bags, lenses,
straps, tripods, etc.).

39 Although the camera example makes it appropriate to discuss "manufacturers" and "products," the
discussion applies equally to services and service providers.
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Community Information. The searcher may be looking for other camera
owners to share information or form enthusiast groups or fan clubs.

The challenge of inferring search objectives is compounded because
searchers rarely use such precise search terms as "Canon PowerS hot S400
digital camera" even when they have a very specific search objective in mind.
With less specific keywords, the range of possible search objectives expands
even further.
Assume that the searcher merely used the keyword "Canon" in the search.
The searcher could be looking for any product bearing the "Canon" brand, and
any such product may have any of the objectives discussed above. This
expands the number of possible objectives exponentially, as each of the
thousands of Canon products creates dozens of additional possible search
In addition, a searcher may manifest any of the following
objectives.
objectives through the use of the keyword "Canon":
•

Employment Related Information. The searcher may be looking for
employment opportunities with Canon, Inc., trying to find or organize
unions associated with Canon, Inc., or trying to communicate with a
Canon employee.

•

Investor or Financial Information. The searcher may be looking to buy
or sell stock in Canon, Inc., or for information about Canon's financial
performance such as reporting documents required by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.

•

Supplier Information. The searcher may be trying to establish a vendor
relationship with Canon, Inc., or find out who Canon's vendors are.

•

The searcher may be looking for information
about Canon in the news. A Canon product may be involved in a
newsworthy event, and the searcher may want to know more about it.
40
For example, Canon sponsors the Canon Camera Museum, so a
searcher might want to know about a new exhibit running at the
museum.

News About Canon.

40 Canon Camera Museum. at http://www.canon.comlcamera-museumlindex.html (last visited Apr. 1.

2(05).
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All of the foregoing search objectives have some relation to Canon, Inc.,
but other legitimate searches could have nothing to do with Canon, Inc.,
41
including the following:
•

Trademark Uses by Third Parties.

The searcher may be looking for

other parties that use the term "Canon" in their trademarks, including
42
43
Chateau Canon la Gaffeliere, Canon Law Institute, Canongate Golf
44
45
Clubs,
Canons Regular of Daylesford Abbey,
and Canon
Communications LLC (a specialty publisher). Although this discussion
is specific to Canon, words often have multiple legitimate trademark
owners.
•

Dictionary Uses.

The searcher may be looking for information related

to dictionary uses of the word "canon." "Canon," among other things,
means a rule or law (especially in religious contexts) and a singing
46
47
style.
Canon also means "canyon" in Spanish.
•

•

The searcher may be looking for information related to
48
United States towns named Canon, such as Canon, Georgia,
Canon
49
City, Colorado, or Canon Rivers in Washington or Minnesota.

Place Names.

Typographical Errors.

Some searchers may make a typographical

error, intending to type a different term such as "cannon."
In addition, "proxy usage" can further expand the range of possible
searcher objectives. In some situations, searchers use trademarks as a "proxy"
for a class of goods, of which the trademarked item is just one member of the
50
class.
Proxy usage can be particularly common when all of the goods in the

4 1 While some of these specific searches would be less likely to occur if the trademark were truly fanciful
and unique, all of the other possible objectives apply to fanciful and nonfanciful terms equally.
4 2 U.S. Trademark No. 2,898,806 (issued Nov. 2,2004).
43 U.S. Trademark No. 2,682,057 (issued Jan. 28, 2003).
44 U.S. Trademark No. 2,549,929 (issued Mar. 19, 2002).
45 U.S. Trademark No. 2, 198,586 (issued Oct. 20,1998).
4 6 Dictionary.com, canon, at http://dictionary.reference.com!search?q=canon (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
4 7 [d.
48 See City.Data.com, Canon, Georgia, at http://www.city-data.com!city/Canon-Georgia.htmI (last
visited Apr. 1, 2005).
49 See Cafion City Chamber of Commerce, at http://www.canoncitychamber.com! (Iast visited Apr. I ,
2005).
50 Stephen W. Feingold, Trademarks: Means To Avoid Confusion, or Propeny Rights ? Two Pending
Cases Outline Dilemma, N.Y. L.J., July 26, 1999, at S2 ("For example, one highly ethical and respected
advertising executive specializing in the Internet, speaking off the record, believes that someone entering
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class are fungible and marketers differentiate their products principall y through
branding.
For example, consider a consumer who wants to purchase a
pseudoephedrine-based decongestant. The consumer may not even know that
the products contain pseudoephedrine but, based on heavy brand advertising,
,,
the consumer may recall the Pfizer brand "Sudafed. 5 1 The consumer could
choose the keywords "pseudoephedrine" or "decongestant," but some
consumers might choose the keyword "Sudafed" as an easier-to-remember
synonym for those keywords. When searchers use "Sudafed" as a proxy, a
consumer' s decision to search for "Sudafed" does not mean that the consumer
intends to buy the Pfizer-branded version of pseudoephedrine.
In the case of "Canon," some consumers might use the term as a starting
point for a search for cameras, copiers, or printers. The searcher' s thought
process might go something like this:
I'm interested in a digital camera but I don't know the digital camera
brands. I could do a search on the keyword "digital camera" but that
might be too generic because it could include all types of cameras,
from junk cameras to professional-grade cameras. I just want a good
digital camera. I know that a coworker just bought a Canon
PowerS hot and that person has similar tastes to me. So I'll start with
the keyword "Canon PowerShot" as my initial search tenn to learn
about that camera and, I hope, competitive cameras of the same
grade.
Unquestionably, Internet trademark law would be easier if searchers did a
better job selecting their keywords. Over time, education efforts may improve
52
the keyword selection process.
In the interim, searchers' keyword selection
processes should be considered as they are, not as one might wish they would
be53_and for now, keyword selection is done poorly.
HONDA in a search engine is just as likely looking for information about Japanese cars as for information
specifically about Honda.").
51 See pfizer, Allergy Cold Cough Sinus, at http://www.allergy-cold.com/#Sudafed (last visited Apr. I ,
2(05).
52 See generally Nielsen, supra note 1 4 (suggesting that at some point better search techniques will need
to be taught in schools).
53 Some courts and commentators presumptuously want searchers to change their search methodologies.
See 1·800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (distinguishing b etween a
searcher's choice to search for a generic term like "contact lenses," which indicates that the searcher is "clearly
looking for general information," and " 1 800contacts.com," which inferentially indicates something else); Chad
J. Doellinger, Trademarks, Metatags, and Initial Interest Confusion: A Look to the Past To Reconceptualize
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Internet Searches Diferfrom Physical Space Searches

Although in many respects the Internet does not materially differ from the
physical world, Internet searches differ from physical space searches in at least
two principal ways.
First, Internet searchers can completely control the keyword selection
process. Contrast this with mass media-such as newspapers, magazines,
television, radio, and billboards-where searchers receive content unassociated
with any keyword. In those circumstances, publishers and advertisers embed
keywords into their content hoping that viewers will recognize the keywords
and be interested in pursuing more information. In other words, mass media
bombards viewers with keywords with the hope that enough viewers will find
the messages relevant. Alternatively, if a viewer has selected a keyword for a
search, the viewer really has very little way to receive customized information
back from the mass media publisher in response to the keyword.
Even when the publisher provides an index of its content, the searcher has
little control over the search. For example, consider the index in a Yellow
Pages telephone book. If a searcher has a search keyword that matches the
editorially selected keywords in the index, the searcher can have a successful
search. However, the number of keywords supported by the index is
54
necessarily limited and may not match the words a searcher would choose.
Thus, searchers may need to redefine their keywords to match those selected
by the Yellow Pages publisher, and searchers with esoteric search terms may
fail to obtain any relevant information.

the Future, 4 1 IDEA 173, 2 10 (2001) (UA consumer looking for optimal infonnation regarding a wide variety
of running shoes should enter 'running shoes' rather than 'Nike. "'); Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and

Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43, 9 1-92 ( 1998); Note,
Confusion in Cyberspace: Defending and Recalibrating the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine, 117 HARv. L.
REv. 2387, 2404 & n.91, 2407 (2004) (generally discussing consumers' selection of keywords, and

specifically arguing that consumers should pick "car rental" or "travel services" instead of "Hertz" or
"Expedia" because the generic terms "will typically suffice to communicate the desired information to a user
expressly interested in these services generally"); cf Paul R. Hagen, Must Search Stink?, Forrester Research
(June 200 I), at 5 (quoting a manufacturing company assessing its search engine: "Most of the complaints we
get are due to the way the users search-they use the wrong keywords.") (emphasis added). While better
keyword selection sounds great in theory, it is backwards to force consumers to pick alternative keywords
instead of crafting a law that addresses consumer confusion based on the keywords searchers organically
choose themselves.

54 See Warren Thorngate, The Economy of Attention and the Development of Psychology, 3 1 CAN.

PSYCHOL. 262, 267 (1990) (an ad hoc study showed that descriptive keywords selected by knowledgeable

readers matched the article's published keywords only I I % of the time).
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In contrast, Internet searchers can affirmatively sort and receive content
that responds to their keyword, rather than passively waiting for it to appear in
mass media. 55 Internet searchers are not constrained to the keyword choices
made by an intermediary publisher. When search providers index every word
they find, a keyword search can succeed even if a publisher does not use the
keyword in any organizational scheme.
The second way Internet keyword-driven searches differ from offline
keyword-driven searches is that Internet searches can lack any "context" to
make inferences about the searcher's objectives.
In offline searches,
significant inferences are often possible regarding the objectives from the
context when the searcher initiates a keyword-driven search. In online
searches, a searcher may merely express his or her objectives using just text in
a "generic" search environment. Text communication inherently limits the
quantity of information a searcher can communicate. As Albert Mehrabian' s
famous study indicates, 55% of a person' s communication i s manifested
through nonverbal means (such as posture, gestures, and facial expressions),
38% is manifested through tone of voice, and only 7% is manifested through
the words themselves. 56 In offline searches, a searcher can use the full range
of communicative elements. If the searcher telephones a merchant, the
merchant can hear the tone of voice. Online, the searcher "speaks" only
through text, often only a few words. It should not be surprising that, when a
search is stripped down to the words itself, communicative elements are lost in
the process.
Physical space searches often have a context that facilitates inferences
about a searcher' s intent based on a single keyword. The following example
illustrates the differences between an Internet search and an offline search,
Recall the searcher using the keyword "Sudafed." If the searcher says to a
grocery store clerk "Sudafed?," one might infer from the grocery store context
that the searcher intends to purchase a decongestant. 57 If the searcher says to
her doctor "Sudafed?," one might infer that the searcher wants more

55 See Rieh. supra note 25. at 146 (questioning prior research on relevance for failing to distinguish
between active and passive searchers); see also Bryce J. Maynard. Note. The Initial Interest Confusion
Doctrine and Trademnrk Infringement on the Internet. 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303 (200).
5 6 See Albert Mehrabian. Communication Withaut Words. PSYCHOL. TODAY. Sept.1968. at 53.
57 We might further infer that such a keyword search is not primarily targeting the acquisition of more
information about Sudafed because. depending on the store, grocery stores often do not provide much product
information beyond product packaging, meaning that such information searches will have low utility.
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information about Sudafed or decongestants generally.

58

Meanwhile, if the

searcher says to her automobile mechanic "Sudafed?," this appears to be an
ambiguous nonsequitur.
In contrast, in most Internet searches, the search environment provides no
information about the searcher.
like Google

Consider all of the things a search provider

might not know about

an Internet searcher. Google may not know

where the searcher is physically located. Google may not know the searcher's
physical status, such as if he or she is congested or teary -eyed.

Google may

not know what the searcher was doing immediately prior to the search-was
the searcher playing computer games, telecommuting, or researching hay
fever?
Therefore, it is possible for a search provider to know only one piece of
information about the searcher : the chosen keyword.

In the of fline Sudafed

examples , the grocery store clerk, the doctor and the mechanic each know
where the searcher is located, what his or her physical condition is, and what
the searcher was doing immediately prior to initiating the search.
Furthermore, even if the clerk, the doctor , or the mechanic cannot figure
out the searcher's objectives from the searcher's keyword plus the associated
context, the person can simply ask the searcher for more information.

Thus,

when a searcher says to her auto mechanic "Sudafed?," the auto mechanic can
request more information before attempting to respond to the inquiry.

In

contrast, many Internet search contexts do not have this iterative quality.

At

Google, a searcher puts the word "Sudafed" into the search box and gets
59
results. Google does not ask searchers to clarify their search or to provide
more information about the search objectives.

Thus, Google-and any fact

finder

make

evaluating

Google's

results

must

inferences

from

a

decontextualized keyword that has not been iteratively clarified.

58 We might further infer that the searcher is not planning to immediately acquire Sudafed from the
doctor directly, because doctors rarely vend over-the-counter pharmaceuticals to their patients.

59 The only current exception is that if Google thinks the searcher made a typographical error, it may
prompt the searcher by asking "did you mean [corrected word]." Google, Goog/e Web Search Features, at
http://www.google.comJhelp/features.html#speU (last visited Apr. 1 , 2(05). See infra note 103.
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III. INTERNET SEARCH FROM THE PUBLISHER' S PERSPECTIVE

This Part looks at the Internet search process from the second of the three
perspectives. While the previous Part looked at Internet search from the
searcher's perspective, this section looks at Internet search from the
perspective of a publisher trying to present content to searchers.
As the previous section indicated, on the Internet, searchers choose the
search terms that manifest their search objectives. As a result, publishers
trying to reach searchers need to (1) anticipate what terms express search
60
objectives and (2) find ways to get search providers to associate the
publisher' s content with the keywords searchers use.
Publishers can communicate words intended to reach searchers through
"data" and "metadata." In this context, "data" refers to content visibly
presented when web visitors arrive at a web page, such as the web page ' s text.
Sometimes this is defined as "on the page" content. 6 1 "Metadata" refers to
62
content about the web page that describes or summarizes the page, such as
the page title, the page URL or domain name, and "metatags."
"Metatags" are HTML commands that allow web publishers to provide
automated instructions to search engine robots. 63 Two types of metatags,

60 Jill

Search
Traffic,
at
see Google, Optimization
Tips, at https://adwords.google.comlselectltips.html (last visited Apr. I , 2(05); see also Daina J. Schemo, In
Online Auctions, Misspelling in Ads Often Spells Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2004, at A I (discussing the
Whalen,

Even

Small

Businesses

Can

Gain

Valuable

http://www.searchengineguide.comlwhalenl2005/01 13jwl .html (Jan. 1 3, 2(05);

financial impact to eBay auction sellers of making typographical errors in their auction listings, meaning that
searchers using the correct spelling do not find them).

See
Keyword Research: Optimization for Conversion, at http://ww .clickz.com!experts/designl

This process of assessing the keywords consumers use is sometimes called "keyword research."
Bryan Eisenberg,

traffic/print.php/30864 1 I (Oct. 3, 2(03).

61 In contrast, attributes outside the publisher's control (such as anchor text and inbound links) are
Danny Sullivan, How Search Engines Rank Web Pages, at

referred to as "off the page" factors.

http://searchenginewatch.comlwebmasters/print.php/34751_2167961 (July 3 1 , 2(03).

62 Technically, "metadata" is usually defined as "data about other data." See Tim Oren, Metadata:
Promises and Perils, Due Diligence, at http://www.pacificavc.comlblogl2003/0812 I .html (Aug. 2 1 , 2(03); see
also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1 029, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2(03),
affd, 380 F.3d 1 1 54 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing metadata in the context of MP3 files), cerro granted, 125 S. Ct.
686 (2004).

63 See Danny Sullivan, How To Use HTML Meta Tags, at http://searchenginewatch.com!webrnastersl

print.php/34751_21 6793 1 (Dec. 5, 2(02).

Although metatags (other than the title) do not appear in "on the

page" content, any web visitor can see a web page' s metatags by using the "View Source" option in his or her
web browser, and the description metatag may appear in the filtering content at search engines.
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"keyword metatags" and "description metatags," deserve special attention.
Keyword metatags allow the publisher to designate certain keywords that
summarize or classify a web page' s contents without those references
64
Description metatags allow the
appearing in the "on the page" content.
publisher to provide a short summary of the website's contents that does not
appear in the "on the page" content,65 although in some cases search engines
will display the description metatag' s content as part of the filtering content for
that page.
Keyword metatags and description metatags are not the only metatag types;
66
Each metatag
there are hundreds of metatags with a variety of purposes.
type' s "validity" depends on the degree to which it is recognized and adopted
by web browser software programs and search providers. Some metatag types
have been incorporated into widely recognized standards such as the
specifications for HTML. Many other metatag types are recognized by only
one or two search providers or web browsers, so few publishers use those
metatags.
The Internet creates a virtually unprecedented information environment
because both data and metadata can be fully searchable by search providers,
meaning that every word a publisher includes in its website can act as
marketing for the publisher. In other words, publishers who incorporate a
keyword into their website may be displayed, through the intermediation of
search providers, in the search results for that term, which may lead searchers
to investigate the website.
This attention from searchers can translate into money, either directly
through revenue models that pay based on the number of visitors (such as
banner advertisements which pay per impression) or indirectly because some
web visitors may choose to transact with the web publisher or those the web
publisher promotes. 67 With money at stake, not surprisingly, some publishers
64

Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 1 74 F.3d 1 036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1 999).

65 Id.
66 See A Dictionary of HTML META Tags, at hnp:/lvancouver-webpages.com/MEfA1metatags.detail.
htrnl (Apr. 4, 2(03).

67 In the mid- and late- 1 990s, many advertisers paid for each ad impression delivered to a website visitor.

Thus, a website that attracted searchers would increase its inventory of ad impressions and make more money,

See Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace: Trademark Liability for Metatagging, 33 GONZ. L. REv.
277, 284, 302-03 ( 1 998); William Romanos, Internet Accuracy Wars: How Trademarks Used in Deceptive
Metatagging Should Be Dealt with To Increase Economic Efficiency, 7 U. BALT. INTELL. PRoP. L.J. 79, 80
even if searchers were misled about the website' s relevance to their search.

( 1 998). Because these practices did not create real economic value, advertisers have largely moved away from
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will use data or metadata to try to attract more searchers from search
68
providers. Not only is this fact inevitable, but in many cases it constitutes a
socially efficient process. Publishers will try to get search providers to
associate their website with the keywords being used by desired searchers. If
publishers pick the right keywords, and search providers make the right
matches, social search costs decrease and society benefits generally.
Unfortunately, not every publisher uses keywords in a manner that
increases social utility. Some publishers deliberately select (and in some cases,
excessively repeat) keywords that have no relevance to the content they are
publishing. 69 In other cases, publishers may place keywords in strategic
locations on the web page hoping that search providers will overweight that
placement, giving the publisher more attention than it deserves. However, in
other cases, publishers' keyword selection and placement decisions may look
funny but still may be legitimate; for example, this Article repeatedly uses the
term "Canon PowerShot S400 digital camera" and search providers will
index the Article on that term-even though this Article has zero or low
relevance to searchers using that keyword.
More generally, it is not possible to conclude that a publisher's keyword
use is objectionable without understanding the searcher' s objectives.
Searchers may use the same keyword for a variety of different meanings. In
some cases, publishers legitimately select keywords that relate to their content,
but that particular use of the keyword will be relevant to only a minority of
searchers, meaning that the majority of searchers would deem the keyword
usage irrelevant. Squelching the publisher' s use of the keyword in this context

paying solely based on the number of ad impressions, instead preferring to pay based on a website's

performance in generating qualified leads or actual sales. See J. William Gurley, The Persistent Rise of
Performance-Based Advertising, CNEf News.com, July 1 0, 2000, at http://news.com.coml2 102-1071_328 1 334.html?tag=st.util.print. As a result, the ability to obtain greater advertising revenues merely by tricking

users to visit a website has declined substantially (except, perhaps, in narrow ad sectors like pornography).

68 See Michael Totty & Mylene Mangalindan, Cat and Mouse: As Google Becomes Web 's Gatekeeper,
Sites Fight to Get In, WAL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A I .
69 These practices are variously called keyword stuffing (or word stuffing or cyberstuffing), keyword

See Webopedia. Keyword Stuffing, at
See generally J.K.
Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 2002 WL 1303 1 24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2(02), vacated by 253 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 20 (N.D.

loading, spamdexing, keyword repetition and search engine spamming.

http://www.webopedia.comfTERMlKlkeyword_stuffing.html (last visited Apr. I , 2(05).

Cal. 2(03) (discussing the various efforts the defendant, a critic of plaintiff, took to manipulate search results

placement); Alan Perkins, The

Classification of Search Engine Spam, at http://www.seoconsultants.coml

artic1es/l OOO/search-engine-spam.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2(05).
Many search engines prohibit keyword stuffing and penalize violators with sanctions as severe as being
excluded from the index.

See Webopedia supra.
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may destroy the publisher' s ability to find and communicate with nonmajority
searchers.
IV. INTERNET SEARCH FROM THE SEARCH PROVIDER' S PERSPECTIVE

This Part represents the third of three different perspectives on Internet
search and looks at Internet search from the search provider's perspective.
A. Search Providers Are Editors, Not Passive Intermediaries
Compared with other types of search providers, search engines often
portray themselves as passive intermediaries for web publishers' content and
7o
ads.
Adherents to this view see search engines as defenseless against the
71
abusive tactics of web publishers seeking to "confuse" the search engines.
There are some kernels of truth to this position. Search engines often
automatically collect data, so publishers may be able to cause the robot to
capture both good and "unwanted" content. Further, many web publishers
aggressively try to "game" search engines in an effort to get as much searcher
attention as possible. Indeed, an entire industry of "search engine optimizers"
has emerged to help web publishers maximize their positioning under search
.
,
.
72
englOes vanous ruIes.
However, it is 100% wrong to treat search engines as passive agents for
publisher content. Search engines are media companies, not neutral providers
73
of information.
Thus, search engines often view their search database as a

70 See David Becker, Google Caught in Anti-Semitism Flap, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.com/
2102-1 03S_3-5 IS601 2.html?tag=st.util.print (Apr. 7, 2004) (quoting Google spokesperson David Krane as
saying "Google's search results

are

solely determined by computer algorithms that essentially reflect the

popular opinion of the Web . . . . Our search results are not manipulated by hand. We're not able to make any
manual changes to the results."); Google,
complaint.html (last visited Apr. 1 , 2005)

Trade11UIrk Complaint Procedure, at http://www.google.com/tm_
("As a provider of spacefor advertisements, please note that Google

is not in a position to arbitrate trademark disputes between the advertisers and trademark owners.") (emphasis
added).

7 1 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Trade11UIrks, Cybersquatters and D011UIin Names, 10 J. ART. & ENT. L. 23 1 ,
234 (200); Nathenson, supra note 53, at l I S.
n See, e.g., Heather Lloyd-Martin, Secrets of Successful Search Engine Optimization, at
http://searchenginewatch.com/searchday/print.php/347 I I_21750S 1 (Mar. 6, 2003) (describing how Search
Engine Optimizations ("SEOs") can help publishers).

73 Cf. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., 2003 WL 2 1 46456S (W.O. Okla. May 27, 2003)

(characterizing the ranking of a publisher via the relevancy algorithm as an "opinion").
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74
proprietary asset that they tightly control to provide a quality user experience
and, not coincidentally, maximize profits.
To debunk any remaining myths about search engine passivity, it is helpful
to consider the ways that search engines control their searchers' experiences:
1. Aggregation
Search engines try to build comprehensive databases,75 but no search
engine incorporates every page on the Internet into their database.76 Instead,
search engines make editorial choices about which websites to include in their
database. Search engines may remove websites based on a publisher ' s
77
overzealous efforts to game the search engine ' s system or due to liability
concerns.78 In other cases, search engines may choose not to index certain
79
websites based on the costs and benefits of catering to esoteric interests.

74 Cf eB ay, Inc. v. B idder's Edge, Inc., 1 00 F. Su pp. 2d 1 0 58 (N .D. Cal. 200) (discussing eBay's
attempts to keep its database of third part y au ction listings propri etary).
75 See Danny Su llivan, Search Engine Size Wars V Erupts, at http://blog.searchengi newatch .comlblogl04
1 1 1 1 -08 4221 (Nov. 1 1 , 2004). Database comprehensiveness benefits searchers because it increases the odds
that search ers with es oteri c search obj ectives will have a successfu l search.
76 Th e "Deep Web" refers to content available onli ne th at is not i ndexed by s earch engines. This content
may be i naccessi ble to s earch robots bec aus e th e content is pres ented on dynamically generated pages , whi ch
th e robots cannot access . See Michael K. B ergman, The Deep Web: Suifacing Hidden Value, 7 J. ELECfRONIC
PUBLISHING, Au g. 2001 , available at h ttp:// www.press.umich.edu ljep/07 Ol lbergman.html. However, content
may als o be exclu ded becaus e publish ers i nstruct search robots to bypass th em, whi ch can be done by placi ng
a robot exclusion h eader into a robots.txt file. Oth er reasons content may not appear i n s earch engines is that a
s earch engine si mply cannot handle th e volu me of data, th e content cannot be found by search engi nes because
no one links to it, th e content is new and th e s earch engines h ave not i ndexed it yet, or because(as dis cussed
later) th e search engin es choose not to i nclude it. N ote als o th at even if a search engine indexes a page, i t may
not index the enti re page if th e page is a large file. See Su llivan, supra note 7 5.
77 See Search King, 2003 WL 21 464 568 , at *3; Stefanie Ols en, Search Engines Delete Adware Company,
CNET News . com, at h ttp://news .com.coml2102-1 024 3-5212479.h tml?tag=st.util.print (M ay 1 3 , 2004)
(Google an d Yah oo kicked Wh enU .com ou t of th ei r databas es for allegedly engagi ng i n cloakin g).
78 See Letter from Ava Paquette, attorney at M oxon & Kobrin and couns el for the Chu rch of Scientology,
to Google, Inc.(M ar. 8 , 2(02), available at h ttp://www.chi llingeffects .orgldmca5121noti ce.cgi?NoticeID=232
(demanding that Google remove content from its database th at was indexed f om a websi te critical of th e
Chu rch of Scientology bas ed on both copyrigh t and trademark grounds ). Google h onored th is request. Declan
McCullagh , Google Yanks Anti-Church Sites, at http://www.wi red.comlnews/pri ntlO.1294. 51 233.00.html
(M ar. 21 , 2002).
79 Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbau m, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines Matters,
INFO. SOC' Y , July Sept. 200 , at 169; see also Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 188.
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Sorting

Search engines detennine the order of search results using a proprietary
methodology called a "relevancy algorithm." Algorithms can be based on a
80
wide variety of factors,
and they do not need to be sophisticated. For
example, search engines could order results alphabetically or by date of
81
publication.
However, most search engine use complex formulas in an
attempt to get the most relevant results to the top of the search results list.
For example, Google' s algorithm purportedly considers 100 different
82
including words in the page title, words on the page (including their

factors,

proximity to each other), words contained in the hypertext links established by
third parties to that page (called "anchor text"), and the page ' s "PageRank," a
complex and data-intensive calculation that considers the number and quality
83
of hypertext links pointing to the web page.
Search engines can also use cash as a "relevancy algorithm" by sorting
search results based on how much the publisher is willing to pay for
placement.

This sorting method has received a lot of criticism, often on the
84
basis that it is unfair for publishers to purchase competitor trademarks, that
search engines should not profit from the sale of trademarks, or that consumers
do not understand that search engines are using cash as a relevancy algorithm.
Whether or not these critiques are fair, sorting search results on the basis of
publishers' willingness to pay can work well because it forces publishers to
carefully assess the value of being associated with a particular keyword.

If a

publisher overestimates the relevancy of a keyword association to searchers,
the publisher overpays for searchers who are not interested in the publisher.
Thus, rank-ordering publishers based on their willingness to pay implicitly
introduces market forces into the publishers' attempts to characterize their
relevancy to searchers.

80 See generally RICARDO BAEZA-YATES & BERTHIER RmEIRO-NETO, MODERN INFORMATION
RETRIEVAL ( 1 999).

8 1 See

Greg

R.

Notess,

On the Net:

Rising

Relevance

in

Search

Engines,

available at

http://www.onlinemag.netJOLI 999/net5.html (May 1999). For example, Nexis search results are,
organized by date. Google News gives users the option to sort search results by date.

82 Chris

Ridings

&

Mike

Shishigin,

PageRank

Uncovered

http://www.texaswebdevelopers.comldocslpagerank.pdf.

35

(Sept.

as

a default,

2002),

at

83 [d. at 8.
84 See G. Peter Albert, Jr. & Rita A. Abbati, Metatags. Keywords. and Links: Recent Developments
Addressing Trademark Threats in Cyberspace, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 34 1 , 358-59 (2003) (describing the
practice

as

"predatory").
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use, their

importance to the Internet search process cannot be overstated. As a practical
matter, relevancy algorithms determine the results that searchers see and
investigate. Searchers do not generally look at search results beyond the first
85
86
which is a result consistent with bounded rationality.
Thus,

page or two,

web publishers who fail to get into the zone of visibility will not reach
87
searchers.
In turn, degraded exposure can materially impact a publisher ' s
88
business and profIts.
Because searchers invariably j udge the search
provider' s performance based on the relevancy of the top results, a search
engine 's decisions about what factors to include and exclude in a relevancy
89
algorithm, and how to weigh each factor, are not made lightly.
85 See Jansen et al., supra note 1 4 (over three-fourths of searchers looked at only one or two pages);
Marable, supra note 23, at 1 3 (88% of search results links selected in ethnographic study were from the first
page of search results). See generally Nico Brooks, The Atlas Rank Report: How Search Engine Rank Impacts
Traffic, Atlas Institute Digital Marketing Insights, available at http://www.atlasdmt.comlmediaipdfs/insights/
RankReport.pdf (June 2004) (the first ranked search result should see ten times the quantity of clicks as the
tenth ranked search result); iProspect, supra note 23 (discussing users' unwillingness to look at more than two
search results pages).
86 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model o/Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. EcON. 99 ( 1 955).
87 Some have expressed concerns that searchers who receive too many search results will abort their
search in frustration. See Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1 407, 1 4 10
(C.O. Cal. 1997); Ooellinger, supra note 53, at 2 1 1 "If every shoe and athletic apparel company were allowed
to include the 'Nike' trademark in the metatags of their web sites, it would make it much more difficult for
someone acrually searching for the Nike web site. Moreover, if every web site for every major shoe company
contained the trademarks of every other major shoe company in the metatags of their web sites, the ability of a
web user to find any given web site would be greatly reduced."); Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable:
Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 MIN. L. REV. 949, 1028 32 (200 1 ).
This thinking is erroneous because of bounded rationality. If searchers focus only on the top search
results, the quantity of "inferior" search results they ignore is irrelevant. However, if the top search results are
not relevant, the searcher may abort the search out of frustration because the searcher will not sift through a
larger dataset to fmd the desired information. See Marable, supra note 23.
88 See Totty & Mangalindan, supra note 68 (discussing how a clothing retailer's sales dropped 80% after
its search results placement had been degraded in Google's index); Adam L. Penenberg, Googling the Bottom
Line, at http://www.wired.comlnewslprintlO.1 294.66485.OO.htrnl (Feb. 3, 2005) (quantifying the traffic and
revenue gains from improved positioning on results lists).
89 See Search King, Inc. v. GOOgle Tech., Inc., 2003 WL 2 1 464568 (W.O. Okla. May 27, 2003)
(discussing the subjective nature of deciding what factors to include or exclude and how much weight to give
each); see also Stefanie Olsen, Ask Jeeves Denounces Paid Inclusion, CNET News.com, at
http://news.com.coml21 02- 1 024_3-5 1 68805.html1tag=st.util.print (Mar. 2, 2004) ("After much testing of paid
inclusion, [Ask Jeeves] found that it can negatively sway search results -producing more commercial and
irrelevant lists of Web sites" which led Ask Jeeves to end its paid inclusion program); Stefanie Olsen, MSN To
Shake Up Search Ads, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml2 I02-1 024_3-5 1 76 1 97.htrnl1tag=st.util.print
(Mar. 19, 2004) (discussing how MSN decided to make changes to its search engine based on testing of
consumer responses).
Amazon.com signaled the importance of algorithms when it hired a ''Chief Algorithms Officer"
reporting to the Chief Information Officer. See Margaret Kane, Amazon Hires Algorithm Guru, CNET
News.com, at http://news.com.coml2 I02- 1017_3-965068.htrnl1tag=scutiCprint (Nov. 8, 2002).
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Because the relevancy algorithm can affect how much money they earn,
90
web publishers want to learn the algorithm and optimize their content for
In practice, this creates an arms race between search
91
engines and web publishers.
Search engines start the cycle by making a
maximum exposure.

change to their relevancy algorithm.

In response, some web publishers

(especially those guided by search engine optimizers) do everything they can
to benefit from the change, and some web publishers succeed in getting
premium exposure for content the search engine does not want to be so highly
ranked.

The search engine responds with a new change, and the cycle starts

over.

The process virtually mandates that search engines constantly change
92
their relevancy algorithms.
In the end, though, search engines decide how to order search results, not
publishers. Publishers are at the mercy of search engine changes, meaning that
a publisher can be the top-ranked search result one day and out of the index on
the next day-even if the publisher does not change its website at all.

The

volatility of results can be attributed to relevancy algorithm changes by the
93
search engines, but it can also be due to changes made by third parties in
anchor text or in the number of links third parties make to the publisher's
website.
Some commentators

have

claimed

that

manipulative web publisher
94
In fact, the exact opposite
practices threaten the viability of search engines.
is true. First, search engines expect these practices. Second, abusive publisher

90 To make it harder for publishers to game the algorithm (and to slow down competitors), search engines
zealously keep their algorithms secret.
n.2 (W.O. Okla. Jan.

See Search King Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457 -M, at 3

\3, 2(03) ("Google's mathematical algorithm is a trade secret, and it has been

characterized by the company as 'one of Google's most valuable assets."'); Stefanie Olsen, Project Searches
for Open-Source Niche, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml2 I02-1032_3-50649 1 3.htm1?tag=st util_pr
int (Aug. 1 8, 2(03).

9 1 See Totty & Mangalindan, supra note 68 (discussing the "arms race[] between big search engines" and
supra note 8 1 ("It becomes a never-ending cycle."); Romanos, supra note
67, at 94 (noting that an arms race produces social costs but also may spur innovation). See generally
O'Rourke, supra note 67, at 286 (discussing search engine antigaming practices).
92 See Stefanie Olsen, Google Co-Founder: No Rush for IPO, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml

search engine optimizers); Notess,

2 102-1 025_3 5066227.htm1?tag=scutiCprint (Aug. 20, 2(03) (citing Google cofounder Sergey Brin as saying
that Google ''tests half a dozen new algorithms a month and implements some subset of those"); Ridings
Shishigin,

&

supra note 82, at 35.

93 These changes could be the product of general algorithmic changes or targeted at specific publishers or
See Search King, No . .CIV-02- 1 457-M at 4 ("Google knowingly and intentionally decreased the

practices.

PageRanks assigned to both Search King and PRAN.").

94 See McCarthy, supra note 7 1 , at 236 (keyword stuffing in metatags ''tends to destroy the usefulness of
a search engine").

HeinOnline -- 54 Emory L.J. 536 2005

537

DEREGULATING RELEVANCY

2005]

practices may endanger search engines with easily gamed algorithms, but
search engines with robust algorithms can withstand these tests.

Gaming

efforts give search engines an additional basis for competitive differentiation
the search engine that does a better job avoiding or mitigating these efforts will
produce more relevant results and be rewardec:l in the marketplace accordingly.
Web publisher games do not jeopardize search engines; instead, they are a vital
component of a dynamic and constantly improving search engine industry.
Some courts and commentators have suggested that a publisher' s liability
for trademark infringement based on using a third party trademark might
depend on if the publisher succeeds in being ranked higher than a trademark
95
owner in search results.
However, any such suggestion seems illogical given
96
the practical logistics of search result placement:
Search engines and third
parties affect placement regardless of what the publisher does, placement can
change daily or even more frequently, and placement can vary significantly
97
between different search engines.

3.

Filtering Content

Search engines also make editorially significant judgments about the
98
Filtering content can educate and
presentation of filtering content (if any).
influence the searcher, affecting the searcher's interest in pursuing a search
result and setting the searcher's expectations for the web publisher's content.
As part of managing the "user interface," search engines decide how much
filtering content searchers see and in what order and prominence.

95 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 804 (9th Cir. 2(02) (indicating that it might have
changed its ruling if Welles had successfully shown up higher than Playboy in the search engines); J.K.

& Co.

Har

v. Kassel, 2002 WL 1 303 1 24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2(02) (finding infringement based on the defendants'

vacated by 253 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2(03); see also
supra note 53, at 205--D9 (proposing a complicated system of liability based on the relative
placement of the trademark owner's search results and an interloper's search results). But see Search King,
Inc. v. Google Tech ., inc., 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2(03) (rejecting relative placement
efforts to move up in the search results),
Doellinger,

as the basis of search engine liability).

96 Cj. Doellinger, supra note 53, at 208 n . 1 94 (raising but sidestepping the issue).
97 See Jakob Nielsen, Diversity Is Powerfor Specialized Sites, at http://www.useit.com!alertboxl200306 1

6.html (June 1 6, 2003) (showing that search engines had little overlap in search results for specialized topic
searches).
Of course this proposal also simply cannot work for words that have multiple trademark owners. More
generally, searchers want the most relevant results, and there could be situations where a third party site is
considered more relevant than the trademark owner' s site.

98 Cf Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 947 (9th Cir. 2(02) (discussing how the visual search

engine Ditto.com was more than a passive agent in the way it delivered its visual search results).
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4.

Reinterpreting Searcher Keywords

In their goal to satisfy searcher objectives, search engines invariably put

words into searchers' mouths. They do so in at least two different ways. First,
to better anticipate searchers' objectives, the search engines reinterpret the
searcher' s keyword to mean something the searcher did not say.
"Concept searching" is an example of this phenomenon.

Using concept

searching, a search engine associates a searcher' s keyword with related words
or concepts, such as synonyms.

For example,

a search engine might

automatically interpret the keyword "GPS" to include "Global Positioning
System," and then automatically execute a search on both the keywords "GPS"
and "Global Positioning System."

Search engines can also use concept

searching to place keywords in taxonomies and to execute a search for both the
specific and general levels within the taxonomy.

For example, a concept

search on the keyword "Canon PowerS hot S4OO" might automatically include
,,99
search results generated from the keyword "digital camera.
In such
situations,

search

engines

must

editorially

determine

what taxonomical

associations to make.
Concept searching can also be used on a much more mechanical level.
Search engines can automatically detect and correct typographical errors-a
search

on

"recieve"

can

be

interpreted

as

a

search

on

"receive"--or

automatically truncate the keyword to a "word stem" and look for all words
containing that word stem.

A

1 00

variation of concept searching is called "phrase recognition."

phrase recognition,

With

the search engine automatically detects a multiword

keyword as a phrase and limits its search to the phrase (as opposed to rmding
results containing the words individually).

101

Second, search engines provide suggested keywords to searchers.

For

example, Yahoo Search and Snap (a new search engine) provide alternative

99

See Playboy Enters

.•

Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp

.•

354 F.3d 1020. 1 023

(9th

Cir. 2004)

(search engine bundled keywords for sale. requiring advertisers to buy the package even if certain keywords
were not wanted).
tOO T
he process of searching for all words containing a word stem is sometimes called "truncation."
Signpost.

See
Use Search Tips: Truncate Wordy. at http://www.marquette.edullibrary/thesignpostltruncation.html

(last visited Apr. 1 . 2005). Other analogous processes include searching the plural form of a singular word (or
vice-versa). or different forms of word tenses (such
lOt
See Notess. supra note 8 1 .

as

including "written" in any search for ''write'').
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and Google is testing a

product called "Google Suggest" that automatically scans the search box and
103
displays possible search keywords.

Editing Publisher Content

5.

In addition to putting words in searchers ' mouths, search engines put words

into web publishers' mouths .

Specifically, search engines associate metadata

with publisher content, in many cases without the publisher knowing or being
able to control this association.

These associations can cause the web

publisher to be displayed as a search result for keywords that the web publisher
did not use at all.
For example, some search engines include anchor text, the third party
words used to establish links, in the data associated with the linked web page.
Web publishers cannot control the words third parties use to link to their
websites, creating the potential that a web publisher will show up in search
results for words it never used. This exploit has become so well known that it
has a name: "Google bombing."

Google bombing occurs when third parties

link to a web publisher using carefully chosen anchor text, which causes the
publisher to appear as a top Google search result for keywords in the anchor
104
text.
Victims of Google bombing include AOL and Microsoft, both listed in
,, 105
search results for the keyword "go to Hel1;
Disney, which has been listed in
search results for pornographic keywords ; 1 06 George W. Bush ' s website, listed
, , 107
and the first publicized victim of
in search results for "miserable failure;
102

See Stefanie Olsen. MSN Launches Revamped Search Engine, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.

coml2 102-1032_3-5254083.html?tag=st.util.print (June 30, 2004) (giving the example of how a search for the
word "Apple" will cause Yahoo Search to prompt searchers to try "Apple Computer" as their keyword);
Stefanie Olsen,

New Snap Site Thinks Outside the Search Box, CNET News.com, at hnp:/Inews.com.com!2 1 02

- 1032_3-5397793.htmI?tag=st.util.print (Oct. 5, 2004).

\ 03 See Google Suggest, at http://www.google.comlwebhp?complete=l &hl=en (last visited Apr. 1 , 2(05).
See BBC News, Google Hit by Link Bombers, at http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilsciltechlI 868395.stm
(Mar. 1 3, 2002); Danny Sullivan, Google's (and Inktomi 's) Miserable Failure, at http://www.searchengine
watch.comlsereportlarticle.php!3296101 (Jan. 6, 2004). See generally John Hiler, Google Time Bomb, at
104

http://www.microcontentnews.comlarticles!googlebombs.htm (Mar. 3, 2(02) (analyzing the phenomenon in
some detail and subcategorizing the phenomenon into humor bombs, ego bombs, money bombs, and justice
bombs).

\ 05 See Linda Rosencrance, Google Search Leads to Gates of "Hell ", at http://www.computerworld.com!

printthis!2002l0,4814,74566,OO.html (Sept. 25, 2(02).
106
See CNN.com, Google Blips: Search Not Always Right,

at http://www.electricsheep.us/storylEpFFuEE

ypVzCrzbNag.shtmI (Sept. 30, 2(02) (abridged version).

\ 07 See Tom McNichol, Your Message Here, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2004, at G 1 (noting that Yahoo,

HotBot, and MSN also were affected by the bombing).
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Bombing,

programer

Andy

Pressman,

[Vol. 54
whose

"friend"

caused
,, 08
Pressman's website to be listed as the top search result for "talentless hack. 1
A different example of Google putting words into publishers' mouths

occurs with Google' s "description" line of filtering content.

Traditionally,

publishers used description metatags with the hope that search engines would
display them as filtering content.

However, in some circumstances, Google

will automatically generate its own description using "snippets" from the web
page, or it will use descriptions authored by members of the Open Directory
1 09
Project.
Compared to their approaches to algorithmically generated search results,
search engines exercise even more editorial control over advertising they run,
10
taking down (or leaving up) advertising capriciously. 1

6. Reinterpreting Publisher Keywords
Many search engines sell keyword-specific advertisements to publishers.
For example, Canon may pay Google to display an ad for the Canon
PowerShot S400 every time a searcher searches on the keyword "digital
camera."

However, search engines may interpret the advertiser-selected

keywords to include other keywords that the search engine believes are
108

See id.

1 09 See Google, My Site 's Listing Is Incorrect, at http://www.google.comlwebmasters/3 .html (last visited

Apr. I , 2005).
For example, an OOP volunteer editor wrote the following description for my personal website at
http://eric ,goldman.tripod.com: ''The author's speeches, articles, perspectives on cyberspace law and internet
law, the reasons for his name change, and favorite vegetarian restaurants."

See http://search.dmoz.orglcgi

associated

truncates

bin/search?search=eric+goldman (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). On February 22, 2004, this exact language was
with

my

personal

site

in

Google

(although

the

language

after

"for").

See

http://www.google.comlsearch?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=%22eric+goldman%22 (last visited Apr. I,
2(05). I did not write that language, and the description does not appear anywhere on my personal website.
Google's composition of "snippets" has prompted at least one lawsuit because a Certified Public
Accountant believed that the search results language falsely represented that he had been disciplined for
certain violations.

See Seth Fineberg, Calif. CPA Sues Google Over "Misleading" Search Results, Acer.

TODAY, Apr. 19, 2004, at 5.

1 10 See Verne Kopytoff, Google 's Ad Rules Complex, Controversial, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 9, 2004, at FI, F5

(quoting Google's vice president of global online sales and operations as saying "our [ad] policies will always
involve an element of discretion and we reserve the right to reject or approve any ads");

Google Guys,

PLAYBOY, Sept. 2004, 55, 56-57 (quoting Google founder Sergey Brin as saying "we don't accept ads for hard
liquor, but we accept ads for wine. It's just a personal preference . . . . We don't try to put our sense of ethics
into the search results, but we do when it comes to advertising."). For an example of Google's arbitrariness,
see, e.g., MSNBC,

Google Bans Environmental Group 's Ads, Feb. 13, 2004, at http://www.rnsnbc.rnsn.comlid

142635901 (reporting that Google dropped a protest ad against Royal Caribbean Cruises because it does not
accept ads with "language that advocates against Royal Caribbean").
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engines reinterpret

searcher

For example, Google may cause Canon's ad

to be displayed in response to a search on "nikon digital camera," a process
I
that Google calls "broad matching." 1 1
Canon may not even realize that
competitive trademarks are included in the broad matched set.

In the future,

search providers will go further and automatically tell publishers what
I 2
keywords they should use for advertising. 1

7. Advanced Technologies
Search engines are constantly looking for new ways to service searcher
needs. In the long-term, searching may be redefined by collaborative filtering
1 3
or artificial intelligence, 1 the use of personal data or past behavior to provide
1
a context for a keyword search, 1 4 and more customized sorting based on
1 I5
In many cases,
geography or using individualized relevancy algorithms.
these advanced technologies will require the search engine to play an even
more active editorial role in sorting and presenting search results.

In the

shorter-run, search engines will attempt to solve searcher needs through
techniques like merchandising search results (telling searchers "If you like X,
I 6
you will really like Y") and presenting more variations of filtering content. 1

1 1 1 See Google, Expanded Broad Keyword Matching, at https:lladwords.google.comlselect/expanded mat
ching.html (last visited Apr. I, 2005). Netscape and Excite used a variation of the practice, requiring
advertisers to purchase a "bundle" of keywords that would trigger the ads. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1 020, 1 023 (9th Cir. 2004).
1 12 See Stefanie Olsen, Google Preps New Tool To Juice Revenue, CNET News.com, at
http://news.com.coml2102-1024_3-5208492.html?tag=st.utiJ.print (May 10, 2004); Pamela Parker, Google
Widens Test to Froogle Merchants, at http://www.cJickz.comlnewslprint.php/34288 11 (Oct. 29, 2004)
(discussing Google "ad automator" tool that automatically scans merchant product feeds to recommend
keywords that the merchant should purchase). But see Societe des Hotels Meridien v. S.A.R.L. Google
France, NRG 04/3772 (T.G.I. Nanterre, Dec. 1 6, 2004), available at http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tgin
anterre20041216.pdf (criticizing Google for suggesting third party trademarks to advertisers to purchase as
keywords).
1 1 3 See Lisa Guernsey, Making Intelligence a Bit Less Anificial, N.Y. TiMES, May I , 2003, at G I ; Steven
Levy, All Eyes on Google, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2004, at 48, 58.
1 1 4 See Stefanie Olsen, Searching for the Personal Touch, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml21O
2-1024_3-5061 873.html?tag=scutil_print (Aug. 1 1, 2003); Levy, supra note 113, at 55-56 (discussing
Microsoft's research project called "Implicit Query," software that will figure out what searchers should be
asking for without having to interrupt their tasks to initiate a search); Steve Silberman, The Questfor Meaning,
WIRED, Feb. 2000, at 173 (discussing the use of Bayesian filters to detennine user interests based on past
activities). Google's Gmail offering may be an early example of this.
1 1 5 See Stefanie Olsen, Search Upstarts Storm Google 's Gates, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.
comJ2 I 02-1038_3-5 1 7 2 198.html?tag=st.utiJ.print (Mar. 1 1 , 2004); Levy, supra note 1 1 3, at 58.
1 1 6 See, e.g., Google WebQuotes, at http://labs.google.comlcgi-binlwebquotes (last visited Apr. I , 2005).
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8. Summary on Passivity
Because search engines so liberally redeploy content to accomplish their
objectives, a third party (like a plaintiff or a judge) cannot make any
assumptions about why content is presented by a search engine.

A searcher

who searches for the keyword "canon" might see a Nikon search result because
the search engine reinterpreted the searcher's keyword, the search engine
reinterpreted Nikon' s content or a third party linked to Nikon' s website with
the word "canon" in the anchor text.

At the same time, Nikon could try its

hardest to be indexed on the word "canon" but still completely fail to do so
based on search engine policies. One should abandon any legal presumptions
about why a search result or an ad appears to a searcher.

This inquiry is

resolvable only by reference to the facts; and the facts change constantly.

B. Keyword Convergence
Until now, this Article has primarily focused on search engines, particularly
those that generate their databases using automated means.

However, the

historical distinctions between search engines and other Internet search
providers have collapsed. Now, virtually all the major ways that searchers can
obtain Internet content have converged on using keywords as the trigger for
content.

The keyword phenomenon is not limited to text; keywords have
1 I7
become fundamental to searching for all types of media, including photos,
1 18
1 19
musical recordings,
and pornography.
Keywords have emerged as the
new "lingua franca" for every aspect of how the Internet can be used as a
commercial or information resource.

1 1 7 E.g. , Google I mage Se arch, at http://www.google. com!irng hp?hl=en&tab=wi&q=google%20image%
20search(last visited Ap r. 1 , 200 5); Dino. co m, at http://www. dino.com!(Ia st visited Apr. 1 , 200 5); see Kelly
v. Arriba Soft Corp. , 336 F.3 d 81 1 , 8 1 5- 1 6 (9th Cir. 2003 )(discussing the operation of the Dino. co m we bsite
and Dino.com' s liability for cop yrig ht infringement).
1 1 8 Se arche rs looking fo r mu sic files through peer-to-peer file sharing services se arch by artist name and
song title. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3 d 6 43, 646 (7 th Cir. 2003 ); A&M Record s, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1 00 4, 1 0 1 2(9th Cir. 2001 ); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu dio s, I nc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259
F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1 032 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
1 1 9 Parental co ntrol soft ware (sometime s pejo ratively called "censorware ") may use keywords to block
access to pornograp hy and othe r o bjectionable co nte nt. See Reno v. Am. Civil Libertie s Union, 521 U.S. 844,
8 55(1997). Not surprising ly, overreliance on keywords to control acce ss to pornograp hy can block legitimate
publications. Classic e xamples include the word s "breast," which is an e ssential word to o btaining information
about breast cancer, and "couple s, " a word that can be used in se xu al content, which caused the blocking of an
off cial W hite House we bsite p age containing the word. See CNET News. com, SurjWatch To Give Users
More Control, at http://news.com.com!21 02-1023-21 1 1 37. html(May 2, 1996).
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Nevertheless, keyword-based search engines are routinely distinguished
from other types of content searching mechanisms, such as the use of domain
120
names.
This subsection argues that these alternative methods of accessing
content have merged into other forms of keyword searches, so the law should
not treat them differently.

1. Domain Names
The most obvious example of keyword convergence is the DNS, which is
12
just a stylized type of search engine. 1 Just like search engines, the DNS
works by having a searcher submit a keyword (the domain name) to the DNS
and receiving content in return-i.e., the web page located at the Internet
Protocol ("IP") address associated with the domain name.

The DNS differs

from stereotypical search engines in that it only returns one search result (the
122
web page)
and does not provide any filtering content before the searcher
receives the result. However, these are details that go to the implementation of
the search functionality; Google replicates this implementation with its "I'm
1 23
Feeling Lucky" feature.
Although the DNS has a different technical architecture and origin than
search engines, the DNS has always functioned as a search tool. In the 1 990s,
it was not uncommon for searchers to guess domain names as a way to obtain
124
relevant content.
Often, a searcher' s guess would take one of two forms.
The searcher might select a trademark, add the suffix ".com," and assume that
the DNS would retrieve the trademark owner's website (for example, assuming
25
that kodak.com was associated with the Eastman Kodak Company). 1
Or, the
1 20 See, e.g., Nathenson, supra note 53, at 87-88 (discussing the differences between domain name
disputes and efforts to game search engines).

121

See Expert Report of Milton Mueller, Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, Nos. 01 -2648/01 -2725 (E.D. Mich.
at http://www.taubmansucks.comlActI08b.html [hereinafter Mueller Report]. Domain names

2002), available

also can be used for email addresses, raising issues beyond this Article's scope.

1 22 See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003 ).
1 23 See Google, Google Web Search Features, at http http://www.google.comlhelp/features.html (last

visited Apr. I , 2(05).

1 24 Mueller Report, supra note 1 2 1 .
1 25 This proposition has a venerable tradition in case law precedent, starting with one of the earliest

Internet cases.

See MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1 994). Appellate cases also
See, e.g., Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d

endorse this proposition.

687, 691 (6th Cir. 2003); PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Techs.,

L.L.c.,

Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493

3 1 9 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir. 2003);

(2d

Cir. 2(00) ('The most common

method of locating an unknown domain name is simply to type in the company name or logo with the suffix
.com"); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entrn't Corp., 174 F.3d 1 036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1 999)
("Oftentimes, an Internet user will begin by hazarding a guess at the domain name, especially if there is an
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searcher might select some generic noun or verb, add the suffix ".com," and
assume that the associated website would provide content relevant to the noun
or verb (for example, assuming that pets.com would contain information
related to pets).

In either case, the searcher used a keyword ("Kodak" or

"pets") in the DNS system in an effort to get relevant content.
126
However, the DNS was never intended to be a search tool,
and it
127
underperforms as a search tool for several reasons.
First, top level domains
("TLDs") like .com have a "relevancy algorithm" based on the first party to
register the domain name, which is a very weak proxy for relevancy. Second,
searchers do not get any filtering content to make predictive determinations
128
Third,

and do not get the convenience of a summary list of search results.

because keywords are capable of multiple meanings, the "one website per
domain name" architecture produces relevancy on a consistent basis only when
most searchers share a single definition of the keyword (such as in the case of a
well-known fanciful trademark).

Finally, searchers can incur unpleasant
l29
consequences, such as mousetrapping
or unwanted pornography, if the

obvious domain name to try. Web users often assume, as a rule of thumb, that the domain name of a particular
company will be the company name followed by .com."); Panavision Int'! L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 13 16,
1 327 (9th Cir. 1 998).
But see Mueller Report, supra note 1 2 1 (calling the assumption a temporary phenomenon from 1 994 to
1 997 and saying "[n)o systematic empirical evidence quantifying the validity of [these) proposition[s) is
available"). Some cases question these searcher expectations and practices. See. , e.g., Interstellar Starship
Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2002); Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372,
377 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Chatam Int'!, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 1 5 7 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 n.17 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Mach.
Head v. Dewey Global Holdings, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22759, *28 (N.D. Cal. 2001 ); The Network
Network v. CBS, 200 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 475 1 , at * 1 6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 1 6, 2000).
126 Ben Edelman, DNS as a Search Engine: A Quantitative Evaluation, at http://cyber.Jaw.harvard.edulpe
ople/edelman/DNS-as-search/ (July 1 , 2002); Mueller Report, supra note 121.
127
See generally Edelman, supra note 1 26 (comparing the relevance of results generated through domain
name guessing, search engines, and the RealNames keyword system).
128 See Rieh, supra note 25, at 159 (discussing the importance of filtering content to the search process).
One could say that the domain name acts as filtering content, but unless a searcher has other information about
the domain name, it provides little reliable insight into what to expect when a searcher gets there.
1 29 Mousetrapping occurs when a web publisher effectively prevents the searcher from leaving by
disabling the "back" button or by opening new pop-up windows faster than the searcher can close them.
Webopedia.com, Mousetrapping, at http://www.webopedia.comITERMlMlmousetrapping.html (last visited
Apr. 1 , 2005); see FTC v. Zuccarini, 2002 WL 137842 1 , at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9 , 2001) (treating mousetrapping
as an unfair trade practice). See generally Eun S. Bae, Comment, Pop-Up Advertising Online: Slaying the
Hydra, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 39 (2003) (discussing various harms associated with
mousetrapping). Software is increasingly killing pop-up ads automatically, which may minimize (at least for a
while) some of mousetrapping's perniciousness. See Stefanie Olsen, Internet Explorer To Stomp Pop-Ups,
CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml2 102-1032_3-5 105139.html?tag=sCutil_print (Nov. 10, 2003). But
see Stefanie Olsen, Revenge of the Pop- Ups, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml2 102-I024_3-
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searcher makes a typing error 1

545

30

or encounters a domain name that has expired
31
and been re-registered by an unexpected third party. 1
Various attempts have been made to improve the DNS's integrity as a
search database. For example, new TLDs in the recent years have abandoned
the "first to register" relevancy algorithm, giving priority to trademark
1 32
owners.
However, these new TLDs have been used comparatively
infrequently.

1 33

5408453 .html?tag=st.util.print (Oct. 14, 20(4) (discussing how websites are finding ways around the pop-up
ad blockers).
1 30 Domain name registrants who register typographical error versions of popular domain names are
called "typosquatters." See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Elecs. Boutique
Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 2001 WL 83388, at * 1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2001), affd without comment, 33 Fed.
Appx. 647 (3d Cir. 2002); Educ. Tours, Inc. v. Hemisphere Travel, Inc., 2004 WL 8874 17, at *2 (N.D. II.
Apr. 26, 20(4). See generally Dara B. Gilwit, Note, The Latest Cybersquatting Trend: Typosquatters, Their
Changing Tactics, and How To Prevent Public Deception and Trademark Infringement, I I WASH U. J.L. &
POL'y 267 (2003); Benjamin Edelman, Large-Scale Registration of Domains with Typographical Errors, at
http://cyber.\aw.harvard.edulpeople/edelmanltypo-domainsl (Sept. 3, 2003).
Congress criminalized some types of typosquatting in the Truth in Domain Names Act, H.R. 939, 108th
Congo (2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.c. § 2252B). The law criminalizes using a misleading domain name
with the intent to cause minors to view sexually explicit pictures. Notorious typosquatter Zuccarini was
sentenced to thirty months in prison for typosquatting on domain names that might appeal to kids and
redirecting those domain names to advertisements for hard core pornography. See Press Release, U.S.
Department of Justice, "Cyberscarnmer" Sentenced to 30 Months for Using Deceptive Internet Names To
Mislead Minors to X-Rated Sites (Feb. 26, 20(4), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/zuccariniSent.htrn.
1 3 1 This phenomenon is referred to as "porn napping" when pornographers re-register the domain name.
See Mike Wendland, Expired Domains Present Opportunity for Net Porn, DETROIT FREE PREss, at
http://www.freep.com!money/techlmwendI 6_2oo205 16.htrn (May I 6. 2002). In one incident. a link from
Senator Orrin Hatch's website was porn napped, leading some to wonder if Senator Hatch endorsed
pornography. See Robert Gehrke, Hatch Removes Mistaken link to Porn Site, at http://www.sunherald.com!
mld/sunherald/61 36653.htm (June 20, 2003).
1 32 More recently, new TLDs such as .info, and .us, and the .kids.us domain, have modified the first to
register approach, using techniques like segmented registration periods where only registrants possessing a
registered trademark in the domain name can register during the initial period. See Afilias.info, The Sunrise
Period, at http://ww.afilias.info/register/schedule!sunrise .Period (July 26, 2001).
1 33 See Caslon Analytics, Profile: Domains and the DNS, at http://www.caslon.com.auldomainsprofilel.
htrn (Oct. 2003); see also Ben Edelman, Registrations in Open ccTLDs, at http://cyber.\aw.harvard.edulpeople
/Edelmanlopen-cctlds/ (July 22, 2002) ("more than 80% [of .cc, .tv, and .ws domains] lead only to
placeholders or to no web content at all," a substantially higher percentage than in .com, .net, and .org); Ben
Edelman, Survey of Usage of the . US TW, at http://cyber.Jaw.harvard.edulpeople/edelman/dotusl (Sept. 20,
2002) (less than 15% of .us domains provide web content); Francis Hwang, Do Domain Names Matter?, at
http://fhwang.net/writing/do_domain_names_matter.html (July 25, 2003) (citing how most prominent
museums have avoided using the .museum TLD, preferring to use the .org TLD); Jonathan Zittrain &
Benjamin Edelman, Survey of Usage of the .BIZ TLD, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edultldsloo l / (June 25, 2002)
("74% of currently registered .BIZ domains provide no web content or provide only error messages or
placeholders.").
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Also, some domain names resolve to a "gateway page" (also referred to as
,, 134
a "shared page" or "intermediate page )
for the sole purpose of allowing
multiple trademark owners or licensees to "share" the domain name through
135
links on the page to their respective sites.
Finally, as a DNS alternative, RealNames deployed a keyword system
where a searcher could type a keyword into their software and receive a list of
136
websites that paid to be associated with that keyword.
RealNames
137
ultimately failed,
perhaps due to searcher migration away from domain
names or perhaps because RealNames delivered less relevant results than
138
search engines did.
None of the efforts to improve DNS quality have rehabilitated the DNS as a
useful search tool.

Instead, the DNS ' s shortcomings have led to two

interesting developments in the keyword convergence process. First, domain
name registries increasingly treat domain names as triggers for search results
139
In May 2003 , searchers arriving at unregistered

just like search engines dO.

domain names in the .biz and .us TLDs, operated by NeuStar, received paid
l40
search results instead of a typical error page.
NeuStar' s trial program only
lasted for a few days, but the concept re-emerged in September 2003 when
VeriSign launched its "Site Finder" program, which presented search results
141
instead of a "page not found" message for the .com and .net TLDs.

r

Besieged by a firestorm of 0 position, VeriSign suspended the program after
14
two weeks in October 2003 .

1 34 Prominent examples include scrabble.com, playtex.com, and disc.com. See David H. Bernstein et aI.,
Trademark and Unfair Competition Issues, PLI GO-OOD2, n.45 (July 2(00).
1 35 See Puneet Singh, Gateway Pages: A Solution to the Domain Name Conflict?, 9 1 TRADEMARK REp.
1226 (200 1 ) .
1 36 See Danny Sullivan, Goodbye Domain Names, Hello ReaINames?, at hnp://www.searchenginewatch.
com/sereport/print.php/34721_2 1 6261 1 (May 3, 2(00).
1 37 See David McGuire. RealNames Going Out of Business, Shutting Down Keywords, WASH. POST, May
I I . 2002. at hnp://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2lwp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A46802002May l l &notFound=true.
1 38 See Edelman. supra note 126.
1 39 See Nick Wingfield, Internet Companies See Value in Misaddressed Web Traffic, WALL ST. J., Sept 5.
2003. at B 1 (discussing how AOL. MSN, and others deliver search results instead of error messages).
1 40 See id.
14 1 See VeriSign, Inc., VeriSign 's Site Finder Implementation. at http://www.verisign.com/resources/gd!
sitefmder/implementation.pdf (Aug. 27. 2(03).
1 42 Press Release. VeriSign, Inc., VeriSign Site Finder Service Update (Sept. 23, 2(03). available at
hnp://www.verisign.com/corporate/news!2003/PC2OO3 1 003 .html. The opposition included three lawsuits
against VeriSign by GoDaddy. Popular Enterprises, and class-action lawyer Ira Rothken.
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These successive efforts by NeuStar and VeriSign strongly indicate that
domain names are converging with other keyword-based search methods.
With these programs, the registries try to present content that a searcher will
,, 143
In
find more useful than a page saying "your search failed-tough luck.

other words, the registries are delivering search results in response to

searchers' keywords.

While the NeuStar and VeriSign programs may be on
144
hiatus, other TLDs deliver keyword-triggered ads for unregistered domains,
and it seems inevitable that more TLDs will do so because searchers have a
45

better experience and registries make some easy money. 1

A second principal example of domain name convergence can be seen from
searcher keyword choices at search engines. Consider the following list of top
147
l46
keywords searched at various meta-search engines
in Summer 2002:

1 43 See Elizabeth Olson, Profits in Missed Exits on Information Highway, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 1 5 , 2003, at
C4 (quoting a VeriSign executive as saying "A year ago, we were asking our users what was difficult for them
. . . [a]nd what we came up with was the frostration of not being able to find what they wanted" and noting that
AOL removed its basic error message because it was confusing consumers).

1 44 Other 1LDs and ccTLDs that present search results for unregistered domains include .cc, .museum,
VeriSign Redirects Error Pages, CNET News.com, at http://news.

.nu, .ph, .tm, and .ws. Declan McCullagh,

com.coml2 1 02-1 032_3·S077S30.html?tag=scutil-print (Sept. 16, 2(03).

1 45 Cf Stefanie Olsen, Cravingfor 'Clicks ' Bogs Down Search, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.

coml2 102.1038_3-S088SS2.html?tag=st_util_print (Oct. 8, 2003) (discussing the myriad ways, legitimate and
not, that search providers try to generate new search sessions).

1 46 A meta-search engine compiles search results from multiple search engines, allowing a searcher to
Wendy Boswell, Meta Search Engine,
ABoUT. COM, at http://websearch.about.comlodlmlglmeta_search_eng.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2(05).
1 47 Wordtracker.com, Search Engine Guide: Wordtracker: Top 500 Keyword Report, at http://www.searc

search these disparate search engines with a single search query.

hengineguide.comlwtl2002J0729_wtl .html (July 29, 2(02). Although the phenomenon has abated somewhat,
in November 2004 the top 20 searched keywords still include Google (#1), eBay (#2), Yahoo (#3), Mapquest
(#7), Yahoo.com (#8), and Hotrnail (#15).

See Wordtracker.com, Top 500 Keywords of the Week, at

http://www.searchengineguide.comlwtl200411 1 1 7_wtl .html (Nov. 17, 2004).
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Table 1: Top Keywords Searched at Meta-Search Engines
Rank

#1
#3
#7
#8
#9
#13
#15
#18
#20

Yahoo
Hotmail
Hotmail.com
Yahoo.com
www.hotmail.com

In all of these cases, if the searcher was looking for the website, they could
have merely put the search term into the address bar instead of going to a meta
1 8
search engine. 4
Especially striking are the keywords ..www.hotmail.com..
and ..www.yahoo.com... where searchers had all of the information they

needed to find the website merely by entering the keyword into the address
bar. However, searchers-enough to rank these keywords in the top twenty of
all searched keywords--chose to initiate their search at a search engine instead
of typing the keyword into their address bar, even though the latter would have
been more efficient.
This search behavior may portend the eventual death of domain names.
Some

searchers,

frustrated

with the DNS 's

low

relevancy or

adverse

consequences, like typo squatting, porn-napping, and mousetrapping, may have

search at a search engine instead of entering
149
domain names into the address bar.
For some searchers, search engines

become trained to start

every

have supplanted the DNS' s core search function of delivering known websites.

In tum, top search engine placements have eclipsed domain names as the
premier Internet locations.

150

1 48 See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp 204 F.R.D. 460. 468 (C.D. Cal. 2001 )
(characterizing a search for nissan.com in a search engine as "pointless").
1 49 A universal search methodology eliminates the transaction cost of time spent making choices about
each search.
1 50 See Dan Gillmor. 'Goog/e Effect ' Reduces Need for Many Domains. SILICONVALLEY.COM, at
http://www.bayarea.comlmldlsiliconvalleylbusiness/columnists/dan�illmorI253 l 424.htrn?template=contentM
odules/printstory.jsp (Jan. 1 2. 2002) (describing how the author let domain name registrations lapse because
search engine placement had become more important than the domain names); Tamara Loomis. Domain Name
Disputes Decline as Internet Matures. at http://www.nylawyer.comlnews/03/02l020603c.html (Feb. 6. 2003)
.•
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2. Link Navigation
Although keyword convergence has been especially pronounced in the
domain name arena, it is also occurring with respect to link navigation.
Specifically, searchers navigating around websites implicitly trigger keyword
searches whether the searcher knows it or not.
Historically, web publishers organized taxonomies manually, meaning that
an editor would manually determine the organization of links.

Increasingly,

however, publishers use links in a taxonomical structure to trigger searches in
151
For example, if a taxonomy has a navigation link

the publisher's database.

called "digital cameras," that link could cause the display of information
resources that the web publisher manually assembled, or the link could trigger
a search for the keyword "digital camera" in the publisher's searchable
15 2
Either approach leads to the same outcome:
The publisher

database.

presents putatively relevant content about "digital cameras" to the searcher.
Meanwhile, by dynamically generating a search results page, the publisher can
take advantage of constantly changing data in the database without having to
manually maintain each page.
Link navigation triggers keyword searches in a second way: through search
engine programs that "distribute" search results and paid advertising. Google' s
153
"AdSense" program is a flagship example of these distribution programs.
Web publishers that participate in the AdSense program place Google-supplied
HTML code on their web pages. When a visitor accesses one of those pages,
the HTML code asks Google' s servers to supply ads to the visitor in

(citing a trademark attorney who said domain name registrations were becoming less important due to search
engines).
BI

See generally Carl Bialik, Lawyers Bid Up Value of Web-Search Ads,

WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2004, at

(discussing how lawyers pay $90 or more per click on advertisements triggered by the keyword

"mesothelioma attorney").
Not surprisingly, the changes in searcher behavior has adversely affected the value of domain names.

See Joanna Glasner, Looking for the Beef (.com), at http://www.wired.comlnews/printlO . l 294.58763.OO.html
(May 12, 2003). This change has correspondingly reduced the number of fights over them. See Loomis, supra
(citing statistics that Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy

("UDRP")

proceedings dropped 50%

See generally Milton Mueller, Success by Default: A New Profile of Domain Name Trademark
Disputes Under ICANN's UDRP, at http://dcc.syr.edulmarkie/markie-report-final.pdf (June 24, 2002).
1 5 1 See Hagen, supra note 53, at 16.
in two years).

1 5 2 In light o f concept searching, a taxonomy-initiated search could, in fact, use different or additional

words to "digital camera" without the searcher even knowing or realizing it.

1 53

See Google, Google AdSense Overview, at https:llwww;google.com!adsense!overview (last visited
See generally Stefanie Olsen, All the Search That's Fit to Print?, CNET News.com, at

Apr. I, 2005).

http://news.com.coml2 102-1 023-984252.html (Feb.

1 2,

2003) (discussing a range of news publishers who

display paid search listings from Google or Overture).
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conjunction with the web page. Google's proprietary algorithms evaluate the
publisher' s page to automatically assess what keywords best characterize that
page.

Google then serves keyword-triggered ads to the web visitor.

By

dynamically assessing the page' s contents and selecting ads based on that
assessment, AdSense increases the likelihood that an ad will be relevant to the
page ' s content-and thus to the searcher as well. From a technical standpoint,
the net effect is that visitors receive these keyword-triggered ads as they
navigate around the Internet, irrespective of whether they intended to conduct
dynamic searches.
Google' s AdSense program, and the many other competitive keyword
154
triggered ad programs,
have revitalized an Internet advertising industry that
155
virtually collapsed in the early 2000S.
Their phenomenal success is
attributable to a simple fact: Contextually relevant keyword-triggered ads do a
better job of meeting searcher objectives than other ways of delivering ads to
consumers.

Based on this fact, advertisers and publishers will continue to

favor keyword-triggered ads.

3. Software Agents
Software agents

are software tools that present content based on a

searcher' s perceived interests. Although these software agents are sometimes
pejoratively maligned as "adware," software agents can deliver more than just
paid advertisements.
Often, the software agents will make judgments about a searcher' s possible
156
Like AdSense, software

interests based on the searcher's online conduct.

agents contextually determine keywords to trigger search content.
For
l57
example, adware vendor WhenU.com
treats the searcher' s input of a domain
name into the address bar as a search and, in response, delivers advertising

1 54 See Danny Sullivan, Overture 's Content Match Takes on Google's Contextual Ads, at http://www.
searchenginewatch.comlsearchday/print.php/347 1 1_2230221 (July 2, 2003) (comparing Overture's Content
Match program with Google's AdSense program).
1 55 See Jim Hu, Online Ad Sales Hit New High, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.coml2 102-1024_35 1 58 1 88.html?tag=st.util.print (Feb. 12, 2004) ("Much of this growth has come from commercial search
. . . . ).
1 56 See David Bank, What's That Sneaking into Your Computer?, WAL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at R I
(discussing the various factors considered b y software agents).
1 57 WhenU.com is one of an emerging class of "adware" vendors. Adware is software that resides on a
user's computer and causes ads to be displayed to the user. See Adware.info, Quck Reference on Adware and
Spyware Software, at http://www.adware.info/ (last visited Apr. I , 2005).
"
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content that WhenU.com thinks is responsive to that keyword.

158

As with the

other methods of Internet search, the designated keyword becomes the link
between the searcher' s objectives and putatively relevant content.
Although software agents often operate passively (in the sense that
searchers do not affirmatively choose them in Stage 2), software agents still
respond to keywords affirmatively selected by the searcher, making them
indistinguishable

from

other intermediaries

delivering

keyword-triggered

content.
4.

Implications of Keyword Convergence

Historically, legal doctrines have treated Internet search methods as legally
,, 159
distinct "SilOS.
However, technology, business practices, and searcher
behavior have effectively mooted the distinctions between domain names,
search engines, directories, and other search approaches. Instead, virtually all
Internet searches are now keyword-driven, as that methodology (combined
with skillful content presentation by search providers and publishers) does a
superior job helping searchers accomplish their objectives. This insight should
changes the way one thinks about policymaking regarding Internet search.
Integrated laws that reflect the converged keyword-driven search environment
are essential.

1 58

For example, WhenU.com uses the phrase " 1800contacts.com" as a keyword to trigger competitive
ads. See 1 -800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2(03).
1 59 For example, legislators have passed a number of laws treating domain names as a special class of
keywords. See, e.g., Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-1 1 3 , 1 1 3 Stat. 1501
( 1 999); Truth in Domain Names Act, H.R. 939, 108th Congo (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.c. § 2252B)
(prohibiting the use of misleading domain names that lead children to pornography); Dot Kids Implementation
and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-3 17, 1 1 6 Stat. 2767 (2002) (creating and implementing a kid-safe
Internet zone at .kids.us); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1 7525 28 (West 1997) (prohibiting the bad faith
registration, use or trafcking of another person's name as a domain name).
However, Congress may be realizing the convergence between keywords and other forms of keywords.
See Children's Online Safety Act of 2004, H.R. 4305, 108th Congo (2004) (proposing to extend 1 8 U.S.c.
§ 2252B to apply to domain names and metatags equally).
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V. THE DEVOLUTION OF INTERNET TRADEMARK LAW

A. A Brief Primer on Trademark Law
Federal trademark law
ways:

trademark
163
cybersquatting.

l60

applies to Internet conduct in three principal
1 62
161
anti
trademark
dilution ,
and

infringement,

While all three laws have important implications for

Internet search, this Article focuses on trademark infringement.
Trademark infringement prohibits trademark use in a manner that "is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection , or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin , sponsorship , or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
I64
activities by another person. "
This prohibition serves dual purposes:
protecting consumers from confusion when making purchasing decisions and
protecting producers' investments in quality that creates consumer goodwill
165
towards them.
In addition , by reducing confusion and sharpening the
communicative effects of words, trademarks can help lower consumer search
166
costs,
an outcome that benefits searchers, trademark owners seeking to be
found, and society in general.
The common law has developed a multifactor test to determine the
167
likelihood that , when two parties use the same or a similar trademark,
consumers will be confused about the source of their respective goods and
services.

This Article refers to the multifactor likelihood of consumer

confusion test as the "MFLOCC" test. Each federal circuit has developed its

160 This Article concentrates on federal law. Many state laws track federal trademark laws closely enough

that this Article's analysis applies equally to them.
161 1 5 U.S.c. § I I 25(a) (2000).

162 Trademark dilution protects owners of famous trademarks from junior uses that reduce the trademark's

capacity to act as source identifiers. Id. § I I 25(c).
1 63 Anticybersquaning protects trademark owners from bad faith registrations of confusingly similar or
dilutive domain names. Id. § 1 125(d).
1 64 Id. § 1 1 25(a)( 1)(A).

1 65 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 1 59, 163-64 ( 1 995).
166 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41
Hous. L. REv. 777 (2004); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcON. 265 ( 1 987).

167 The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination

thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown. "
1 5 U.S.C. § 1 127.

HeinOnline -- 54 Emory L.J. 552 2005

DEREGULATING RELEVANCY

2005]

553

own set of factors to consider under the MFLOCC test, although the factors are
similar across the circuits.

Frequently referenced versions of the MFLOCC
l68
test include the Ninth Circuit's Sleekcraft test
and the Second Circuit's
69
1
Polaroid test.
Professor McCarthy provides a summary version of an
MFLOCC test using the following factors:
•

The degree of resemblance between the conflicting designations;

•

The similarity of the marketing methods and channels of distribution;

•

The characteristics of the prospective purchasers and the degree of
care they exercise;

•

The degree of distinctiveness of the senior user' s mark;

•

Where the goods or services are not competitive, the likelihood that
prospective buyers would expect the senior user to expand into the
field of the j unior user;

•

Where the goods or services are sold in different territories, the extent
to which the senior user's designation is known in the junior user's
territory;

•

The intent of the junior user; and

•

Evidence of actual confusion.

170

B. The Breakdown o/ the MFLOCC Test and Goodwill Misappropriation
The MFLOCC test has not fared well in the Internet era. The MFLOCC
test is a workhorse, expected to apply with equal vigor across multiple media
and contexts ranging from product packaging to corporate names, from
television advertisements to decorated blimps.
fits-all test will have some frayed edges.

Not surprisingly, a one-size

Internet search has exposed two of those edges. First, Internet cases have
accelerated a nascent judicial trend to use legal heuristics to bypass the
MFLOCC test. Second, Internet cases have exposed trademark law ' s inability
to sharply distinguish between the different ways words can be used.

168 See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekeraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
169 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elees. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
1 70 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:29 (4th ed.
2(03).
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The "goodwill misappropriation" doctrine illustrates both deficiencies.
Some courts use goodwill misappropriation as an alternative to the MFLOCC
171
test in finding infringement.
Other courts use goodwill misappropriation as
an analytical tool to evaluate one or more of the MFLOCC factors, but
goodwill misappropriation replaces any concrete demonstration of plaintiff
172
harm.
In both cases, goodwill misappropriation is a conclusion rather than
an analytical tool; if a junior user can be said to have misappropriated the
senior user's goodwill, then the junior user has infringed.
The

misuse

definitional,

as

of the

goodwill

there is

misappropriation

no uniformly

accepted

doctrine

definition

is

partially

of goodwill

misappropriation. McCarthy describes goodwill in at least five different ways:
"the lure of the place," "the lure to return," "buyer momentum," "the legal and
economic recognition of buying habits," and the "expectancy of continued
,, 173
patronage.
With so many definitions, the goodwill misappropriation
doctrine provides courts with flexibility to reach any desired conclusion. As a
result, goodwill misappropriation analysis adds little to an infringement
analysis.
Considering how trademarks can be used as communicative tools in
Internet

searching

provides

a

better

understanding

of

goodwill
74
misappropriation and distinguish it from other forms of trademark uses. 1

This Article will explore three types of uses: referential uses, associative uses,
and misappropriative uses.

While these three uses are not exhaustive, the

interaction between them sheds important light on the Internet search context.
1.

Referential Uses

Words

l75

successfully transfer information between a speaker and listener

when both parties attach the same meaning to them. Mechanically, when the
speaker uses a word, the listener attempts to cognitively associate the word
with a pre-existing definition.

If the listener does not have a pre-existing

1 7 1 See Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2(02); Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entrn't Corp., 174 F.3d 1 036 (9th Cir. 1 999).
1 72 See 1 -800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2(03).
1 73 I McCARTHY, supra note 170, § 2: 1 8.
1 74 See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 166, at 786-88 (discussing the role of trademarks in
lending precision to words as communicative tools).
1 75 This discussion principally refers to word trademarks, but this discussion applies with equal force to
nonword trademarks.
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definition and cannot figure out a definition from the context, the word fails to
communicate.
176
Trademarks work the same way.
A speaker using a trademark attempts
to cognitively trigger the listener' s definition for the trademark. However,
trademarks have special properties as words because the trademark owner has
caused consumers to establish a new and unique definition in their minds-i.e.,
when a listener is exposed to X's trademark, the listener thinks of X's
1
products. 77
By definition, trademarks necessarily enter the social lexicon. 178 Once a
trademark owner has created a new proprietary definition for a term, the term
becomes the exclusive way to reference that definition; there is no other
179
effective way to implicate that definition without doing SO.
Therefore, if I
ask my wife to pick up a package of "Sudafed" at the drugstore, I am hoping
she and I will each make the same cognitive association-the association
created by Pfizer.
I

define trademark use for its lexical content, not as a source identifier, as a
"referential use." My reference to Sudafed treats Sudafed just like any other
word as the only logical term available to describe the referent.
Referential uses should not be restricted by trademark law, which applies
,,
only to trademark "uses in commerce. 180 Therefore, my repeated use of the
term Sudafed in this Article should be excluded from trademark law on that
basis. Alternatively, referential use in commerce still should not be trademark
infringement because there should be no consumer confusion about the
referent's source. In some cases, courts excuse referential use under the

1 76 Landes & Posner, supra note 166. See generally Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications

Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1 070 (CD. Cal. 1 999) (treating "Playboy" and "Playmate" as dictionary words, not

terms), rev 'd 354 F.3d 1020(9th Cir. 2004).
1 77 This is true whether the word has a single definition (i.e., only one trademark owner has trademark
rights in the word) or if multiple trademark owners all have protectable rights in the same word. In the latter
trademar

ffd

case, the word can take on additional definitions in the consumer's mind, but the consumer distinguishes each
definition from the others.

1 78 See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE LJ. 1687,

1711(1999).

1 79 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2(02)(giving examples of how

silly it would be to try to describe the Chicago Bulls basketball team without using the words "Chicago Bulls"
or Playboy Magazine without using the word "Playboy").

1 80 1 5
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(2000).
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"nominative use" doctrine, 181 which applies when a junior user uses a
trademark to describe the senior user' s prodUCt. 182
2. Associative Uses

Some referential uses form associations in the listener's mind with other
words or concepts that the listener already knows. A paradigmatic example is
183
comparative advertising.
To make the comparison, the junior user needs the
listener to associate the junior user' s product with the senior user' s product, by
finding common properties between the two products, such as that the products
serve the same consumer need, but the junior user' s product has a superior
attribute (e.g., cheaper price or better quality).
Associative trademark uses thus work similarly to referential trademark
uses. In each case, the junior user taps into the listener's pre-existing
definition and uses the word for that referential effect. However, in associative
uses, the junior user links that trademark' s definition with some
communicative point the junior user is trying to make.
If the communicative point is that the junior user's product comes from the
senior user, the junior user may be creating confusion about the product' s
source and the trademark use may be infringing. The Article revisits this point
under misappropriative uses. False associative uses may create harms beyond
trademark infringement, such as false advertising or possibly trademark
dilution.

181

McCarthy defines nominative use as "a use of another's trademark to identify. not the defendant's
goods or services, but the plaintiff s goods or services . . . so long as there is no likelihood of confusion." 3
McCARTHY, supra note 170, § 23: 1 1 ; see Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 3 1 8 F.3d 900, 903--D4 (9th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 824 (2003); Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 801 . Sometimes the term "nominative
U
����
182 Not all courts recognize nominative use as a defense. See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.c.,

3 1 9 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003), overruled in part by 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004); see also Chad J. Doellinger,
Nominative Fair Use: Jardine and the Demise of a Doctrine, I Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PRoP. 66 (2003),
available at http://www.law.northwestern.eduljournalslnjtip!v lln1l5. Under my approach, the plaintiff cannot
establish a prima facie case of trademark infringement when a trademark is used referentially in the Internet
context, so there should be no need to reach defenses.
1 83
Another example of associative use is parody. For a trademark parody to work, the trademark must be
used enough to conjure up the subject trademark. See 5 McCARTHY, supra note 1 70, § 3 1 : 153; see also Davis
& Boustani, supra note 38, at 10 1 1 (discussing initial interest confusion and parody).
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Otherwise, accurate associative uses help consumers by facilitating useful
l84
cognitive links.
If Canon says that "If you are considering a Nikon digital
camera, you should also consider Canon's digital cameras," the associative use
helps the listener understand that there are two product families in the digital
camera group of products, and both Canon and Nikon may fill the same
consumer needs. Unquestionably, this type of statement references the
definition of "Nikon" in consumer's heads, but linking the definition of Nikon
to Canon facilitates a quick understanding of Canon products' properties and
SS
how they interrelate with the already-known properties of Nikon's products. I
This may also cause the consumer to expand his or her consideration set, but so
long as the consumer's search is not tainted by some defect (like credibility
transference, as discussed below), adding competitors to a consumer's search
S6
promotes socially beneficial competition. I Canon could reach the same point
by brute force-that is, by defining its product attributes without any
association to Nikon's attributes-but this is both socially wasteful and, more
importantly, the consumer ends up worse off because the consumer' s
respective understandings of the attributes of Canon and Nikon are less easily
S7
compared. I
The previous example focused on comparative advertising and suggests
that any accurate comparative advertising should be a permitted associative
SS
use. I
More generally, any associative uses that help consumers build
cognitive taxonomies of relationships between products and services should be

1 84 See Stacey L. Dogan, A n Exclusive Right To Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REv. 29 1 , 3 1 6-19 (2003) (discussing

some of the social benefits that can arise when a junior user evokes a senior user).
1 85 See August Storck K.O. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting how comparative
advertising referencing the competitor helps consumers because "[tJhey leam at a glance what kind of product
is for sale and how it differs from a known benchmark").
186 See Katherine Ivancevich, Comment, Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corporation: Perpetuating
the Metatag Fallacy, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35 1 , 383 84 (2002) (discussing how trademark
owners will feel competitive pressure to improve their products as a result); Brian D. Kaiser, Note,
Contributory Trademark Infringement by Internet Service Providers: An Argument for Limitation, 7 J. TECH.
L. & POL'y 65, 99 (2002) (same).
1 87 The Federal Trade Commission encourages narning competitors in comparative advertising. See 16
C.F.R. § 14. 1 5(b) (2004) ("Commission policy in the area of comparative advertising encourages the narning
of, or reference to competitiors [sic], but requires clarity, and, if necessary, disclosure to avoid deception of the
consumer.").
188 See generally 4 McCARTHY, supra note 1 70, § 25:52 (trying to make sense of confused comparative
advertising jurisprudence).
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ex.cluded from trademark infringement. Nothing proprietary to the trademark
.
. .
18
. taken In
owner IS
th'IS aSSOCIatIve
process. 9
3. Misappropriative Uses

In contrast, a class of associative uses goes beyond building cogrutlve
taxonomies. At some point, the association also takes advantage of a
trademark owner' s goodwill, and should be classified as a misappropriative
use.
To distinguish associative uses from misappropriative uses, there should be
a clearer understanding of consumer goodwill. As indicated earlier, goodwill
has no broadly accepted definition, so I offer my own: Goodwill represents a
consumer's aggregated positive feelings towards the trademark owner's
products that may facilitate subsequent transactions with the trademark owner.
A junior user can take advantage of these positive feelings towards the senior
user to increase a consumer's propensity to transact with the junior user.
Goodwill misappropriation occurs when a junior user makes a trademark
associative use that causes consumers to transfer good feelings established by
the senior user over to the junior user, and the junior user derives some benefit
from that transference . This Article refers to the transference of good feelings
as "credibility transference."
Properly cabined within the MFLOCC test, treating this misappropriative
use as goodwill misappropriation serves a valuable purpose. To find goodwill
misappropriation, courts should isolate the good feelings developed by the
senior user, determine how those good feelings have been transferred to the
junior user, and identify some benefit the junior user derived from the
transference. As a practical matter, a properly executed MFLOCC test will
make many of these inquiries; this means that the goodwill misappropriation
doctrine should collapse back into the MFLOCC test. Indeed, McCarthy
counsels that trademark "misappropriation" should not be used as a shortcut
around trademark law's standard doctrines. 190

1 89 See John P. Liefeld, How Surveys Overestimate the Likelihood of Consumer Confusion, 93
TRADEMARK REp. 939, 962--Q3 (2003) (pointing out that just because a consumer has a trademark definition in
his or her head, the consumer is not necessarily confused at time of purchase).
190 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1 70, § 10:72. McCarthy adds: "[Olne cannot dispense with the carefully
constructed requirements for trademark protection by blithely claiming that defendant 'misappropriated' some
symbol of plaintiff . . " [d.
.

.
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Unfortunately, some courts have used goodwill misappropriation in a far
less nuanced way. Instead of requiring credibility transference, courts have
found trademark infringement in situations where associative uses, or in some
cases mere referential uses, were being made. Such unrestrained views of
misappropriative uses makes trademark law unpredictable, illogical and
socially counterproductive, by inhibiting socially beneficial or necessary
secondary uses.
C.

Initial Interest Confusion

The "initial interest confusion" doctrine ("lIC") exemplifies the devolution
of trademark law. lIC lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification,
and a uniform standard for analyzing claims. With its doctrinal flexibility, lIC
has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut down junior users who have
not actually engaged in misappropriative uses.
1.

The Development of the Doctrine

lIC traces its roots to the 1975 Second Circuit case Grotrian, Helferich,
1 91
Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. Steinway & Sons.
In that case, two high-end
piano manufacturers used trademarks that were partial homonyms ("Steinway"
and "Grotrian-Steinweg," with the latter word pronounced in German
phonetically the same as Steinway). Although piano purchasers are careful
and sophisticated, the court still found the trademark usage harmful:
The harm to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a consumer,
hearing the "Grotrian-Steinweg" name and thinking it had some
connection with "Steinway," would consider it on that basis. The
"Grotrian-Steinweg" name therefore would attract potential
customers based on the reputation built up by Steinway in this
The harm to Steinway in short is the
country for many years.
likelihood that potential piano purchasers will think that there is some
1 92
connection between the Grotrian-Steinweg and Steinway pianos.

Although the Second Circuit did not expressly state it, the court predicated the
harms on credibility transference between competitors. In other words,
potential piano purchasers might transfer their good sentiments towards
Steinway pianos to the benefit of Steinway' s competitor. Thus, if piano
purchasers considered Stein way a credible choice based on their past
19 1 523 F.2d 133 1 (2d Cir. 1975).
192 [d. at 1 342 (footnote omitted).
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interactions with the brand, Grotrian-Steinweg might also be considered a
credible choice if the purchasers viewed the two competitors as related.
Perhaps recognizing the risks of recognizing harm even when the implied
sponsorship does not directly cost the trademark owner sales, the court issued
two important caveats. First, the court said that the mere possibility of
consumers making an association between the two companies would not be
193
enough.
Second, the court immediately cautioned that "each trademark
,194
suggesting the court was
infringement case is to some extent sui generis,,
concerned that this particular portion of the ruling would be applied too
mechanically.
The Second Circuit reiterated the link between IIC and credibility
transference in a 1987 case involving two companies in the oil business, Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp. 195 Mobil Oil had a consumer-oriented
196
retail petroleum business branded under its familiar Pegasus logO.
Mobil
Oil also had a business-to-business bulk oil trading business that did not use
the Pegasus logo. The junior user, Pegasus Petroleum, competed with Mobil
Oil in the oil trading business but not the retail consumer business. The court
observed that Pegasus Petroleum gained additional credibility in initial sales
pitches because bulk oil customers miftht assume, based on the name, that
97
Pegasus was associated with Mobil Oil.
Based on that implicit association,
customers might be willing to listen to Pegasus's sales pitch where they may
have otherwise rejected it. Thus, despite the purchasers' sophistication and no
evidence of actual confusion, Pegasus Petroleum misappropriated goodwill
from Mobil Oil.
Grotrian and Mobil Oil squarely locate lIe in the realm of sponsorship
198
In other words, the credibility transference is problematic
confusion.
because the purchaser may believe that the senior user is sponsoring or
affiliated with the junior user. While sponsorship confusion is not a crystal
clear doctrine, treating the lIe doctrine as a subset of sponsorship confusion
kept lIe from having a huge impact on trademark jurisprudence.

1 93 /d. at 1 342 n.20.
1 94 [d. at 1342.
1 95

1 96

8 1 8 F.2d 254 (2d CiT. 1 987).

�

1 97 Mobil Oil Corp. , 8 1 8 F.2d at 259.

1 98 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 170, §§ 23:6, 23.8.

HeinOnline -- 54 Emory L.J. 560 2005

2005]

DEREGULATING RELEVANCY

561

In 1999, in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment
199
Corp. , the Ninth Circuit divorced IIC from credibility transference. Instead,
Brookfield merely required searcher "diversion." In this case, Brookfield
commercially licensed, under the trademark "moviebuff," databases of
2OO
entertainment industry information targeted towards high-end customers.
Meanwhile, West Coast intended to make available a searchable database of
movie information at moviebuff.com and include the term "moviebuff.com" in
its keyword metatags. The court found that, as the junior user, West Coast's
20
domain name infringed using a standard MFLOCC analysis. 1
Addressing keyword metatags, the court found IIC because West Coast's
keyword metatags diverted traffic from Brookfield to West Coast, which meant
that West Coast "impro�erly benefit[ed] from the goodwill that Brookfield
,, 2 2
developed in its mark.
The court explained its reasoning with a billboard
analogy:
Using another' s trademark in one's metatags is much like posting
a sign with another's trademark in front of one's store. Suppose
West Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster") puts up a
billboard on a highway reading-"West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead
at Exit 7"-where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but
Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's
store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to
locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the
highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers who
prefer West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue
searching for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster right there.
Customers are not confused in the narrow sense: they are fully aware
that they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to
believe that Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored by,
West Coast. Nevertheless, the fact that there is only initial consumer
confusion does not alter the fact that Blockbuster would be
203
misappropriating West Coast' s acquired goodwil1.
The Article defers a substantive critique of this analogy to Part V.C.3. For
now, the analogy illustrates how Brookfield changed the basis of lIC from
credibility transference to diversion. As the analogy states, customers do not
199

200
20 1
202
203

174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
[d. at 104!.
See id. at 1054-60.
[d. at 1062.
[d. at 1064.

I
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consider Blockbuster because of some transferred credibility from West Coast;
instead, customers transact with Blockbuster because the advertising diverted
them to a place where Blockbuster would be considered.
The Brookfield definition of lIC reflects this shift. Brookfield defined lIC
as "the use of another' s trademark in a manner calculated to capture initial
consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result
,,
of the confusion. 204 The linchpin is capturing initial consumer attention;
everything after that appears immaterial. 205
Following Brookfield, courts have characterized lIC in a variety of ways. 206
,,
Some courts have focused on "deceptive diversion. 207 For example, IIC in the
Seventh Circuit has required bait-and-switch competitive passing off208 or
some deception that causes consumers to think the junior user is the senior
user.209
lO
Other courts have focused on competitive diversion? For example, in the
January 2004 Playboy v. Netscape ruling, the Ninth Circuit redefined lIC as
"customer confusion that creates initial interest in a competitor's product.

204 Id. at 1062 (quotations and citations omitted). McCarthy echoes this definition. See 3 MCCARTHY,
supra note 170, § 23 :6.
Other cases have used more abbreviated definitions, such as "momentary" or "brief' confusion. See,
e.g., Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d S08, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) ("briefly"); OBH, Inc. v.
Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 195 (W.D.N.Y. 200) ("momentarily"); Simon Prop. Group v.
mySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1 049 (S.D. Ind. 2(00) ("Even if the consumer immediately became
aware of his or her mistake and immediately learned that mySimon is not affiliated with SPG, initial interest
confusion still would have occurred."); Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d
935, 972 (S.D. Tex. 1 999) ("fleeting"); N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs.,
79 F. Supp. 2d 33 1 , 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1 999) ("momentarily").
205 Promatek Indus., 300 F.3d at 8 1 2-13 ("What is important is not the duration of the confusion, it is the
misappropriation of [the trademark owner' s) . . . goodwill. [The metatag user) . . . cannot unring the bell.").
206 See David M. Klein & Daniel C. Glazer, Reconsidering Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet, 93
TRADEMARK REp. 1035, 1 039-41 (2003).
207 See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. The Savin Group, 2004 WL 2829324, at * 1 7 n.13 (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 2004)
("Internet initial interest confusion requires a showing of intentional deception."); Deere & Co. v. MTD
Holdings Inc., 2004 WL 324890, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2004); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 170,
§ 23:6 ("Initial interest confusion can be viewed as a variation on the practice of 'bait and switch."'); Martin
Schwimmer, Inured to False Starts: Applying Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine to Paid Search (July 2(03)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) (defining and applying the tort of "deceptive diversion").
208 See AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimJerChrysler Corp., 3 1 1 F.3d 796, 830 (7th Cir. 2002) (saying no IIC in
trade dress case where there was no "bait and switch"); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Ruid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382
(7th Cir. 1 996).
209 See Promatek Indus., 300 F.3d at S 1 2-13.
2 1 0 See, e.g., Row Control Indus. v. AMHI, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1 193, 1200 (W.D. Wash. 2(03); Klein
& Glazer, supra note 206, at 1 037.
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Although dispelled before an actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion
impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is
,,
therefore actionable trademark infringement. 2 1 1 The Playboy case aligns (for
now) the Ninth Circuit with the Third Circuit, which also constrains nc to
.
1
competItors.2 2
So far, this Article has addressed four different characterizations of TIC: (1)
as a subset of sponsorship confusion predicated on credibility transference
(Second Circuit Grotrian and Mobil Oil cases), (2) attention diversion
(Brookfield), (3) deceptive diversion (Seventh Circuit cases), and (4)
competitive diversion (Playboy v. Netscape). 213 The First Circuit has a fifth
approach, which does not recognize IIC at al1. 214 Given these varying
approaches, courts clearly lack consensus about what causes nc. The
confusion over IIC does not stop there. Courts have used divergent methods to
determine the interaction between IIC and the MFLOCC test.
Originally, IIC was a nondispositive tool to analyze one or a couple of
MFLOCC factors,215 including purchaser care,216 consumer sophistication,217
. .
. . 219
Then,
' 218 and competItIve proXlffilty.
eVl'dence 0f actual confuSlon,
Brookfield, in a footnote, suggested that in cases involving keyword metatags,
the MFLOCC test was inappropriate, allowing the IIC doctrine to become a

2 1 1 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th CiT. 2004)
(citations omitted).
2 1 2 See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 294 (3d CiT. 2001); see
also Albert & Abbati, supra note 84, at 356--57 (noting that noncompetitiveness appears to be a defense to
IIC).
2 1 3 Admittedly, the division of cases into these four buckets is somewhat arbitrary. For example,
Brookfield can be accurately characterized as a competitive diversion case even though the court's language
focuses on attention diversion.
2 1 4 See The Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 290 F. Supp. 2d 241 (D.R.I. 2003), rev'd on
other grounds, 376 F.3d 8 ( l st CiT. 2004); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 7 1 8 F.2d
120 1 , 1207 ( l st Cir. 1 983). Based on Weiss Associates, Inc. v. HRL Associates, Inc., 902 F.2d 1546 (Fed. CiT.
1 990), some also argue that the Federal Circuit does not recognize IIC either. See, e.g., Rachel Jane Posner,
Manipulative Metatagging, Search Engine Baiting, and Initial Interest Confusion, 33 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 439, 462 (200).
2 1 5 Davis & Boustani, supra note 38, at 7.
2 1 6 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1 997).
2 1 7 See, e.g., Rust Env't & Infrastructure, Inc., v. Teunissen, 1 3 1 F.3d 1210 (7th Cir. 1997); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 8 1 8 F.2d 254 (2d CiT. 1 987); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg
Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 523 F.2d 1 3 3 1 (2d Cir. 1975).
2 18 See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., lnc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 1 94 (5th Cir. 1 998).
2 1 9 See, e.g., IntersteUar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix Inc., 1 84 F.3d 1 107, 1 1 1 0-1 1 (9th CiT. 1 999), ajJ'd,
304 F.3d 936 (9th CiT. 2002).
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220
The MFLOCC bypass approach has since
bypass of the MFLOCC test.
22
been followed by a number of courtS. I
The Ninth Circuit has twice reversed Brookfield to eliminate IIC as a
bypass to the MFLOCC test, fIrst in the 2002 Interstellar Starship case 222 and
then again in the 2004 Playboy case.223 However, not every court in the Ninth
224
Circuit has gotten the message,
and even the Ninth Circuit bypassed the
MFLOCC test in the 2003 Horphag case involving keyword metatags.225
Courts have also been unclear whether IIC supports a determination of a
"likelihood of consumer confusion," or if IIC creates a different measurement
for infringement, such as a "likelihood of initial interest confusion." Once
again, the Ninth Circuit has led the way, implying in the 2002 Interstellar
Starship case that the appropriate standard is "likelihood of initial interest
,,
227
confusion, 226 a standard fully endorsed in the 2004 Playboy case.
However, most other courts considering IIC have not adopted a "likelihood of
initial interest confusion" standard.228 Other courts have used IIC in unusual

220 Specifically, the court said:
As a district court within our circuit recognized in a recent case involving a claim of trademark
infringement via metatags usage, "[tJhis case . . . is not a standard trademark case and does not
lend itself to the systematic application of the eight factors."

Because we agree that the

traditional eight-factor test is not well-suited for analyzing the metatags issue, we do not attempt
to fit our discussion into one of the

Sleekcraft factors.

Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp, 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 n.24 (9th Cir. 1 999) (internal
.

citation omitted).

22 1 See Key3Media Events, Inc. v. Convention Connection, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4043, at *8 (D.

Nev. Jan. 25, 2002); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190-9 1 (W.D.N.Y. 200);
Simon Prop. Group v. mySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1049 (S.D. Ind. 200); Bihari v. Gross, 1 1 9 F.
Supp.

2d 309, 3 1 9 (S.D.N.Y.

200) (but finding no violation).

222 Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2(02).
22 3 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
224 See J.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 20, 1 124 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2(03); Edge Wireless,
LLC v. U.S. Cellular Corp., 2004 WL 1661992, at * 1 7 (D. Ore. July 23, 2004).
225 Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040-42 (9th Cir. 2(03), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1 1 1 1 (2004). The court did not conduct an MFLOCC analysis or reference IIC at all.

226 See Interstellar Starship, 304 F.3d at 945.
227 See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1026-27; see also 1 -800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467

(S.D.N.Y. 2(03) (also using a "likelihood of initial interest confusion" standard).

228 I did a search in Westlaw's ALLCASES database on December 12, 2004 for the term "likelihood of

initial interest confusion."

The search yielded only twelve cases using the term out of the 100+ cases

referencing lIC (search results on file with the author).
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ways, such as treating IIC as a new ninth Polaroid MFLOCC factor229 and
23o
finding that IIC supported a trademark dilution claim.
As should be evident by now, the Brookfield case took an already unclear
IIC doctrine and threw it into chaos. Courts simply have no idea how to apply
23i
the IIC doctrine.
Perhaps there is no better evidence of that chaos than the
Ninth Circuit' s own jurisprudence, which has addressed IIC (or analogous
keyword metatags) six times in five years and seemingly made up new rules
each time. 232 Realizing the illogic of the Ninth Circuit's approach to IIC,
Judge Berzon's concurrence in Playboy calls for the Ninth Circuit "to consider
whether we want to continue to apply an insupportable rule" articulated in
Brookfield.233
2.

The Failings of the Doctrine

Judge Berzon is correct: The IIC rule is unsupportable. IIC commits the
cardinal sin of enabling a finding of trademark infringement when the junior
user is making associative or referential uses of a trademark. It does this in
large part because IIC is predicated on multiple mistaken and empirically
unsupported assumptions about searcher behavior. 234
229 See Katz v. Modiri, 283 F. Supp. 2d 883, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 2(03); Savin Corp. v. The Savin Group, 2003
WL 2245 1 7 3 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003), rev 'd on other grounds, 391 F.3d 439 (2d Cir. 2004).
230 See Avlon Indus. v. Robinson, 2003 WL 22025004, at *3 (N.D. III. Aug. 27, 2(03).
23 1 See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham
Trademark Act, 183 A.L.R. FED. 553 (2003) (collecting, and trying to organize, the conflicting cases).
232 The chronology in order:
•
Apr. 1 999: lIC bypasses MFLOCC test; keyword metatags create lIe. Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1 999).
•
Feb. 2002: Keyword metatag usage was nominative use; nominative use bypasses the MFLOCC
test. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2(02).
•
June 2002: lIC is subordinate to MFLOCC test; articulating a likelihood of initial interest
confusion standard. Interstellar Starship, 304 F.3d 936.
•
July 2003: Keyword metatag usage infringes; no reference to either lIC or MFLOCe. Horphag
Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003).
•
Jan. 2004: lIC subordinated to MFLOCC test; search provider who enables keyword-triggered ads
may cause likelihood of initial interest confusion; court does not distinguish between direct or
contributory trademark infringement for detennining the search provider's liability. Playboy, 354
F.3d 1 020.
•
Aug. 2004: Considering only a few MFLOCC factors, but not linking lIC to any of those factors;
IIC found because the website was displaying relevant content that searchers might find useful.
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004).
233 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1036 (Berzon, J., concurring); see Doellinger, supra note 53, at 174 (calling the
IIC doctrine "muddled and nearly incoherent").
234 Cj. Mueller Report, supra note 1 2 1 (IIC "lacks an established corpus of social science research
confirming its existence and defming its characteristics.").
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First, IIC assumes that a searcher using a trademarked keyword is looking
for the trademark owner (or, perhaps, some authorized licensee or secondary
235
user).
This assumption is unsupportable because of objective opaqueness.
Searchers' objectives cannot be inferred from the keywords they employ. As
the examples above in Part II.B illustrate, it is impropl'r to assume that using a
trademarked keyword means that the searcher wanted to fmd the trademark
owner. Because of objective opaqueness, any IIC doctrine built on diversion is
inherently flawed. Finding searcher "diversion" is not possible until one
236
knows where searchers were heading in the first place.
Second, a keyword search at a search engine should result in some filtering
content (Stage 5). IIC ignores the impact this content can have on the
searcher's decision to proceed with the search. A searcher who proceeds from
the results evaluation stage (Stage 5) to the investigation stage (Stage 7) has
already made a decision (Stage 6) that the results may be relevant to the
searcher' s objectives.
Third, filtering content may educate the searcher in ways that cause the
searcher to dynamically change search objectives. 237 For example, a searcher
seeking more information about Canon cameras might search using the
keyword "Canon" and receive a Nikon ad that reminds the searcher about prior
238
positive impressions of Nikon.
The searcher may then decide to suspend the
search for Canon cameras and digress to explore more about Nikon. At this
point, the searcher is no longer searching for Canon. Thus, based on the

235 See OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y. 200) ; see also
Shipman, supra note I , at 276 (trademark owners suffer harm because they are not at the top of the search

results list); Note, supra note 53, at 2405-07.
23 6 See Yelena Dunaevsky, Comment, Don 't Confuse Metatags with Initial Interest Confusion, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1349, 1384-85 (2002).
Presuming diversion without knowing searcher objectives brings to mind Alice's conversation with the
Cheshire Cat:
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
'''That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.
"I don't much care where -" said Alice.
'''Then it doesn't much matter which way you go," said the Cat.
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 100 (Richard Kelly ed., Broadview Press 2000)

(1 865).

237 See ROSENFELD & MORVILLE, supra note 9, at 104; Kurt M. Saunders, ConfuSion Is the Key: A
Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword Banner Advertising, 7 1 FORDHAM L. REv. 543, 573-74 (2002).
238 See Mark S. Nadel, The Consumer Product Selection Process in an Internet Age: Obstacles To
Maximum Efectiveness and Policy Options, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 183, 250 (2000) (noting how memory

prompts can facilitate beneficial competition).
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exposure to Nikon-oriented filtering content, the searcher dynamically
develops a new search objective-"get more information about Nikon"-and
investigates the search result accordingly. The dynamic shift in search
strategies might frustrate some trademark owners, but so long as the searcher is
not confused, the searcher will optimize the search as he or she sees fit. The
fact that it was prompted by a search for Canon, which may reinforce in the
searcher' s mind that Nikon and Canon are in the same product class, is an
example of associative use discussed earlier.
Finally, to the extent that IIC has been used in metatag cases, the lIC
doctrine has been predicated on incorrect understandings about metatags,
particularly keyword metatags. From a legal standpoint, keyword metatags
have earned mythical status, which has led to some courts to deem their usage
as per se infringing239 or, at minimum, confmnation of a publisher' s bad
4
faith. 2 0
However, keyword metatags' powers have never been all that mythical.
Starting in the mid-1990s, some search engines weighted keyword metatags in
41
their relevancy algorithms ?
When publishers then manipulated their
keyword metatags to provide suboptimal keyword associations, search engines
progressively realized that keyword metatags were a poor indicator of
relevancy.
As a result, almost all search engines have removed keyword metatags
242
from their relevancy algorithms.
Since 2002, only one major search engine,
243
Inktomi, still incorporates keyword metatags in its algorithm -meaning that
239 See Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003).
240 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2000), see also Doellinger,

supra note 53, at 220 ("[Tlhe only reason a competitor would include the trademarks of another in the
metatags of its web site would be to attempt to divert some of the trademark holder's potential customers.");
O'Rourke, supra note 67, at 303 ("[Tlhere seems to be general agreement that metatagging at best is an unfair
way to compete and at worst is morally reprehensible. ").
24 1 Danny Sullivan, Death of a Meta Tag, at http://www.searchenginewatch.com!sereportlprint.php/34721
_2165061 (Oct. I , 2002). Sullivan says that Infoseek and AltaVista both started recognizing keyword
metatags in early 1 996, Inktomi starting in mid- 1 996 and Lycos starting in mid-1 997. [d.
242 [d.
243 [d. As of Fall 2002, Inktomi remains the only major search engine to recognize keyword metatags;

Google, FAST, AltaVista, and Lycos do not. According to Inktomi, 'The meta keywords value is just one of
many factors in our ranking equation, and we've never given too much weight to it." Id.
A secondary search engine, Teoma, is also rumored to include keyword metatags in their algorithm, but
Teoma has not clearly announced its policy. See Email from Darcy Cobb, Dotted Line Communications
(public relations firm for Teoma), to Eric Goldman, Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law
School (Sept. 2, 2003, 10:23 am) (on me with author) (citing Teoma's policy as "When crawling a site, Teoma
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keyword metatags currently influence search result rankings for a small
percentage of searches. Because of their low impact, search engine industry
analysts now routinely advise publishers not to waste their time carefully
244
crafting keyword metatags.
Concern has also been expressed about the surreptItIOUS or invisible
245
operation of keyword metatags, but these concerns are misguided on several
fronts. Even if keyword metatags operate invisibly, so do most other aspects
of search engine operations. Because search engine algorithms are secret,
246
searchers have no idea how search results are generated or what the results
247
are (editorial content versus ads).
Thus, a search engine's consideration of
"invisible" keyword metatags text is just one more factor that searchers do not
understand.248 By way of comparison, searchers cannot see or understand
anchor text used to Google bomb. The fact that invisible words were used to
match searchers with content is immaterial to searchers. Searchers care about
249
If keyword
the relevancy of the results, not how they were generated.
metatags lead to relevant results, the searcher accomplishes his or her goals
even if the process is opaque to searchers ?50

collects

as

much infonnation

as

possible. While metatags are not always helpful, they can sometimes be

helpful. Therefore, Teoma collects metatag infonnation when it helps improve the relevance of search
results.").

244 See Andrew Goodman, An End to Metatags (Enough Already, Part 1), at http://www.traffick.com!artic
le.asp?aID= 102 (Sept. 2, 2002); Markus Hoevener, The Death of the Meta Tags, at http://www.bloofusion.com

Iwhite papers/meta_tags/death-of-meta tags.pdf (last visited Apr. I , 2005) ("Most of the web sites operated by
and still rank on #1 positions."); Sullivan, supra note 24 1 ; Jill Whelan,
No Meta Keyword Tags, at http://www.searchengineguide.com!whalenl2002/1004jwI .html (Oct. 4, 2002).
245 See. e.g., Nathenson, supra note 53.
246 See Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 79, at 1 77; Marable, supra note 23, at 5; see also Olsen, supra

Bloofusion don't even have meta tags

note 90 (discussing Nutch, an effort to develop an open-source search engine with transparent algorithms).

247 Marable, supra note 23, at 5. This report followed up an earlier report also showing that searchers did
not understand how search engines work. See Consumer WebWatch, A Matter of Trust: What Users Want

From Web Sites, at http://64.78.25.46/view article.cfrn?id= 101 55&at=5 1 O (Apr. 16, 2002) ("Users are largely
unaware that search engines may not be neutral guides to the online world.").

248 This same critique applies with equal force to keyword-triggered ads. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v.

Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1 034 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring).

249 See Stefanie Olsen, Are Search Engines Confusing Surfers?, CNET News.com. at http://news.com.

corn!2 102-1 024_3-509070I .html?tag=sCutil_print (Oct. 1 3, 2003) (quoting Yahoo! spokesperson Diana Lee).
250 lntrona and Nissenbaum argue that search engines do not disclose enough infonnation about their
practices, hindering searchers from making infonned choices between search engines. lntrona & Nissenbaum,

supra note 79, at 1 8 1 .

While search engines do withhold crucial information about their coverage and

algorithms to prevent search results manipulation, that infonnation may be irrelevant to searchers so long
the searchers subjectively feel that they are getting good results.
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Furthermore, publishers can visibly use third party keywords in ways that
251
For example,
are, in practice, no less invisible than keyword metatags.
publishers can display a trademark using a font color that is virtually identical
to the web page's background color or using a miniscule font size, or in text so
far "below the fold"-i.e., below the top portion of the page initially displayed
to a searcher who visits the page-that few searchers realize it is there. Trying
to distinguish keyword metatags from these techniques would emphasize form
over substance. And, of course, if the keyword in the keyword metatag also
appears in the "on the page" content, there is nothing surreptitious about
putting the keyword in the keyword metatag.
Finally, no matter what the publisher does, search engines ultimately
252
decide what data to collect, how to weigh it, and how to present it.
Therefore, a publisher's inclusion of a term in a keyword metatag does not
guarantee that the search engines will index it, that the publisher will appear in
the search results,253 or that any searcher will ever see the search results. No
matter what steps a publisher takes to be indexed on a third party trademark,
search engines have the final say. While it may never have been appropriate to
craft special legal rules for keyword metatags, evolved practices make these
rules anachronistic.
The keyword metatag is dead from a marketing
254
standpoint; its legal significance should end as well.
Description metatags operate differently from keyword metatags, so they
warrant a brief discussion. Unlike keyword metatags, some search engines
display the description metatags verbatim as filtering content in the search
results. In these cases, the searcher may see the text-and any trademark
references by the publisher-and use it to decide whether to investigate the
search results further. In those cases, the description metatag actually filters

25 1 See Nathenson, supra note 53, at 62 (discussing a variety of practices). Note that keyword metatags
are not completely hidden from searchers; anyone can see keyword metatags by viewing the web page's
source file. See Lastowka, supra note 20, at 861 n. l 3 1 . Keyword metatags just seem invisible because
searchers have to take that extra step, and usually there is no reason to do so.
252 See Perkins, supra note 69 (stating that keyword metatags should not be considered bad search engine
practices because search engines decide what to do with them).
253 Many search engines truncate the number of search results made available to searchers. For example,
Google cuts off search results at 10. Ridings & Shishigin, supra note 82, at 7. Truncation reduces the
amount of computations a search engine needs to make in determining its search results order. ld.
254 Sullivan, supra note 24 1 .
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searchers before they make the choice to investigate the website, and this
filtering function may save searchers time.255
On the other hand, not every search engine indexes or displays description
metatags. As discussed earlier, Google may display a description in its search
256
results authored by a third party.
In these cases, including a trademark in the
description metatag (like putting the trademark in the keyword metatag) may
not affect search engine indexing.
3. Deconstructing Brookfield

The various failings of the IIC doctrine (including the mistaken
assumptions about metatags) pervade almost every case finding infringement
due · to IIC or metatags. The multiple and repeated errors courts make
regarding IIC and metatags can be seen by re-examining the seminal
Brookfield case and, in particular, the oft-cited (and oft-criticized) billboard
257
analogy.
First, in the billboard analogy, the searcher is not actively conducting a
search. Rather, the driver is passively exposed to content (the billboard). The
court's hypothetical assumes that the content is impactful enough to cause the
driver to instantly develop a search objective and start implementing the
search. The court further presumes that the search objective is to find West
Coast Video, an assumption that may be reasonable in context?58
the search engine context, the searcher proactively selects a keyword
that encapsulates his or her search objective. Due to objective opaqueness, the
searcher' s goals are not clear from the keyword. Thus, making an inference
that a searcher using the keyword "moviebuff.com" is looking for Brookfield's
In

255

See Bihari v. Gross, 1 19 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2(0) (discussing how a gripe site's filtering

content-that clearly disparaged the trademark owner in the filtering content itself-removed any confusion
the searcher might have experienced before investigating the site).

256 See supra Part IV .A.S.
257 See supra note 203.
258 H owever, this fact pattern is especially stylized because of the unique attributes of video rental

searches. To watch a video, a searcher needs access to a video player. This usually limits video rentals to
geographic locations where the searcher has easy access to a video player, such as the searcher's house or

business or a friend's house-in other words, usually i n geographic areas the searcher knows. In the billboard

analogy, the searcher is attempting to spontaneously rent from a store in an unfamiliar neighborhood. Though
possible, this type of search seems extremely rare.
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website is far less reasonable than the analogous presumption when a driver
259
initiates a search in response to a billboard featuring West Coast Video.
Second, the analogy makes an apples to-oranges comparison. 260 In the
search engine context, keyword metatags act as a trigger to cause the display
of filtering content, but the searcher never sees the text contained in the
keyword metatags. In the billboard analogy, the billboard is the filtering
content. Therefore, keyword metatags and billboards do not perform the same
search function.
Furthermore, the filtering content displayed to searchers using the keyword
"moviebuff.com" remains unknown. The billboard analogy deliberately uses a
stylized example of intentionally false filtering content that prominently
displayed the competitor' s trademark. In the Internet context, this is most
closely analogizable to pagejacking. However, imagine if the search engine
filtering content displayed for the keyword "moviebuff.com" was both
accurate and did not reference a Brookfield trademark. For example, assume
the filtering content triggered by "moviebuff.com" said: "Welcome to West
Coast Video, A Great Place to Rent Movies."Z61 At that point, does it seem
likely that a searcher would expect to find Brookfield' s offerings at this site?
Especially if another search result unambiguously indicated that the associated
site was Brookfield' s? Because the content the searchers saw is unknown,
there is no fair comparison of the billboard' s false filtering content to the
metatag's trigger of unknown filtering content.
In any case, the display of filtering content triggered to a moviebuff.com
metatag is an associative use. It merely educates the searcher about products
259 The presumption was also unreasonable in Brookfield because West Coast Video had legitimate and

protectable trademark rights in the term "Movie Buff' in some contexts. See Brookfield Communications, Inc.
v. W. Coast Entm't Corp, 174 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999). The court makes a point of distinguishing
between "movie buff' and "moviebuff' based on the omission of the space. [d. at 1066. Yet, this distinction
seems unreasonable given that searchers do not choose keywords precisely and some search engines
automatically correct typographical errors. See Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 8 1 1
(7th Cir. 2(02) (finding that including the term "copitrack" in the keyword metatags was infringing when the
plaintiff had a trademark in "copitrak," even though a searcher using the keyword "copitrak" would not find
the defendant's website unless the search engines reinterpreted the keyword to include the typographically
erroneous version "copitrack").
260 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Berzon, J., concurring); see also Jason Allen Cody, Note, Initial Interest Confusion: What Ever Happened to
Traditional Likelihood o/ Confusion Analysis ?, 12 FED. OR. B.J. 643, 68 1 (200212003) (discussing this point
generally).
26 1 Because West Coast Video had some protectable rights in a phrase that included the term "Movie
Buff," I think the same result attaches if West Coast Video's filtering content displayed "Movie Buff."

HeinOnline -- 54 Emory L.J. 571 2005

572

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

that may share some attribute. The Brookfield case improperly manufactured
goodwill misappropriation out of a benign associative use.
Finally, the court ignored differential search costs between physical space
and cyberspace. In the billboard analogy, the driver initiates a search doomed
to fail, but during the course of conducting the search, the driver does not get
additional feedback along the way about whether or not the driver is making
progress towards the objective. Furthermore, the driver may not have a cast
or time-effective way to obtain more information to correct the search. In
contrast, cyberspace searchers get continuous feedback about their search
progress each time searchers see an additional web page, and the "costs" to
correct their search can be as minimal as hitting the back button?62
The Brookfield court's analogy of keyword metatags to a deliberately
deceptive billboard fundamentally misapprehends the nature of Internet
263
search.
However, the point of deconstructing the billboard analogy is not to
prove that it reached the wrong outcome. Instead, the analogy' s fact pattern
may appropriately give rise to a Lanham Act violation, either as false
264
advertising or perhaps under a standard MFLOCC analysis. Nonetheless, a
262

Indeed, because of the constant feedback and lower correction costs, Internet searchers may become
much more willing to take chances in their Internet searches than they would be in physical space searches.
263 Compare the defciencies of the Brookfield analogy with a counteranalogy offered in the district court
opinion in Playboy v. Netscape:
This case presents a scenario more akin to a driver pulling off the freeway in response to a sign
that reads "Fast Food Burgers" to find a well-known fast food burger restaurant, next to which
stands a billboard that reads: "Better Burgers: I Block Further." The driver, previously enticed
by the prospect of a burger from the well known restaurant, now decides she wants to explore
other burger options. Assuming that the �ame entity owns the land on which both the burger
restaurant and the competitor's billboard stand, should that entity be liable to the burger
restaurant for diverting the driver?
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (c.n. Cal. 1999). Notice
that the searcher forms a search objective based on accurate, nonbranded filtering content. Then, the searcher
receives additional relevant, accurate, nonbranded filtering content responsive to that search objective. Unlike
videotapes, searchers may spontaneously seek fast food in an unfamiliar geographic area. Thus, while all
billboard examples are poor analogies to Internet searching, the Playboy analogy may be closer to describing
Internet search than the Brookfield analogy.
2
64 Professor McCarthy similarly confuses the applicable doctrines in his analogy describing IIC:
The analogy to trademark initial interest confusion is a job-seeker who misrepresents ectucational
background on a resume, obtains an interview and at the interview explains that the inflated
resume claim is a mistake or "typo." The misrepresentation has enabled the job-seeker to obtain
a coveted interview, a clear advantage over others with the same background who honestly stated
their educational achievements on their resumes. In such a situation, it is not possible to say that
the misrepresentation caused no competitive damage.
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billboard-initiated search cannot be properly analogized to Internet search.
The policy inferences made by the Brookfield court, and followed by many
265
other courts, based on such an analogy are erroneous.
4.

Consequences of a Bad Doctrine

Because TIe lacks a rigorous definition, defendants are virtually powerless
to combat it--specially under Brookfield' s framework of treating any efforts
to capture initial consumer attention as goodwill misappropriation. Search
engine robots can capture and index every word on every age, making it
E6
possible for those words to capture initial consumer attention. 2 Further, some
publishers can successfully communicate with searchers only by using
trademarks for their referential and socially-beneficial associative uses. As
Judge Berzon said in Playboy, "the metatag holding in Brookfield would
expand the reach of initial interest confusion from situations in which a party is
,,267
initially confused to situations in which a party is never confused.
The contradictory and unstable results in lIe cases may be, in part, due to
courts' desires to reach a less harsh result than the result Brookfield seems to
require. However, courts still do not have a solid doctrinal grasp of the harms
lIe supposedly causes. The lack of a clear understanding of the harm leads to
paradoxical rulings like those permitting publishers to put a third party
trademark on their web pages-where it is almost guaranteed to be indexed by
search engines, while, at the same time, deeming it infringement for the
publisher to put the same term in the keyword metatags-where, more likely
z68
than not, it would be ignored by search engines ,
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1 70, § 23.6. McCarthy's analogy is perplexing because the job seeker uses the
university's trademark as a false "product" attribute (i.e., inflated credentials of the person's services being
sold), not a confusing designation of the product source (the job seeker, not his degree-granting institution,
supplies those services). Further, the job seeker does not use the trademarks of other job seekers, so the other
job seekers would not have standing to sue for trademark infringement. Therefore, the "competitive damage"
experienced by other job seekers may be due to false advertising or misrepresentation, but not trademark
infringement.
265 See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1 036 (Berzon, J., concurring).
266 All marketing is, by definition, an effort to capture initial consumer attention. See Dunaevsky, supra
note 236, at 1 376 ("[W]hat other purpose can a business owner have in setting up a website, if not to attract
consumers?") .
267 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034 (Berzon, J., concurring).
268 See Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 8 1 1 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding Equitrac 's use
of the term "Copitrack" in its metatags infringing, but at the same time mandating that Equitrac display the
text on its website in a manner that should likely cause search engines to index the term "Copitrak");
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entrn't Corp., 174 F.3d 1 036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (permitting
West Coast Video to display an advertisement saying "Why pay for MovieBuff when you can get the same
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More problematically, the IIC doctrine has been used as a content
regulation tool to shut down websites that the trademark owner does not like,
270
such as parody websites,269 gripe websites, websites marketing gray market
.
271
'
deaIers, 272
goods,
web SItes
publ'IS h'mg
about used eqUIpment
'
websites publishing information relevant to their inquiries,273 websites
274
providing conference attendees with a directory of resources for their trip,
and websites advertising a provider of postsale equipment servicing. 275
Normally, trademark law should not interfere with these socially beneficial
trademark uses. Also troubling are cases suggesting that search providers can
be liable for IIC,276 a result that could circumscribe search providers' ability to
facilitate keyword searches. These results are deeply troubling for the free
flow of relevant content. Trademark law should not deplete the social
discourse of valuable content, yet lIC has emerged as a tool to do just that.

thing here for FREE?" but preventing West Coast Video from including "moviebuff.com" in the metatags);
O'Rourke,

supra

cf

note 67, at 298 (giving the example of a clothing website putting the phrase "This site is not

in any way affiliated with the Gap gap or Babygap babygap" into the keyword metatags) .

269 See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2(01); OBH,
Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 1 76 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Dr. Seuss Enters. , v. Penguin
Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).

270 See 1.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 2002 WL 1 303 1 24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2(02), rev 'd, 253 F. Supp. 2d
DBH, 86 F. Supp. 2d 176. See generally Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers,
Towards a Bright-Line Approach to [Trademarklsucks. com, 20 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., July 2003, at 4,
1 120 (N.D. Cal. 2(03);

10 (criticizing the use of UC against gripe sites).

27 1

See Bayer HealthCare

LLC v. Nagrom, Inc., 2004 WL 2216491 (D. Kan. Sep. 7, 2004);

see also Bayer

Corp. v. Custom Sch. Frames, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D. La. 2003) (although based on the facts in this

case, the usage may have violated the Lanham Act in other ways); cf. Empresa Cubana del Tabaca v. Culbro
Corp., 2004 WL 602295 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004) (UC found even though the trademarked goods are

rev 'd in part, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2(05).
272 See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., LLC, 3 1 9 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2(03) (providing information

embargoed),

about accessories and dealers using the plaintiffs trademarks in the domain names); Caterpillar Inc. v.

TeleScan Techs., LLC, 2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 3477 (C.D. m. Feb. 13, 2002) (providing database of dealers of

plaintiffs products).

273 See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004) (displaying

automobile-related information at nissan.com is 1IC).

274 See Key3 Media Events, Inc. v. Convention Connection, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4043 (D. Nev.

Jan. 25, 2002).

275 See Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2(02). See generally Ivancevich,
supra note 186 (criticizing the Promatek case for failing to recognize the defendant's role as an after-market
service provider).

276 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); 1 -800

Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2(03).
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VI. DEVELOPING AN INTEGRA TED LAW OF KEYWORDS
Recognizing the foregoing problems, some commentators have tried to
278
277
While these
salvage IIC by limiting it to competitors
or metatags.
alternatives would improve upon the existing law, minor patches to IIC do
little to cure the problem. More structural doctrinal reform is needed.
The problem of achieving reform is that trademark law has principally
derived from situations where consumers
communications.

Cases like

Mobil Oil

passively receive commercial

provide such an example, where the

customer had a latent search-"will buy oil at the right price"-that was
activated by an unsolicited telephone call using a trademark that allegedly
transferred some credibility. Similarly, in the

Brookfield billboard

analogy, the

driver did not have any search objective until the deceptive billboard created
one. With passive search processes like these, there may be a greater risk that
a consumer is sent in the wrong direction ("diverted") because the content
containing the trademark also creates the search objective.

At minimum, it

becomes more supportable to treat those searchers as having homogeneous
search objectives, because the search objectives derived from the same content.
Keyword-based Internet

searches

are different.

In

most

situations,

searchers actively pick the keywords they use to find information and actively
choose between intermediaries to help convert those words into relevant
content.

Models built on passive-based search strategies do not work.

To

enable searchers to pick keywords that manifest their interests, and to permit
publishers and search providers to cater to those interests, deregulation of the
keyword is necessary. This Part proposes three complementary ways to do so.

A. Move Infringement Analysis Back in Time
As currently applied, the IIC and goodwill misappropriation doctrines have
pushed trademark infringement analysis into the early stages of the search
process. Doing so creates two principal concerns: ( 1 ) liability may reduce the
information searchers receive to conduct predictive evaluations, which may
277 Brief of Amicus Curiae Google, Inc. at 12-13, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, (2d Cir. 2004)
(No. 04-0026-cv) (authored by Mark A. Lemley and supporting neither appellants nor appellee-but
supporting reversal) [hereinafter Google Brief]; Maynard, supra note 55.
278 Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, 1.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 253 F. Supp. 2d
1 130 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C 02-0400 CW) (authored by Fred von Lohmann and supporting the defendant's
motion for reconsideration), available at hrtp:!lwww.eff.orglIPI200207 1O-taxes-com-amicus.pdf (last visited
Apr. 1, 2005).

HeinOnline -- 54 Emory L.J. 575 2005

576

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

(2)

there is less confidence that

make searches less efficient and effective, and

trademark owners suffer actual harm from diversion because whether the
searcher intends to transact with anyone is unknown.

1. Searchers Benefit from Filtering Content
This Part turns first to problems arising from reducing information at early
search stages. At early stages, the searcher may be doing associative learning.
If trademark law restricts information considered by the searcher based on
assumptions about the searcher's objectives, trademark law may counter
productively increase the search costs by delaying or preventing associative
learning.
In addition to facilitating associative learning, filtering content speeds up

predictive judgments.

Filtering content allows searchers to quickly grade for

topicality and make decisions about which search results to investigate more
deeply. Therefore, searchers benefit from more filtering content earlier in the
79
This is especially true for searchers using a keyword for a
process, not lesS ?
"minority" or esoteric definition; good filtering content helps them make
efficient topicality determinations to find publishers who use the keyword for
280
the same nonmajority meaning.
All of this suggests that searchers benefit by
having

an appropriate quantity of accurate

filtering

content;

or stated

negatively, searchers are harmed by legal doctrines that dissuade search
providers and publishers from providing filtering content.
Along these lines, the

Playboy court tried to mandate filtering content with

its suggestion that liability for keyed banner ads could be avoided if the ad
"clearly identifies [the ad's] source . . . or a search engine clearly identifies a

279 See Rieh, supra note 25, at 159 ("Web users would make their predictive judgments more efficiently if
they could see more clues to indicate the facets of information quality and cognitive authority . . . . Without
enough clues, users often had to open one Web page based on guessing rather than decision, and often had to
come back to the search results page because their choice was not what they expected."); Zachary Rodgers,
Ask Jeeves Bows New Search Functions, Hints at Future Plans, at http://www.clickz.comlresources/search_ref
erence/heavyweightslprint.php/3370961 (June 2 1 , 2004) (discussing how better filtering content virtually
eliminated "pogo sticking" between search results and associated publisher pages); see also Julie A. Rajzer,
Comment, Misunderstanding the Internet: How Courts Are Overprotecting Trademarks Used in Metatags,
2001 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 427.
280 Consider that in some cases, lower-ranked search results result in higher conversion-to-sale. See Nico
Brooks, The Atlas Rank Report-Part II: How Search Engine Rank Impacts Conversions, Atlas Institute
Digital Marketing Insights (2004), available at http://www.atlasdmt.comlmedialpdfslinsights/RankReportPart2
.pdf. This data suggests that searchers may be more interested in specific search results because they have
sorted through the filtering content on the search results page.
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Unfortunately, the court had no empirical

evidence to demonstrate that the labels would dispel confusion or that
282
searchers have any confusion that needs to be dispelled.
In a choice
between judges and search providers as to who is better positioned to decide
how to present filtering content, search providers-guided by information
283
scientists and market forces
will always reach better results.
The

Playboy

court also worked from the wrong premise. The court, and

many others, believed that searchers who see filtering content in response to a
trademarked keyword search are confused about the sponsorship or affiliation
284
of the filtering content.
This assumption has never been backed up
285
empirically,
As
and it appears to be another intuition-driven myth.
discussed earlier, searchers do not understand why they get the search results
they get, so they have no basis to infer some connection between a trademark
286
owner and search results.
There is also zero evidence that searchers care
about the behind-the-scenes machinations that produce the content they see.
More problematically, the assumptions about sponsorship or affiliation
build off the false assumption that we know what the searcher expected to find
based on the keyword they chose. Instead, searchers' "true" search objectives
287
If a

are partially revealed only when they act upon the filtering content.

searcher decides to investigate search results further, the searcher indicates that
the publisher' s information may be relevant to the search objectives.

On the

other hand, if a searcher ignores the filtering content, then it is possible to infer

281

282

Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1030.
Compare Playboy's mandatory disclosure with Wells Fargo & Co.

v. WhenU.com, Inc. , 293 F. Supp.
2d 734, 757-58 (E.D. Mich. 2003), in which the court said that WhenU's keyword-triggering of ads was not a

use in commerce in part because it did not display the trademark owner's trademarks.
283 Cf Jon H. Oram, Note, The Costs of Confusion in Cyberspace, 107 YALE LJ. 869, 874 ( 1 997)
(,'Technological solutions often will do a better job of solving intellectual property problems than legal
institutions could ever hope to do.").
284 This assumption pervades the Brookfield case. See also Doellinger, supra note 53, at 219 (''Tbe mere
appearance of a defendant's website on a search engine results list necessarily indicates consumer confusion at
a certain level."); Mark Sableman, Search Service Keyword-Based Advertising: Trademark Infringement or
Fair Competition? 134 (Aug. 6, 2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
285 The surveys offered in the 2004 Playboy and 1-800 Contacts cases did try to establish this proposition
but both surveys were flawed beyond repair.
286 See Klein & Glazer, supra note 206, at 1 061-63; cj. Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 749 (making that
determination for keyword-triggered ads).
28 7 Cf Google, Optimization Tips, at https:lladwords.google.comlselectltips.html (last visited Apr. I ,
2005) (discussing the importance for advertisers to write good a d copy/filtering content to generate cost
effective leads).
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Either way, the searcher

suffers no harm.
This discussion prompts an obvious solution:

Do not base trademark

infringement on a search provider's or publisher' s accurate display of filtering
288
content.
Such liability jeopardizes the delivery of filtering content, to
searchers'

detriment, assuming phantom harms to the

searcher and the

trademark owner.
In contrast, false filtering content raises some concern because it can
increase search costs, such as when filtering content causes searchers to
289
Once
incorrectly believe that the search results are from the senior user.
searchers pursue this search result, a publisher can cause searchers to continue
their investigation without clarifying or removing the false expectations.

In

some cases, even after searchers realize the mistake, searchers may stick with
90
the publisher because they irrationally overvalue the sunk search costS ?
Alternatively, searchers may persist with the falsely induced search because
"switching costs"-i.e., the search costs incurred from stopping the existing
search and starting a new one-to fmd the trademark owner are not justified by
291
the benefit.
Unclear or deceptive information from the publisher could lead
searchers to a "point of no return," where even rational searchers will persist
with the publisher rather than find the originally intended trademark owner.
The searcher reaches the "point of no return" because the searcher's goodwill
towards the trademark owner caused the searcher to invest more search costs
into the publisher. A publisher who causes a searcher to reach the point of no
return on that basis has engaged in "switching cost exploitation." In this sense,
switching cost exploitation is a species of credibility transference.

288 While this is a simple solution, it would unavoidably reverse decisions like Playboy v. Netscape and 1v. WhenU, both of which held the search provider liable merely for displaying filtering content
(in both cases ads) triggered by keywords. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp. , 354
F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
289 See Saunders, supra note 237, at 565 (discussing differences between true, false and unclear filtering
content).
290 Economists generally consider it irrational to include sunk costs in decisionmaking about future
behavior. However, psychological studies suggest that people do so nonetheless. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes &
Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Costs, 35 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 1 24
(1 985).
29 1 See H.A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product af Thaught, 68 AM. ECON. REv. I , 1 0 (1978);
see also Romanos, supra note 67, at 9 1 .

800 Contacts
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case presents a possible example of switching cost

When the Pegasus salesperson cold-called buyers, the implicit

credibility (that the call was coming from Mobil Oil, a major industry player)
caused buyers to investigate a transaction further.

Ultimately buyers would

realize, prior to closing, that Pegasus was not Mobil Oil. However, price was a
292
paramount basis of competition for commodity Oil,
so a buyer might transact
with Pegasus rather than seeking out Mobil Oil if the price savings from
dealing with Mobil Oil did not warrant the search costs.

By then, the buyer

had passed the point of no return.
However,

online

searches

differ from

offline

searches

because

the

switching costs online are trivial throughout most search stages. The buyers in

Mobil Oil needed to find Mobil

Oil and negotiate a new deal from scratch, with

no certainty that they would achieve a comparable or superior price. Internet
searchers on the wrong path can hit the back button, pull down a bookmark, or
293
type a new address in the address bar.
With such low switching costs, few
online publishers will cause searchers to reach the point of no return prior to an
actual transaction.
This discussion prompts three legal conclusions.

The first conclusion is

that filtering content, by itself, cannot cause trademark infringement.

If the

filtering content accurately informs searchers what to expect from a publisher,
neither the searcher nor the trademark owner is being exploited.

Even when

the filtering content falsely creates the impression that the publisher is the

rs

senior user, the publisher may immediately correct the im ression at the
website before searchers invest anything further in their search.

94

292 Credibility about delivering on promises also could have been a major factor. and the implicit

association with Mobil Oil may have helped. However, during the course of negotiations, buyers would form
their own independent assessment of Pegasus's ability to deliver. When the buyer realized that Mobil Oil and
Pegasus were two different companies, Pegasus could have successfuUy earned enough independent credibility
during the negotiations that Pegasus cleared the buyer's minimum threshold for credibility.
293 See Bihari v. Gross, 1 19 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n . l 5 (S.D.N.Y. 200) ("[Rlesuming one's search for the
correct website is relatively simple. With one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay, a viewer can return
to the search engine's results and resume searching for the original website.").
294

See Thomas F. Presson & James R. Barney, Trademarks as Metatags: Infringement or Fair Use ?, 26

AIPLA Q.J. 147, 170 ( 1 998).
For an example of how website content can cure any initial misapprehensions, see Scholastic, Inc.

v.

Escolastica. com, 1 00 Fed. Appx. 152 (4th Cir. 2004), in which the fact that the allegedly infringing activity led
English-speaking customers to the Spanish-language website supported the court's finding that no consumers
were actually confused. See also Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 779 (7th Cir. 2004) (proximate display
of search results does not confuse consumers when website visits will allow searchers to distinguish the
parties).
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Furthermore, as previously discussed in Part IV .A.S, publishers do not
control what filtering content searchers see.

Even if a publisher tries to

disseminate deceptive filtering content, such as by putting misleading text into
the description metatag, there is no guarantee that any search engine will
display that content or that any searchers will see the false content, act upon it
or find the resulting content irrelevant.

The dissemination of false filtering
29 5
but it

content might trigger other legal doctrines, such as false advertising,

would be inappropriate to find trademark infringement per se based on false
filtering content.
The second conclusion is that, due to the low switching costs, publishers

p

will likely need to ublish a significant quantum of deceptive content to exploit
9
switching costS ?
Searchers will constantly judge the progress they are
making towards their objectives, and can exit at any time with low costs.
This leads to the third conclusion:

The MFLOCC test can adequately

handle any situation where a publisher has engaged in sufficiently deceptive
297
conduct to exploit switching costS.
No heuristic, like IIC or goodwill
misappropriation, is necessary to cover these circumstances.
factors should be considered

Further, all

what false filtering content searchers saw, how

the publisher perpetuated the misconception, and why searchers did not switch
despite the putatively low cost of doing so.

Similarly, disclaimers also can serve the purpose of correcting initial searcher impressions, although
some courts have rejected disclaimers as a fix to TIC because the courts improperly found harm in a referential
or associative use. See Ford Motor Co. v. Ford Fin. Solutions, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 26, 1 1 28 (N.D. Iowa
2(0); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y. 2(0).
295 See FTC v. Pereira, No. 99-J 367-A (E.D. Va. 1999), available at http://ftc.gov/os!caselistl9923264/99
23263.htm; see also O' Rourke, supra note 67, at 296-99 (discussing metatags and false advertising); Dogan &
Lemley, supra note 166, at 821 ; Saunders, supra note 237, at 575 (discussing false banner ads).
296 Searchers are surprisingly tolerant of lost time in searches. It takes, on average, twelve minutes for a
searcher to get frustrated with a search. Danny Sullivan, WebTop Search Rage Study, at http://searchengine
watch.comlsereportlprint.php/34721_21 6345 1 (Feb. 5, 2001). Only 7% were frustrated in three minutes or
less. [d.
Pernicious mousetrapping seems like another type of switching cost that publishers might impose.
However, mousetrapping that blocks the searcher's exit, but does not increase the searcher's propensity to
transact with the publisher, is not really a switching cost that dissuades the searcher from finding the senior
user (although it may support other causes of action).
297 See Klein & Glazer, supra note 206 (arguing that the MFLOCC test should apply, and giving examples
of how IIC is redundant with other legal doctrines); see also Cody, supra note 260.
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At Early Search Stages, There Is Less Reason To Believe that Trademark
Owners Suffer Any Hann

Having discussed the benefits of filtering content, this subsection turns to
the second principal problem of pushing trademark law too early into the
search process. At early stages, there is less reason to believe that the searcher
will actually transact with anyone. Therefore, any purported harms to the
98
trademark owner are especially speculative.2
Consider the following assertion from the 1-800 Contacts v. When U.com
case, where the WhenU system caused a competitor' s advertisement to appear
when a searcher entered 1 800contacts.com into their browser' s address bar:
"consumers who have typed Plaintiff s < 1 800contacts.com> URL into the
browser bar are clearly searching for contact lens products, and expect to
complete a transaction with Plaintiff in a short span of time, with little effort or
,, 99
transaction costS. 2
Not surprisingly, the court did not cite any supporting evidence for this
statement. In doing so, the court made three unsupportable assumptions that
contravene the objective opaqueness principle:
•

•

•

Searchers using the keyword " 1 800contacts.com" are "clearly"
searching for contact lens products. There could be lots of reasons
why they selected that keyword.
Those searchers expect to complete a transaction with 1-800 Contacts.
Searchers could be comparison shopping or could be dissuaded by
stockouts or high prices.
Those searchers expect to transact "in a short span of time." Searchers
may transact in stages, separating an investigation from an associated
transaction by hours, days, or even months.

As this discussion illustrates, judging trademark infringement at the outset
of a search requires the court to make too many assumptions about subsequent
searcher behavior. As one expert explained:

298 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 755 (E.D. Mich. 2(03) (stating that,
in keyword-triggered ads case, "plaintiffs have failed to come forward with concrete evidence of even a single
customer or potential customer who failed to purchase products or services from them because of WhenU" ).
299 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 2003 WL 22999270, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2(03).

HeinOnline -- 54 Emory L.J. 581 2005

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

582

[Vol. 54

Online shoppers do not conduct the linear purchases that many
retailers envision. Rather they browse a catalog, talk to friends, go
online to research a product, visit the store to experience it, go back
to the Web to comparison shop, then make the purchase either online
or offline . . . . Retailers think of shop� ing as a funnel . . . but it's
non-linear, sporadic and [unpredictable]. 00
In contrast, deeming the keyword-triggered ad as infringing treats every
301
searcher exposed to the ad as a lost customer to 1 -800 Contacts --even
though some searchers may never transact for contact lens products at all, other
searchers who were comparing prices choose to transact with competitors for
procompetitive reasons, and yet other searchers end up transacting with 1 -800
Contacts anyway despite the ads. In other words, the 1 -800 Contacts court
assumed an immediate and linear shopping process even though consumer
behavior does not necessarily follow that model.

Instead, it is very likely that not every person who entered
" 180Ocontacts.com" was going to transact. Ecommerce websites measure
"conversion to sale," the ratio between the number of visitors to the website to
the number of actual purchasers. No website has 100% conversion to sale;
conversion to sale varies by industry and website, but it is often expressed in

300 See
Report,

at

supra

Eisenberg,

note 60 (quoting Kelly Mooney);

see also

Q3 2004 E-Commerce Site Trend

http://www.doubleclick.comluslknowledge_centralldocumentsltrend_reportsldc_q304ecommerce_

04l l .pdf (Nov. 2004) (26% of all online retailer sales came from searchers who returned to abandoned online
shopping carts) [hereinafter DoubleClick Trend Report] ; Press Release, comScore Networks, Inc., comScore
Study

Reveals

the

Impact

of Search

Engine

Usage

http://www.comscore.comlpresslrelease.asp?id=526 ("[O]nly

on

Consumer

Buying

(Dec.

13,

2004),

at

15 percent of online purchases following a

[consumer electronics or computer (CFJC)] search occurred in the same user session as the search itself, with

85 percent of conversions occurring in a latent (or non search) session.").

301 Consider the following statement from American Blind's lawsuit against Google based on searchers

who click on keyword-triggered text ads for competitors: ''these competitors will have obtained a customer, or
potential customer,

solely

products and services."

as a result of the goodwill and reputation associated with American Blind and its

See

Complaint at 1 3 , Am. Blinds & Wallpaper Factory, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2004) (04-CV 00642) (emphasis in original).

Competitors will need to provide lots of

information to searchers between the time the searcher clicks from Google and closes a transaction, much of
which will inform the searcher about the respective goodwill and reputation of their company.

American

Blinds conveniently omits all of that activity in trying to connect the dots.
A recent Note in the Harvard Law Review systematically makes this same error, presuming that the mere
selection of a trademark as a keyword guarantees business to the trademark owner to the exclusion of all other
competitors.

See

Note,

supra

note 53. This erroneous assumption leads the Note to conclude that trademark

owners will overinvest in preemptive or combative marketing and underinvest in product quality because of
the "diversions."

[d.

at 2400-05.

At minimum, these arguments ignore objective opaqueness, dynamic

evolutions of search objectives and nonlinear behavior between searching and transacting.
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30
the 1 % to 2% range. 2 In other words, for every 1 00 visits to a retail website,
only one or two of those visits will result in a transaction with the retailer; the
other 98 or 99 visits do not result in a sale. Therefore, without any empirical
evidence to show what happened with specific users, the 1-800 Contacts
court' s massive overestimation of lost sales manufactured a significant
303
quantum of harm where none may have existed.
At the same time, while shopping processes may be episodic and nonlinear,
it is important not to forget that searchers pick keywords with a search
objective in mind. In that regard, consider the following from the Playboy
case: "We presume that the average searcher seeking adult-oriented materials
on the Internet is easily diverted from a specific product he or she is seeking if
,,304
other options, particularly graphic ones, appear more quickly.
On what basis did the court presume this?305 To make this presumption,
the court must oxymoronically assume that ( 1 ) the searcher entered the search
term "playboy" into the search engine with such strong brand loyalty that the
searcher was looking only for Playboy Enterprises, and (2) the searcher's
brand loyalty was not strong enough to prevent diversions the moment that
alternative graphic options were presented.
The Playboy court cannot have it both ways. Without any empirical
support, it strains credibility to believe that easily diverted searchers actually
intended to transact with Playboy. One might feel differently if the filtering
content (i.e., the contents of the ads) caused a credibility transference such that
searchers clicked on the ads thinking they were heading towards Playboy
Enterprises.
In that case, the advertisers may commit switching cost
exploitation, depending on what content the advertisers displayed on their site.
However, without a credibility transference, why did these Playboy diehards
abandon their search objective so easily? I offer one theory: Searchers who
302 See Bryan Eisenberg, Benchmarking an Average Conversion Rate, at http://www.clickz.com!expertsl
cnn/trafc/print.php/3362641 (June 4, 2004); cf. Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 756 (noting the plaintiff's
low conversion rates). As another way of evidencing the vast chasm between searches and conversion, note
that searchers who put items into an online shopping cart (thus strongly manifesting an interest in transacting
with the website) abandon those shopping carts 57% of the time. See DoubleClick Trend Report, supra note
300, at 3.
303 See Klein & Glazer, supra note 206. at 1045 47 (IIC protected lost sales in offline world. but no
evidence of Jost sales online).
304 Playboy Enters Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020. 1028 (9th Cir. 2004)
(emphasis added).
305 This is an especially vexing question given that the appeals court made this finding of fact. even
though it remanded the case for trial.
.•
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were so easily diverted were using Playboy as a proxy or otherwise were not
really looking for Playboy Enterprises. If so, treating their "diversion" as a
harm overestimates the real consequences.
3. Summary on the Timing oj Infringement Analysis
The Playboy and I -800 Contacts courts simply made up the trademark
owners' harms-and, in the process, significantly overinflated them-by
mistakenly focusing on early stages in the searchers ' process. Pushing the
infringement determination later in the search process will inhibit the
speculation that can lead courts astray.

B. Modernize the MFLOCC Test
Perhaps surprisingly, given its venerability and the lack of academic
criticism directed towards it, the MFLOCC test lacks any deep pedigree in the
social sciences. The MFLOCC test traces its roots to the 1 961 Polaroid
306
case,
where Judge Friendly laid out the factors with a brief citation to the
307
1939 Restatement oj Torts.
There is no evidence that the MFLOCC test was
predicated on social science, nor did any body of literature validate that the
MFLOCC test accurately characterized consumer search behavior at the time.
Since the Polaroid case, the information science field has grown
substantially and search behavior has changed radically (due in large part to
changes in mass media), but the MFLOCC has remained basically unchanged.
At some point, the MFLOCC test should be revised to reflect evolutions in
consumer search behavior. For now, this Article suggests some short-term
modifications to the MFLOCC test to reflect Internet search practices.

1. Add a "Relevancy " Factor to the MFLOCC Test
The MFLOCC test should include a factor considering if searchers found
the junior user' s content relevant to their search. The current factors do not
directly consider search objectives and content relevancy, but they should.
Without a content relevancy factor, courts mechanically applying the existing

306 Polaroid COIp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1 961).
307 See id. at 495 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 729-3 1 ( 1939)).
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factors can reach the anomalous conclusion that content was relevant but
308
infringing.
In some cases, courts attempted to resolve this anomaly by basing
309
infringement on consumer confusion about the content 's source.
Unfortunately, this inquiry contradicts basic trademark law, which should
3IO
Confusion about
focus on consumer confusion about the source of goods.
content source at an intermediate stage does not, by itself, give us any insight
into the consumer's ultimate confusion about a transaction. Furthermore, even
if a searcher is confused about content source, this confusion may be alleviated
or eliminated by the content itself (i.e., the filtering content). Finally, even if
the searcher is confused about the content' s source, the content could still be
relevant to the searcher' s objectives; in which case the searcher may not care
about the content's source so long as the content helps the searcher.
Content relevancy does not need to be a per se defense to trademark
infringement. Perhaps it will become that in practice, but for now the
suggestion is relatively narrow. Content relevancy should be a factor in the
MFLOCC test as a way to remind courts not to allow trademark law to block
11
content that reduces search costS. 3
2.

Consider the Search Stage

As previously discussed in Part VLA.2, courts should consider a search's
stage when the searcher is exposed to a junior user' s trademark usage. That
section proposes that filtering content delivered in response to a contextless
keyword should never be trademark infringement, while trademark uses that
create switching cost exploitation could be.

308 A prime example of this is Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir.
2(04), which found fiC because searchers would find the provided content relevant and useful.

309 See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
3 1 0 See Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 3 1 9 F.3d 770, 776 (6th CiT. 2003) ("[I)t is irrelevant whether customers

would be confused as to the origin of the web sites, unless there is confusion as to the origin of the respective
products."); Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923 (2d CiT. 1990) (rejecting confusion about
advertising content as actionable trademark confusion when the source of the advertised services was clear).
This analysis becomes more complicated where the trademarked product is the content, such as with
publishers like newspapers.

31 1

Cf O'Rourke, supra note 67, at 306-07 (expressing concern that the MFLOCC factors do not account

for increases in consumer search costs, creating the possibility that no trademark infringement will be found
even if such costs increase).

While I completely agree with this concern, I reject any assumption that

metatagging increases consumer search costs.
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Consider Minority Definitions

The MFLOCC test currently does not account for vanatlons among
searchers in their search objectives or tactics.
As McCarthy says, "In
determining trademark infringement and unfair competition, everything hinges
upon whether there is a likelihood of confusion in the mind of an appreciable
,,
number of 'reasonably prudent' buyers. 3 1 2
Unfortunately, the reasonably prudent buyer standard necessarily leads to
incorrect legal results. By measuring activity against a single standard, the
reasonably prudent buyer standard treats searchers as having equal information
needs or ultimate objectives. However, this contradicts fundamental principles
of information science, which is built on the principle that different searchers
3I3
have different needs.
The reasonably prudent buyer standard does have some utility. For
example, when competitive products are on a store shelf, and a consumer is
trying to select between them, the reasonably prudent buyer standard makes a
lot of sense. In those cases, given the relative proximity of the transaction, it is
efficient to consider if the packaging and trademark usage would confuse a
reasonably prudent buyer.
However, Internet search suggests a different approach. Because the test
only requires an "appreciable number" of confused consumers, the reasonably
prudent buyer standard forecloses majority definitions of words, in some cases
31
protecting only 1 1 % of the relevant population. 4 Stated alternatively, a usage
that 89% of the population understands could be trumped by an 1 1 % minority.
This makes no sense, and it has a collateral cost. In order to recognize and
preserve space for minority definitions of a trademarked word, it is important
to make sure that even if only a small fraction of the consumer base
understands the term as used, they can still communicate with each other. In
the search engine environment, where keywords are decontextualized, this is
3 1 2 3 McCARTHY, supra note 1 70, § 23:91. See generally Michael J. Allen, The Scope of Confusion
Actionable Under Federal Trademark Law: Who Must be Confused and When ?, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 321
(1991) (discussing the various approaches used to detennine the relevant class of consumers in a consumer
confusion analysis); Shashank Upadhye, Trademark Surveys: Identifying the Relevant Universe of Confused
Consumers, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PRoP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 549 ( 1 998).
3 1 3 ROSENFELD & MORVILLE, supra note 9, § 6.2.1 ("Many studies indicated that users of information
systems aren't members of a single-minded monolithic audience who want the same kinds of information
delivered in the same ways.").

3 1 4 3 McCARTHY, supra note 170, § 23:2.
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especially crucial.

Otherwise, the reasonably prudent buyer standard will, in
315
effect, remove minority definitions from the social lexicon.
The MFLOCC test can accommodate mUltiple definitions of trademarked
words merely by segmenting users into classes. Each class of users would be
evaluated separately .

If an appreciable number of users fit into a class that

wants to communicate with each other using a trademark, and those users all
clearly understand the word usage, trademark law should step aside.
4.

Require Plaintifs To Provide More Rigorous Evidence of Confusion or
Hann

McCarthy says that "There are at least three routes of proof of likelihood of
confusion: ( 1 ) Survey evidence; (2) Evidence of actual confusion; and/or (3)
Arguments based on a clear inference arising from a comparison of the
,,3 1 6
conflicting marks and the context of their use.
Throughout the Internet era, courts have skipped options ( 1 ) and (2),
instead basing their likelihood of confusion finding on option (3).

However,

the intuition based approach has been riddled with errors, as courts make
unsupportable assumptions and misapprehend facts about the Internet.
This Article has already addressed several examples of poor judicial
factfinding, such as the overemphasis on keyword metatags as misleading
consumers (even as search engines have phased out reliance on them) and the

1 -800 Contact court' s

belief that entering a domain name into the address bar

meant that consumers were ready to close deals.

There are plenty of other

examples.
The solution is simple: Courts should not rely on their own intuition about
317
possible harms.
Instead, they should require trademark plaintiffs to provide
318
rigorous evidence of proof of confusion or harm.
315

See James

Gleick,

Get Out of My Namespace, N.Y. liMEs,

Mar. 2 1 , 2004, at §6, p. 44 (discussing the

problem of overlapping namespaces and the risk of overriding legitimate names).
3 1 6 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 170, § 23:2.1 (citations omitted).
317
See generally Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 4 1 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 721 (2004) (discussing
how judicial intuition and stereotyping has lessened the standards for actual harm from trademark usage).
3 1 8 See Lemley, supra note 1 78, at 1 7 \ 3 ; Feingold, supra note 50, at S2 (discussing how empirical
evidence of consumer expectations is the analytically proper way to determine trademark infringement); Uli
Widmaier,

Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law,

33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 603 (2004);

cf

Moseley

v . V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 4 1 8 (2003) (requiring trademark dilution plaintiffs to provide evidence of
actual dilution rather than being able to assert "likelihood of dilution").
al.,

Web-Tracking Data: An Under- Utilized Legal Resource,

See generally Stephen W.

Feingold et

INTERNET L. & STRATEGY, Mar. 2004, at
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In fact, two recent cases suggest a small trend towards Internet plaintiffs
actually providing survey evidence. In

1 -800 Contacts

and

Playboy,

trademark

plaintiffs introduced surveys purporting to show the likelihood of consumer
confusion?

19

While

this

is

overweighed defective surveys.

a

positive

development,

the courts have

In both cases, the courts effectively deemed

the survey evidence methodologically tainted but still found the defective
survey probative of a likelihood of initial interest confusion?20
Given the judicial casualness towards survey evidence, it is not surprising
that courts generally are willing to accept weak evidentiary proof from
plaintiffs. And there is no question that it is not easy to provide rigorous
3 1
evidence. 2 However, without courts requiring plaintiffs to prove some harm,
there have been too many inconsistent and indefensible outcomes.
C.

Immunize Search Providers
1.

Why Search Providers Need a Safe Harbor

By casting search providers in a starring role

as

Internet power brokers, this

Article diverges from prevailing stereotypes that publishers control search
results. Due to search providers' active editorial role--especially where search
providers draw a profit from the trademarked keyword-it seems logical that
trademark

owners would want to hold them liable for trademark
3
infringement. 22 In fact, a few attempts to hold search providers liable for
(discussing the type of evidentiary showings that trademark owners might make to establish consumer
diversion).

3 19 In addition, in Wells Fargo, the court noted its inability to find confusion about the source of WhenU's

ads "without evidence of how [WhenU users] perceive WhenU's ads," implying it needed to see that evidence
on an advertiser-by-advertiser (or even an ad-by-ad) basis.
F. Supp. 2d 734, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2003).

See Wells

Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293

320 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1 020, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2004)

("The expert study [Playboy] introduced establishes a strong likelihood of initial interest confusion among
consumers . . . .

Defendants may have valid criticism of Dr. Ford's methods and conclusions, and their

critique may justify reducing the weight eventually afforded Dr. Ford's expert report."); 1 -800 Contacts, Inc.

v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 499-500 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Plaintiffs survey statistics rely on numerous
leading questions that suggested their own answers, and that are therefore entitled to little weight in assessing

consumer confusion . . . . [Tlhe survey is burdened by other flaws . . . , Accordingly, Mr. Neal ' s survey, as
designed and carried out, is not dispositive of whether pop-up advertisements generated by the SaveNow
software has caused actual confusion among SaveNow users, and is not evidence of actual confusion.
However, Mr. Neal's survey is at least suggestive of the likelihood of initial interest confusion.").

321 See Allen, supra note 3 1 2, at 344; Doellinger, supra note 53, at 2 1 7-18.
322 See Christine D. Galbraith, Electronic Billboards Along the Information Superhighway: Liability
Under the Lanham Act for Using Trademarks To Key Internet Banner Ads, 4 1 B.C. L. REv. 847, 877-79
(2000) (arguing for such liability); Lastowka, supra note 21 (reaching the opposite conclusion).
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trademark infringement based on keyword usage already have been made to
3 4
3 3
date in the courts 2 and by legislators. 2
In contrast, domain name registrars have long enjoyed protection from
trademark

infringement

Lockheed Martin

v.

lawsuits

for

�erforming

Network Solutions3 5

their

DNS

functions.

gave domain name registrars a

common law shield from liability, and Congress subsequently codified an
expansive safe harbor in 1999 as part of the Anticybersquatting Consumer
3
Protection Act. 26
It is anomalous to treat domain name registrars differently from other
3 7
keyword-based search providers. 2
As explained above in Part IV.B . l , the
DNS is just another form of keyword search, where the registrars are the
search providers and the registrants are the publishers.
Further, domain name registrars manage the keywords in their database,
just as other search providers do.

For example, in the late 1 990s, Network

Solutions manually reviewed 10% of domain name registrations and rejected

323

See Playboy, 354 F.3d 1020 (finding liability was possible; reversing the district court opinion finding

no liability); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004) (denying the

search engine's summary judgment motion); 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (finding liability); U-Haul

Intern., Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003) (no liability); Wells Fargo, 293 F.

Supp. 2d 734 (no liability); Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. v. Gator Corp., 2002 WL 3 1 356645
(E.D. Va. Jul. 17, 2002) (granting injunction).
Other lawsuits against search providers have been irresolute because these cases have settled. See In re
The Gator Corp. Software Trademark & Copyright Litig., Case No. MDL- 1 5 1 7 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Innovator Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 8 1 6 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Fragrance

Counter, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Some have been abandoned. See Mark Nutritionals, Inc. v.
Alta Vista Co., No. SA-02-CA-0087 EP (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 31, 2002). Some are pending. See Am. Blinds
& Wallpaper Factory, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 04-CV-00642 (S.D.N.Y. complaint filed Jan. 27, 2004);
Rescuecom

Corp.

v.

Google,

Inc.

(N.D.N.Y.

complaint

filed

Sept.

6,

2004),

available

at

www.rescue.comlgooglesuit. pdf.
The issue has been litigated internationally as well, in some cases resulting in adverse rulings against
search providers. See Pamela Parker, German Firm Vows To Take Google to Court, at http://www.clickz.com/
news/print.php/3350371 (May 6, 2004); David A. Vise, Firms Sue Google for Ad Links to Competitors, WASH.
POST, May 26, 2004, at E I .
324 These efforts have principally been attached to laws addressing "spyware" or "adware." See, e.g.,
Utah Spyware Control Act, H.B. 323, 2004 General Session, Part 2 (Utah 2004) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 13-40-201).
325 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997), affd, 1 94 F.3d
980 (9th Cir. 1999).
326 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106- 1 1 3 § 3004, 1 1 3 Stat. 50 I (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.c. § 1 1 1 4(2)(D) (200» .
327

See Google Brief, supra note 277, at 18-19.
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registrations that contained "prohibited" character strings.

328

Domain name

registrars also "sell" third party trademarks by prompting potential registrants
to select alternative domain names as a way to generate more domain name
3
registrations. 29
Further, some domain name registrars serve keyword
triggered ads on the "coming soon" pages displayed for "parked" domain
33
names. 0
Based on this behavior, it is impossible to distinguish the DNS from other
search providers.

If domain name registrars "deserve" a safe harbor, then so

do all other search providers.

However, there are at least two compelling

policy reasons why Internet search providers warrant a safe harbor.

First,

search providers compete with each other to do a better job for searchers. The
search engine market is dynamic and competitive. There has been significant
33 1
and new competitors-

turnover among the most popular search engines,

328 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 1 999) (observing that
the character strings were "specific variations on the words Olympic, Red Cross, or NASA, and certain
'obscene' words").

329 For example, on March 7, 2004, I conducted a search at networksolutions.com for the domain name

"nike.com."

Network Solutions informed me that nike.com was unavailable, but "similar names" were

See Network
Domain Name Search Results, at http://www.networksolutions.com/en_US/name-itlsearchresults.jht

available, specifically i-nike.com, webnike.com, 4-nike.com, fomike.com, and freenike.com.
Solutions,

ml;jsessionid=A3ZIC2ZJTN I OWCWLEAMCFEQ?_requestid=94 1 422 (last visited Mar. 7, 2004).
Search engines also prompt keyword advertisers to consider additional terms to purchase, including

See Complaint 'H 29, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc. (No. 04-9484)
, available at http://cyber.\aw.harvard.edu/blogs/gerns/palfrey/PerfectiOCornplaintPD

terms trademarked by third parties.
Nov. 19, 2004)

(filed

FCropped.pdf (last visited Apr. 1 , 2(05).

330

See Zurakov v. Register.com, Inc., 304 A.D.2d 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
33 1 See Jakob Nielsen, Statistics for Traffic Referred by Search Engines and Navigation Directories to
Useit, at http://www.useit.com/aboutlsearchreferrals.htmI (Apr. I I , 2(03) (stating that ''the Web is nowhere
close to being locked down; there is still plenty of opportunity for new sites").
Rankings of search engines

are

controversial, especially given complex interrelationships where some

search engines integrate search results from other search providers. Nevertheless, an argument can be made
that in Summer 1998, the top five search engines were, in order, Yahoo!, Excite, Infoseek, Lycos, and
AltaVista.

See

Search Engine Guide,

Ratings of Most Visited Search Engines

(1998) (on file with author)

(showing this order using three different survey providers and methodologies). By early 2003 , an argument

can be made (based on Nielsen NetRatings data of total search hours) that the top five search engines were, in
order, Google, AOL, Yahoo!, MSN, and Ask Jeeves.

Activity, at

See

Brian Morrissey,

http://www.clickz.com/news/print.php/2108921 (Mar. 12, 2(03).

Search Guiding More Web

Assuming that these rankings

can be fairly compared against each other, then in less than five years, the # 1 search engine dropped to #3, and
the other top four search engines dropped off the list (including two, Excite and Infoseek, that effectively went

out of business), while a new # I player emerged that was not even on top 10 lists in 1998.

An early 2004 survey shows the same top five players as in 2003 , but changes the order to be Google,
Yahoo!, MSN, AOL, and Ask Jeeves.

See

Press Release, NetRatings, Inc., One in 'Three Americans Use a

Search Engine, According to NielsenlNetRatings (Feb. 23, 2004),

available at

netratings.com/pr/pc040223_us.pdf.
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both powerful and small--continue to enter the market. 332 Search engines all
share the same basic interface-a search box-making it easy for searchers to
switch between them, 333 and many searchers regularly use multiple search
4
engines? 3
As a result, search engines compete for searchers at the search provider
selection stage (Stage 2).

More than any other attribute, search engines

compete on the relevancy of their search results-searchers want relevant
results. 335 Thus, search engines that do a better job anticipating and solving
searcher needs should have competitive success in the marketplace. 33 6

332 See John Markoff, Google Envy Is Fomenting Search Wars, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 2004, at C I ; see also
Jim Hu & Mike Ricciuti, Search and Destroy: Microsoft, Google May Go Head-to-Head, at http ://ecoustics
cnet.com.com!Microsoft,+Google+may+go+head-to-headl2009-1 032_3-1 02064I .html (June 25, 2(03); Levy,

supra note 1 1 3; Olsen, supra note 1 1 5; Brad Stone, Little Engines that Can, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2004, at 59.
333 See TELANG, supra note 12; cf. Nielsen, supra note 14 ("As we've seen in recent studies, [searchers]
typically scan the home page looking for 'the little box where I can type.

) (emphasis in original).

"'

334 See Keynote Systems, Search Engine Industry Research Abstract, at 5, at http://www.keynote.coml

downioadslcemlKeynote_SearchEngine_abstract.pdf (June 2004) (up to 20% of searchers "regularly use
different search engines for different types of searches"); see also Sullivan, supra note 32.

335 See Lloyd-Martin, supra note 37 (quoting a Google official as saying that searchers first determine if

their search results are relevant before looking at any other aspect of a search results page); Press Release,
NetRatings, Inc., supra note 33 1 , (says Jason Levin, NetRatings analyst: ''The message is loud and c1ear
search engine users value relevant and credible information over all else and they are choosing their search
engines accordingly."). This phenomenon also applies to search engines attached to ecommerce websites. See
Ann Badnarz, Staples Switches Web Search Tools, NetworkWoridFusion, at http://www.nwfusion.coml
newsI2003/0428staples.html (Apr. 28, 2003) ("[P]eople were abandoning Staples' consumer and small
business Web site when their searches yielded poor results"); Robert D. Hof, Commentary: Desperately
Seeking Search Technology, at http://www.businessweek.com:/printlmagazinelcontentlOl_391b3750038.htm?
mz (Sept. 24, 2(01) ("80% of online users will abandon a site if the search function doesn't work well.");
Nielsen, supra note 14 (saying that users make quick assessments about the quality of search results and

abandon the site if the results "look like junk").

336 See Matt Hines, Future of Search Rides on Relevence, at http://news.com.coml2 102-1032_35555954.html?tag=st.util.print (Jan. 29, 2(05); Susan Kuchinskas, MSN Fights for Google Search Share, at
http://www.internetnews.comlbus-news/print.php/3435481 (Nov. 12, 2004) (quoting an Ask Jeeves
representative as saying that relevancy is one of the biggest competitive differentiators today); see also
Romanos, supra note 67, at 96; Shannon N. King, Note, Initial Interest Confusion: Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 3 1 3 (200).
Introna & Nissenbaum express concern that competition will force search engines to cater to majority
interests, in the process underserving minority interests. See Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 79; see also
Eszter Hargittai, Open Portals or Closed Gates? Channeling Content on the World Wide Web, 27 POETICS 233
(2000) (agreeing with Introna & Nissenbaum and proposing the creation of a publicly funded or charitable
portal site to be the online analogue of public broadcasting, along with aggressive marketing of the site).
However, the more likely scenario is that searchers will use multiple search providers-some catering to mass
market interests and others occupying niches-and that search providers will personalize relevancy algorithms
to better serve the diversity of searcher objectives.
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It bears reiteration that search providers are trying to solve a very difficult
7
inferring searcher intent from a keyword that lacks context and
8
may have been poorly chosen by the searcher. 33 To overcome these obstacles

problem: 33

and still deliver search results that searchers consider relevant, search providers
9
must anticipate searchers' systematic errors. 33
Necessarily, correcting these
errors requires search providers to make editorial decisions about what
searchers mean, not what they say.

Further, to divine searcher intent, search

providers must innovate-and some innovations may require search providers
40
to use trademarks. 3
Preventing search providers from using trademarks as
one of the tools to anticipate searcher needs would prevent search providers
from achieving optimal content relevancy.
Second, many trademarked words can have multiple trademark owners
(separated by industry, geography, or both).

Search providers cannot, with

1 00% accuracy, determine which meanings are meant by either searchers or
publishers. Creating liability for search providers based on using a trademark
to make keyword associations would, in effect, force the search provider to
engage in a costly and possibly irresolute inquiry into each use of that word in
their database. More likely, prudent search providers would remove keyword
associated content based on unsubstantiated claims of infringement, in effect
allowing trademark owners to purge search providers databases despite the
41
. I reI evance to some searchers. 3
potentla
337 Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 79 ("Relevancy ranking is an enormously difficult task. Some
researchers working on search technologies argue that relevancy ranking is currently the greater challenge
facing search engines."); Levy,

338 See Novak v.

supra note

1 13, at 56- 58 (quoting the CEO of search engine A9.com).

Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[T]he user's intent is

rarely crystalline. Thus, the search process is imperfect.").

339 See Hagen, supra note 53, at 8 ("15% of online search failures come from user errors like misspelled

words or typos, and another 40% come from customers and firms using different terms.").

340 See Michael Kanellos, Microsof Aims for Search on Its Own Terms, CNET News.com, at

http://news.com.com!2 102-1008_3-5 1 1091O.html?tag=scutil_print (Nov. 24, 2003) (describing how new
Microsoft products may analyze text that users

are

working on and may initiate queries using keywords (that

may be trademarks) from the text without the user specifically initiating the query).
At least one court has hinted that making keyword reinterpretations, even if it requires the use of a
trademarked term, should not necessarily dictate trademark infringement.

See

Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Ga.-Pac.

Corp., 2004 WL 2660566, at *6 (2d Cir. Nov. 23, 2004) (even if the search engine "confuses" a defendant's
product with the plaintiff s trademarked term, this "reflects little, if anything, about whether consumers

are

actually confused") (internal quotations omitted).

34 1 See Ina Steiner, eBay Bans Goog/e Keywords, at http://www.auctionbytes.com!cab/abnly03/m08/i07/

s02 (Aug. 7, 2003) (discussing how eBay demanded that Google curtail keyword-triggered ads for listing
software that can be used with eBay's website, a demand that Google complied with).

Google has since

refused to stop selling keywords on a trademark owner's request, although Overture continues to do so.
Stefanie Olsen,

Goog/e Plans Trademark Gambit,

CNET News.com,

at

See

http://news.com.com!2102-1 038_3-

5 190324.html?tag=st.util.print (Apr. 1 3 , 2004).
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In other words, if search providers are liable for using trademarked

keywords, trademark owners can obtain an unwarranted outcome: exclusive
34
ownership of the word, regardless of context. 2 Such exclusivity arrogates the
word from the social vernacular to a single trademark owner' s benefit, and in
the course of doing so, deprives society of any minority definitions for the
term.
loses.

That particular trademark owner may benefit, but the rest of society
343

In contrast, when search providers do their jobs successfully, they can

increase the probability that searchers will find what they were looking for.
This success does not merely create private benefit for the search providers; it
344
which promotes

creates social utility by lowering social search costs,

marketplace competition (both on price and product attributes) and increases
34
social knowledge. 5 Put differently, searchers want search engines to solve
their needs by delivering the highest relevance results to them, and the law
34
should remove any impediments to doing SO. 6

2. Implementing a Safe Harbor
Search providers could be immunized from liability using a rigorous
definition of trademark "use" under the Lanham Act.
reference is a "use."

Not every trademark

The Lanham Act says a trademark is in "use in

commerce" in the following two circumstances:
( l ) on goods when . . . it is placed in any manner on the goods or
their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or
labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the
goods or their sale, and . . . (2) on services when it is used or
.
347
. .
'
d ISp
· Iayed In the sai e or advertlSlng 0f servIces
. . . .

342 See Lemley, supra note 178.
343 Cf Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1 16 1 , 1 165 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (discussing how
depriving publishers of the right to use indexable words would make the publisher effectively invisible).

34 See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Informntion, 69 J. POL. EcON. 2 13 ( 1 96 1 ).
345 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 73 4 , 756 (E.D. Mich. 2(03) ("Harm to

WhenU would harm the public as well. WhenU benefits participating consumers by improving access to
relevant, useful and money-saving information about products and services that interest them. WhenU's
advertisements increase the choices available to consumers and thereby promote competition."); Elkin-Koren,

supra note 30, at 1 85 ("Decentralized competition among search engines is therefore essential for keeping a
competitive market in electronic commerce."); Klein & Glazer, supra note 206, at 1 063.
346 See Nadel, supra note 238.
347 15 U.S.C. § 1 127 (200).
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The words "placed" and "displayed" make this definition fairly explicit.
Consumers need to perceive the trademark before the mark is being used in
348
commerce.
If the alleged junior user does not use the trademark in a
perceivable manner, such as in marketing actually presented to potential
34
consumers, the use cannot confuse consumers about a product' s source. 9
This is particularly true when Internet searchers have no clear understanding
about search providers' technical operations.
Cases addressing whether a search provider uses a trademark are split:
Two cases involving the adware defendant WhenU.com held that automated
3 o
keyword associations do not "use" the trademark, 5 one WhenU.com case
35 1
directly and deliberately contradicted those two opinions,
the GEICO
opinion (in the context of keyword-triggered ads sold by search engines) cast
3
its vote with the latter WhenU.com opinion, 5 2 and the Playboy opinion punted
on this question by saying that it did not need to decide if liability was based
35 3
on direct or contributory infringement.
While these authorities indicate the divisive nature of the question, the
cases suggesting search providers "use" trademarks are both contrary to the
statute and detrimental to search efficiency.

Search providers do not "use" a

trademark regardless of the editorial role played by search providers.

This

argument is not based on treating the search providers as passive conduits for
the dissemination of publisher content. Instead, search providers should make
editorial decisions about how third party trademarks can be used in their
systems to help searchers achieve their search goals.

348

Widmaier makes this point in a very detailed and compelling argument. See Widmaier, supra note

3 1 8 ; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 166, at 799, 820 (noting that trademark use requires the defendant
to actually market goods and services under the trademark); Michael R. Sees, Comment, Use of Another 's

Trademark in a Web Page Meta Tag: Why Liability Should Not Ensue Under the Lanham Act for Trademark
Infringement, 5 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 99 (1 998).
349 See, e.g., DaimletChrysler AG v. Bloom, 3 1 5 F.3d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 2(02); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800
Reservations, Inc., 86 F.3d 6 1 9 (6th Cir. 1 996).

350 See V-Haul In!'I, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (E.D. Va. 2(03) (noting, among
other things, that WhenU.com "merely uses the marks for the 'pure machine-linking function'''); Wells Fargo,

293 F. Supp. 2d at 762 ("WhenV does not use any of the plaintiffs' trademarks to indicate anything about the
source of the products and services it advertises"); see also Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877-79 (6th Cir.

2(02) (regarding a website that auctions domain names, "[tJhe possibility that its customers might buy or sell
infringing domain names does not alter the fact that Aftemic does not use those names").

35 1 See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenV.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2(03).
352 See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704-05 (E.D. Va. 2004).
353 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
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To ensure some breathing room for search providers to make those editorial
judgments and to solve the hard relevancy problem, ultimately legislative
intervention-like the registrar safe harbor in the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act-may be appropriate. For now, however, the public
would greatly benefit from judicial recognition of the hazards of creating
search provider liabilitls and a strict statutory reading of "use in commerce"
under the Lanham Act. 54
CONCLUSION

The Internet is one of the great democratizing technologies, ranking
alongside Gutenberg' s printing press and the rise of public libraries. Among
other attributes, it democratizes communication by fully empowering users to
search for information using their own words, rather than being constrained by
words selected by some editorial intermediary. 355 For the first time, searchers
and publishers need not rely upon the words selected by intermediate editors.
Trademark law threatens to take away what technology enables. At a time
when keywords show unprecedented promise to empower searchers, the legal
system is interposing itself as the new intermediary to guarantee content
relevancy. Unfortunately, any effort to legally impose content relevancy is
destined to fail dramatically. Blunt legal instruments cannot make the nuanced
judgments required to deliver content that searchers find relevant.
The collateral costs of trademark law's "war on relevancy" in Internet
searching are substantial. Minority definitions of words may become invisible,
shrinking our lexicon. Criticism of trademarks may become risky and
imperiled. Trademark owners are legally mandated to gamer attention at the
expense of all others, increasing search costs for searchers with different
expectations or desires. Cumulatively, these effects may increase overall
search costs by hampering the ability of searchers to use keywords to find what
they want.

354 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 166, at 838 (arguing that existing trademark law is '1ust fine," it just
needs to be applied with restraint).
355 For example, the library card catalog was organized by keywords chosen by the librarians . A searcher
who wanted to search on some other keyword simply could not do so. The same phenomenon occurs with
every publication with an editorially-produced index, such as books, Yellow Pages and magazine indexes. See
Nielsen, supra note 14 ("A typical comment is: '1 don't want to have to navigate this site the way they want
me to. 1 just want to find the thing I'm looking for. ''').
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The solution is simple: Deregulate the keyword in Internet searching. This
solution, however, requires significant self-restraint to realize that judges and
legislators cannot infer searcher objectives from decontextualized Internet
keywords, no matter how obvious it seems. It also requires one to believe that
search providers will deliver relevant content or will be punished in the
marketplace for failing to do so. Keyword deregulation is essential, however,
for Internet search to achieve its democratizing potential.
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